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
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AN ABRIDGMENT OF Mr. *LOCKE*'s ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING.

THE SEVENTH EDITION.

GLASGOW,

PRINTED AND SOLD BY ROBERT AND ANDREW FOULIS

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TO THE MUCH ESTEEMED

Mr JOHN LOCKE.

Honoured Sir,

I Send you this imperfect draught of your excellent *Essay* concerning *Human Understanding*; which, I must confess, falls as much short of the Perfection, as it does of the length of the original. Nevertheless, as I lately intimated to you (and you were pleased to think, that what I propos'd in reference to this Design, would not be wholly lost Labour) I am not without Hopes, that it may in this contracted *Form*, prove in some Measure serviceable to that noble End, which you have so successfully aimed at in it, viz. *The Advancement of Real and useful Knowledge*. The Inducement which moved me to think of abridging it, was a Consideration purely extrinsical to the Work itself; and in effect no other than this; that it would be better suited to the Ease and Convenience of some sort of Readers, when reduced into this narrow Compass. In order to this, I thought the *First Book*, which is employed in refuting the common Opinion of *Innate Notions* and *Ideas*, might be best spared in this Abridg-

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ment; especially, since the Reader may be convinced by what he shall find here, that such a Supposition is at least needless, in regard he may attain to all the Knowledge he has, or finds himself capable of, without the help of any such *Innate Ideas*. Besides this, I have retrench'd most of the larger Explications; and some useful Hints, and instructive Theories, I have wholly omitted; not because they are less considerable in themselves, but because they seemed not so necessary to be insisted on in this *Abridgment*, considered as a previous Instrument, and preparatory Help, to guide and conduct the Mind in its *Search after Truth and Knowledge*. I did particularly pass by that accurate Discourse, concerning the Freedom and Determination of the *Will*, contained in *Cap.* 21. *L.* 2. because I found it too long to be inserted here at large, and too weighty and momentous to be but slightly and imperfectly represented. This, I hope, will prove no prejudice to the *Essay* it self, since none, I presume, will think it reasonable to form a Judgment of the whole Work from this Abridgment of it: and I perswade my self, that few *Readers* will be content with

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this *Epitome*, who can conveniently furniſh themſelves with the *Eſſay* at large. However, I am apt to think, that this alone will ſerve to make the Way to Knowledge ſomewhat more plain and eaſie; and afford ſuch Helps for the Improvement of Reaſon, as are perhaps in vain ſought after in thoſe Books, which profeſs to teach the *Art of Reaſoning*. But nevertheleſs, whether you ſhall think fit to let it come abroad under the Diſadvantages that attend it in this *Form*, I muſt leave you to judge. I ſhall only add, that I think my own Pains abundantly recompenc'd by the agreeable, as well as inſtructive Entertainment, which this nearer View, and cloſer Inſpection into your *Eſſay*, afforded me: and I am not a little pleaſed, that it has given me this Opportunity of expreſſing the juſt Value and Eſteem I have for it, as well as the Honour and Reſpect I have for its Author. I am,

Honoured SIR,

Oxon. Ap. 17, 1695.

Your very humble, and obliged Servant,

JOHN WYNNE.

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THE INTRODUCTION.

1. SINCE it is the *Understanding* that sets man above the rest of sensible beings, and gives him all the advantage and dominion which he has over them; it is certainly a subject, even for its nobleness, worth the enquiring into.

2. My purpose therefore is to enquire into the *Original*, *Certainty*, and *Extent* of human knowledge; together with the grounds and degrees of *Belief*, *Opinion*, and *Assent*, which I shall do in the following method.

3. *First*, I shall enquire into the *Original* of those *Ideas* or notions, which a man observes, and is conscious to himself he has in his mind, and the *Ways* whereby the understanding comes to be furnished with them.

Secondly, what *Knowledge* the understanding hath by those ideas; and the certainty, evidence, and extent of it.

Thirdly, I shall make some enquiry into the nature and grounds of *Faith* and *Opinion*.

4. If by this enquiry into the nature of the understanding, I can discover the powers thereof, *how far* they reach, and where they fail us, it may be of use to prevail with the busie mind of man

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to be more cautious in meddling with things exceeding its comprehenſion, to ſtop when it is at the utmoſt extent of its tether, and to ſit down in a quiet ignorance of thoſe things, which upon examination are found to be beyond the reach of our capacities. We ſhould not then perhaps be ſo forward out of an affectation of *Univerſal Knowledge*, to perplex our ſelves with diſputes about things to which our underſtandings are not ſuited; and of which we cannot frame in our minds any clear or diſtinct perceptions, or whereof (as it has perhaps too often happened) we have not any notions at all: but ſhould learn to content our ſelves with what is attainable by us in this ſtate.

5. For though the *Comprehenſion* of our underſtanding comes exceeding ſhort of the vaſt extent of things; yet we ſhall have cauſe enough to magnifie the bountiful *Author* of our being, for that portion and degree of knowledge he has beſtowed on us ſo far above all the reſt of the Inhabitants of this our manſion. Men have reaſon to be well ſatisfied with what God hath thought fit for them, ſince he has given them (as St. Peter ſays, Πάντα πρὸς ζωὴν καὶ εὐσέβειαν) whatſoever is neceſſary for the conveniencies of *Life*, and information of *Virtue*; and has put within the reach of their diſcovery, the comfortable proviſion for this life, and the way that leads to a better. How ſhort ſoever their knowledge may come of an univerſal,

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or perfect comprehension of whatsoever is, it yet secures their great concernments, that they have light enough to lead them to the knowledge of their *Maker*, and the sight of their own *duties*. Men may find matter sufficient to busie their heads, and employ their hands with variety, delight, and satisfaction; if they will not boldly quarrel with their own constitution, and throw away the blessings their hands are filled with, because they are not big enough to grasp every thing. We shall not have much reason to complain of the narrowness of our minds, if we will but employ them about what may be of use to us; for of that they are very capable: and it will be an unpardonable, as well as childish peevishness, if we undervalue the advantages of our knowledge, and neglect to improve it to the ends for which it was given us, because there are some things that are set out of the reach of it. It will be no excuse to an idle and untoward servant, who would not attend his business by candle-light, to plead that he had not broad sun-shine. The candle that is set up in us, shines bright enough for all our purposes. The discoveries we can make with this, ought to satisfie us. And we shall then use our understandings right, when we entertain all objects in that way and proportion, that they are suited to our faculties; and upon those grounds they are capable of being proposed to us; and not peremptorily or intemperately require

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demonstration, and demand *certainty*, where *probability* only is to be had, and which is sufficient to govern all our concernments. If we will disbelieve every thing, because we cannot certainly know all things; we shall do much what as wisely as he who would not use his legs, but sit still and perish because he had no wings to fly.

6. When we know our own *strength*, we shall the better know what to undertake with hopes of success. And when we have well survey'd the *powers* of our own minds, we shall not be enclin'd either to sit still, and not set our thoughts on work at all, in despair of knowing any thing; nor on the other side, question every thing, and disclaim all knowledge, because some things are not to be understood. Our *Business* here, is not to know all things, but those things which concern our conduct: if we can find out those measures, whereby a *rational creature*, put into that state which man is in, in this world, may and ought to govern his opinions and actions depending thereon, we need not be troubled that some other things scape our knowledge.

7. This was that which gave the first *rise* to this *essay* concerning the understanding. For I thought that the first step towards satisfying several enquiries the mind of man was very apt to run into, was to take a survey of our *Understandings*, examine our own *powers*, and see to what things

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they were adapted. Till that was done, I suspected we began at the wrong end, and in vain sought for satisfaction in a quiet and secure possession of truths that most concern'd us, whilst we let loose our thoughts in the vast *ocean* of being, as if all that boundless extent were the natural and undoubted possessions of our understandings; wherein there was nothing exempt from its decisions, or that escaped its comprehension. Thus men extending their enquiries beyond their capacities, and letting their thoughts wander into those depths where they can find no sure footing, it is no wonder that they raise *questions* and multiply *disputes*, which never coming to any clear resolution, are proper only to continue and increase their doubts, and to confirm them at last in perfect *scepticism*. Whereas were the capacities of our understandings well considered, the extent of our knowledge once discovered, and the *horizon* found, which sets bounds between the enlightned and dark parts of things, between what is, and what is not comprehensible by us, men would perhaps with less scruple acquiesce in the avow'd ignorance of the *one*, and employ their thoughts and discourse, with more advantage and satisfaction in the *other*.

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BOOK II.

CHAP. I.

Of Ideas in General, and their Original.

BY the term *idea*, I mean whatever is the object of the understanding, when a man *thinks*; or whatever it is which the mind can be employ'd about in thinking.

I presume it will be easily granted me, that there are such *ideas* in mens minds: every one is conscious of them in himself; and mens words and actions will satisfie him that they are in others. our *first inquiry* then shall be, how they come into the mind.

It is an establish'd opinion amongst some men, that there are in the understanding certain *innate principles*, some primary notions, (κοιναι εννοιαι) *characters*, as it were stampt upon the mind of men, which the soul receives in its very first being, and brings into the world with it.

This opinion is accurately discuss'd, and refuted in the *first* book of this *essay*, to which I shall refer the reader, that desires satisfaction in this particular.

It shall be sufficient here to shew, how men barely by the use of their *natural faculties*, may attain to all the knowledge they have, without the help

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of any *innate* impreſſions; and may arrive at certainty without any ſuch original notions or principles. For I imagine, any one will eaſily grant, that it would be impertinent to ſuppoſe the *ideas* of *colours* innate in a creature to whom God hath given *ſight*, and a power to receive them by the eyes from external objects. I ſhall ſhew by what ways and degrees all other *ideas* come into the mind; for which I ſhall appeal to every one's own experience and obſervation.

Let us then ſuppoſe the mind to be, as we ſay *white paper*, void of all characters, without any *ideas*: how comes it to be furniſhed? whence has it all the materials of reaſon and knowledge? to this I anſwer, in one word, from *experience* and *obſervation*. This, when employ'd about external ſenſible objects, we may call *ſenſation*: by this we have the *ideas* of *bitter*, *ſweet*, *yellow*, *hard*, &c. which are commonly call'd *ſenſible qualities*, becauſe convey'd into the mind by the *ſenſes*. The ſame *experience*, when employ'd about the internal operations of the mind, perceiv'd, and reflected on by us, we may call *reflection*. Hence we have the *ideas of perception*, *thinking*, *doubting*, *willing*, *reaſoning*, &c.

Theſe two, *viz. external material things*, as the objects of ſenſation; and the *operations of our own minds*, as the objects of reflection, are to me the only *originals* from whence all our *ideas* take their

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beginnings. The underſtanding ſeems not to have the leaſt glimmering of *ideas*, which it doth not receive from one of theſe two *ſources*. Theſe, when we have taken a full ſurvey of them, and their ſeveral *modes* and compoſitions, we ſhall find to contain our whole ſtock of *ideas*; and that we have nothing in our minds which did not come in one of theſe two ways.

'Tis evident that children come by degrees to be furniſh'd with *ideas* from the objects they are converſant with. They are ſo ſurrounded with bodies that perpetually and diverſly affect them, that ſome *ideas* will (whether they will or no) be imprinted on their minds. *Light* and *colours*, *ſounds*, and *tangible* qualities, do continually ſollicite their proper *ſenſes*, and force an entrance into the mind. 'Tis late commonly before *children* come to have *ideas* of the operation of their minds; and ſome men have not any very clear or perfect *ideas* of the greateſt part of them all their lives. Becauſe, tho' they paſs there continually; yet, like floating viſions, they make not deep impreſſions enough to leave in the mind clear and laſting *ideas*, till the underſtanding turns inward upon its ſelf, and *reflects* on its own operations, and makes them the objects of its own contemplation.

When a man *firſt perceives*, then he may be ſaid *to have ideas*; having *ideas*, and perception, ſignifying the ſame thing. It is an opinion main-

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tain'd by ſome, that the *ſoul always thinks*, and that it always has the actual perception of *ideas* as long as it exiſts: and that *actual thinking* is as inſeparable from the ſoul, as *actual extenſion* is from the body. But I cannot conceive it any more neceſſary for the ſoul always to *think*, than for the body always to *move*: the perception of *ideas* being (as I conceive) to the ſoul, what motion is to the body, not its *eſſence*, but one of its *operations*: and therefore, though thinking be never ſo much the proper action of the ſoul, yet it is not neceſſary to ſuppoſe, that it ſhould always think, always be in action. That perhaps is the priviledge of the infinite *author* and preſerver of all things, *who never ſlumbers nor ſleeps*; but is not competent to any *finite* being. We know certainly by experience, that we ſometimes think; and thence draw this infallible conſequence, that there is ſomething in us that has a power to think, but whether that ſubſtance perpetually thinks or no, we can be no farther aſſured than experience informs us.

I would be glad to learn from thoſe men, who ſo confidently pronounce, that the human ſoul always thinks, how they come to know it: nay, how they come to know that they themſelves think, when they themſelves do not perceive it. The moſt that can be ſaid of it, is, that 'tis poſſible the ſoul may always think; but not always retain it in *memory*: and, I ſay, it is as poſſible the ſoul

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may not always think; and much more probable that it ſhould ſometimes not think, than that it ſhould often think, and that a long while together, and not be conſcious to it ſelf the next moment after that it had thought.

I ſee no reaſon therefore to believe, that the ſoul thinks before the ſenſes have furniſh'd it with *ideas* to think on; and as thoſe are increas'd and retain'd, ſo it comes by exerciſe to improve its faculty of thinking, in the ſeveral parts of it; as well as afterwards by *compounding* thoſe *ideas*, and *reflecting* on its own operations, it increaſes its *ſtock*, as well as facility in remembring, imagining, reaſoning, and other *modes* of thinking.

CHAP. II.

Of Simple Ideas.

OF ideas, ſome are *ſimple*, others *complex*. A *ſimple idea*, is one uniform appearance or conception in the mind, which is not diſtinguiſhable into different *ideas*. ſuch are the *ideas of ſenſible qualities*, which though they are in the things themſelves ſo united and blended, that there is no ſeparation, no diſtance between them; yet the *ideas* they produce in the mind, enter by the ſenſes ſimple and unmix'd. Thus, tho' the hand feels *ſoftneſs* and *warmth* in the ſame piece of *wax*;

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yet the *ſimple ideas* thus united in the ſame ſubject, are as perfectly *diſtinct* as thoſe that come in by different ſenſes.

Theſe *ſimple ideas* are ſuggeſted no other way than from the two ways above-mentioned, *viz.* *ſenſation* and *reflexion*.

The mind being once ſtored with the *ſimple ideas*, has the power to repeat, compare, and unite them to an infinite variety: and ſo can make at pleaſure new *complex ideas*. But the moſt enlarged underſtanding cannot frame one new *ſimple idea*; nor by any force deſtroy them that are there.

CHAP. III.

Of Ideas of one Senſe.

IDeas with reference to the different ways wherein they approach the mind, are of *four ſorts*.

Firſt, There are ſome which come into our minds by *one ſenſe* only.

Secondly, There are others convey'd into the mind by *more ſenſes than one*.

Thirdly, Others that are had from *reflexion* only.

Fourthly, There are ſome ſuggeſted to the mind by all the ways of *ſenſation* and *reflexion*.

Firſt, Some enter into the mind only by one ſenſe peculiarly adapted to receive them. Thus *colours*, *ſounds*, *ſmells*, &c. come in only by the

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eyes, ears, and *nose*. And if these organs are any of them so disorder'd as not to perform their functions, they have no postern to be admitted by; no other way to bring themselves in view, and be perceiv'd by the understanding. It will be needless to enumerate all the particular *simple ideas* belonging to each *sense*; nor indeed is it possible; there being a great many more than we have *names* for.

CHAP. IV.

Of Solidity.

I Shall here mention one which we receive by our *touch*, because it is one of the chief ingredients in many of our complex ideas; and that is the idea of *solidity*: it arises from the resistance, one body makes to the entrance of another body into the place it possesses, till *it* has left it. There is no idea which we more constantly receive from *sensation* than this. In whatever posture we are, we feel somewhat that supports us, and hinders us from sinking downwards: and the bodies we daily handle, make us perceive, that while they remain between them, they do by an unsurmountable force hinder the approach of the parts of our hands that press them. This idea is commonly called *impenetrability*. I conceive *solidity* is more proper

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to express it, because this carries something more of *positive* in it than *impenetrability*, which is *negative*, and is perhaps more a consequence of solidity, than solidity itself. This seems to be the most *essential* property of body, and that whereby we conceive it to fill space: The idea of which is, that where we imagine any space taken up by a solid substance, we conceive it so to possess it, that it excludes all other solid substances. This resistance is so great, that no force can surmount it. all the bodies in the world pressing a *drop of water* on all sides, will never be able to overcome the resistance it makes to their approaching one another, till it be removed out of their way.

The idea of solidity is distinguished from that of *pure space*, in as much as this *latter* is neither capable of resistance, nor motion: 'tis distinguished from *hardness*; in as much as hardness is a firm cohaesion of the solid parts of matter making up masses of a sensible bulk, so that the whole doth not easily change its figure. Indeed, *hard* and *soft*, as commonly apprehended by us, are but *relative* to the constitutions of our bodies: that being called *hard* which will put us to pain sooner than change its figure, by the pressure of any part of our bodies; and that *soft*, which changes the situation of its parts upon an easie and unpainful touch.

This difficulty of changing situation amongst

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the parts gives no more *ſolidity* to the hardeſt body, than to the ſofteſt; nor is an *adamant* one jot more ſolid than *water*: he that ſhall fill a yielding ſoft body well with *air* or *water*, will quickly find its reſiſtance. By this we may diſtinguiſh the idea of the extenſion of *body*, from the idea of the extenſion of *ſpace*: that of *body*, is the cohaeſion or continuity of ſolid, ſeparable, and movable parts; that of *ſpace*, the continuity of unſolid, inſeparable, and immovable parts. Upon the ſolidity of bodies depends their mutual *impulſe*, *reſiſtance*, and *protruſion*. Of *pure ſpace* and *ſolidity* there are ſeveral (among which I confeſs my ſelf one) who perſwade themſelves they have clear and diſtinct ideas: and that they can think on *ſpace* without any thing in it that reſiſts, or is protruded by body, as well as on ſomething *that fills ſpace*, that can be protruded by the impulſe of other bodies, or reſiſt their motion; the idea of the diſtance between the oppoſite parts of a concave ſurface, being equally clear without, as with the idea of any ſolid parts between. If any one ask what this *ſolidity* is, I ſend him to his ſenſes to inform him: let him put a *flint* or *foot-ball* between his hands, and then endeavour to join them, and he will know.

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CHAP V.

Of simple Ideas of divers Senses.

SOme ideas we get into the mind by *more than one sense*, as *space*, *extension*, *figure*, *rest* and *motion*. These are perceivable by the eyes and touch.

CHAP. VI.

Of simple Ideas of Reflection.

SOme are had from *reflection*, only: such are the ideas we have of the *Operations* of our minds: of which the two principal are *perception* or *thinking*; and *volition* or *willing*. The powers of producing these operations are call'd *faculties*, which are the *understanding* and *will*, the several *modes* of thinking, &c. belong to this head.

CHAP. VII.

Of simple Ideas of Sensation and Reflection.

THere are some simple ideas convey'd into the mind by all the ways of *sensation* and *reflection*; such are *pleasure*, *pain*, *power*, *existence*,

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unity, succession. Pleasure or delight, pain or uneasiness accompany almost every impression on our senses, and every action or thought of the *mind.* By *pleasure* or *pain* we mean whatever delights or molests us, whether it arises from the thoughts of our minds; or any thing operating on our bodies. Satisfaction, delight, pleasure, happiness and uneasiness, trouble, torment, misery, &c. are but different degrees, the one of pleasure, the other of pain.

The author of our beings having given us a power over several parts of our bodies to move or keep them at rest as we think fit; and also by their motion to move our selves and other contiguous bodies; having also given a power to our minds in several instances, to chuse amongst its ideas which it will think on: to excite us to these actions of *thinking* and *motion* he has join'd to several thoughts and sensations a perception of *delight:* without this we should have no reason to prefer one thought or action to another, motion to rest. In which state, man however furnish'd with the faculties of understanding and will, would be a very idle unactive creature, and pass his time only in a lazy lethargick dream.

Pain has the same efficacy to set us on work that pleasure has; since we are as ready to avoid that, as to pursue this. This is worth our consideration, that *pain is often produc'd by the same ob-*

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jects and ideas that produce pleasure in us. This their near conjunction gives us new occasion of admiring the wisdom and goodness of our *Maker*, who designing the preservation of our being, has annexed pain to the application of many things to our bodies, to warn us of the harm they will do us, and as advices to withdraw us from them. But he not designing our preservation barely, but the preservation of every part and organ in its perfection, hath in many cases annex'd pain to those very ideas which delight us. Thus *heat* that is very agreeable to us in one degree, by a little greater increase of it, proves no ordinary torment: which is wisely order'd by *nature*, that when any object does by the vehemence of its operation disorder the instruments of sensation, whose structures cannot but be very delicate, we might by the pain be warn'd to withdraw before the organ be quite put out of order. That this is the *end of pain*, appears from this consideration; that tho' great light is insufferable to the eyes; yet the highest degree of *darkness* does not at all disease them: because *that* causes no disorderly motion in that curious organ the eye. But excess of *cold* as well as *heat* pains us; because it is equally destructive to the temper which is necessary to the preservation of life.

Another reason why God hath annex'd several degrees of pleasure and pain to all the things that

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environ and affect us, and blended them together in all things that our thoughts and senses have to do with, is, that we finding imperfection and dissatisfaction, and want of compleat happiness in all the enjoyments of the creatures, might be led to seek it in the enjoyment of him *with whom is fulness of joy, and at whose right hand are pleasures for evermore*. Tho' what is here said concerning *pleasure* and *pain* may not perhaps make those ideas clearer to us, than our own experience does, yet it may serve to give us due sentiments of the wisdom and goodness of the *sovereign* disposer of all things, which is not unsuitable to the main end of these enquiries; the knowledge and veneration of him being the *chief end* of all our thoughts, and the proper business of all understandings.

Existence and *unity* are two other ideas suggested by every object without, and every idea within: when ideas are in our minds, we consider them as being actually there, as well as we consider things to be actually without us; which is, that they *exist*, or have existence: and whatever we consider as *one thing*, whether a *real being* or *idea*, suggests the idea of *unity*.

Power is another idea deriv'd from these sources: for finding in our selves that we can *think*, and *move* several parts of our bodies at pleasure; and observing the *effects* that natural bodies pro-

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duce in one another; by both these ways we get the idea of *power*.

Succession is another idea suggested by our senses, and by reflection on what passes in our minds. For if we look into our selves, we shall find our *ideas* always whilst we are awake, or have any thought, passing in train, one going and another coming without intermission.

CHAP. VIII.

Some farther considerations concerning simple Ideas.

WHatsoever is able by affecting our senses, to cause any perception in the mind, doth thereby produce in the understanding a *simple idea*; which whatsoever be the cause of it, is look'd upon as a *real positive idea* in the understanding. Thus the ideas of *heat* and *cold*, *light* and *darkness*, *motion* and *rest*, &c. are equally positive in the mind, tho' some of their causes may be meer *privations*. An enquiry into their causes concerns not the ideas as in the understanding; but the nature of the things existing without us. Thus a *painter* has distinct ideas of white and black, as well as the philosopher, who tells us what kind of particles, and how rang'd in the surface, occasion'd those colours.

That a *privative* cause may produce a *positive*

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idea, appears from ſhadows; which (tho' nothing but the abſence of light) are diſcernible; and cauſe clear and poſitive ideas. The natural reaſon of which may be this, *viz.* that ſince ſenſation is produc'd only by different degrees and modes of motion in our animal ſpirits, variouſly agitated by external objects; the abatement of any former motion muſt as neceſſarily produce a new ſenſation as the increaſe and variation of it; and thereby introduce a new idea. We have indeed ſome *negative* names which ſtand not directly for poſitive ideas, but for their abſence; ſuch as *inſipid*, *ſilence*, which denote poſitive ideas, *viz. taſte* and *ſound*, with a ſignification of their abſence.

It will be uſeful to diſtinguiſh *ideas* as they are *perceptions* in our minds, from what *they are in the bodies* that cauſe ſuch perceptions in us: for we are not to think the former exact images and reſemblances of ſomething inherent in the ſubject, moſt of thoſe of *ſenſation* being in the mind, no more the likeneſs of ſomething exiſting without us, than the names that ſtand for them are the likeneſs of our ideas, which yet upon hearing, they are apt to excite in us.

Whatſoever the *mind perceives in its ſelf*, or is the immediate object of perception, thought or underſtanding, that I call an idea: and the power to produce any idea in our mind, I call the *quality of the ſubject* wherein that power is: thus a *ſnow-ball*

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having the power to produce in us the ideas of *white*, *cold*, and *round*, thoſe *powers* as they are in the ſnow-ball, I call *qualities*; and as they are *ſenſations* or *perceptions* in our underſtandings I call them *ideas*: which ideas if I ſpeak of ſometimes, as in the things themſelves, I would be underſtood to mean thoſe *qualities* in the objects which produce them in us. Theſe *qualities* are of *two ſorts*, firſt, *original* or primary, ſuch are *ſolidity*, *extenſion*, *motion* or *reſt*, *number* and *figure*. Theſe are inſeparable from body, and ſuch as it conſtantly keeps in all its changes and alterations: thus take a grain of *wheat*, divide it into two parts, each part has ſtill *ſolidity*, *extenſion*, *figure*, *mobility*: divide it again, and it ſtill retains the ſame qualities, and will do ſtill, tho' you divide it on till the parts become inſenſible.

Secondly, *Secondary qualities*, ſuch as *colours*, *ſmells*, *taſtes*, *ſounds*, &c. which whatever reality we by miſtake may attribute to them, are in truth nothing in the objects themſelves, but *powers* to produce various ſenſations in us; and depend on the qualities before-mentioned.

The *ideas* of *primary* qualities of bodies are reſemblances of them: and their patterns really exiſt in bodies themſelves: but the ideas produced in us by *ſecondary* qualities, have no reſemblance of them at all: and what is *ſweet*, *blue* or *warm* in the idea, is but the certain bulk, figure, and moti-

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on of the insensible parts in the bodies themselves, which we call so.

Thus we see that fire at one distance produces in us the sensation of *warmth*, which at a nearer approach causes the sensation of *pain*. Now what reason have we to say that the idea of *warmth* is actually in the fire, but that of pain not in the fire, which the same fire produces in us the same way? the bulk, number, figure and motion of the parts of fire, are really in it, whether we perceive them or no; and therefore may be call'd *real* qualities, because they really exist in that body. But *light* and *heat* are no more really in it, than sickness or pain: take away the sensation of them; let not the eyes see light or colours, nor the ear hear sounds; let the palate not taste, or the nose smell, and all *colours*, *tastes*, *odours* and *sounds*, as they are such particular ideas vanish and cease, and are reduc'd to their causes (that is) bulk, motion, figure, &c. of parts.

These *secondary* qualities are of two sorts, first *immediately perceivable*, which by immediately operating on our bodies, produce several different ideas in us. Secondly, *mediately perceivable*, which by operating on other bodies, change their primary qualities, so as to render them capable of producing ideas in us different from what they did before. These last are powers in bodies which proceed from the particular constitution of those primary

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and original qualities, to make such a change in the *bulk, figure, texture,* &c. of another body, as to make it operate on our senses different from what it did before; as in fire to make lead fluid: these two last being nothing but powers relating to other bodies, and resulting from the different modifications of the original qualities are yet otherwise thought of; the former being esteemed *real qualities*; but the latter barely *powers*: the reason of this mistake seems to be this; that our ideas of sensible qualities containing nothing in them of bulk, figure, *&c.* we cannot think them the effect of these primary qualities which appear not to our senses to operate in their productions, and with which they have not any apparent congruity, or conceivable connexion: nor can reason shew how bodies by their bulk, figure, &c. should produce in the mind the ideas of *warm, yellow,* &c. but in the other case, when bodies operate upon one another, we plainly see that the quality produced hath commonly no resemblance with any thing in the thing producing it, and therefore we look upon it as the effect of power: but our senses not being able to discover any unlikeness between the idea produced in us, and the quality of the object producing it, we imagine that our ideas are resemblances of something in the objects, and not the effects of certain powers plac'd in the modification of the pri-

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mary qualities, with which primary qualities the ideas produced in us have no resemblance.

This little excursion into natural philosophy was necessary in our present enquiry to distinguish the *primary* and real qualities of bodies which are always in them, from those *secondary* and imputed qualities, which are but the powers of several combinations of those primary ones, when they operate without being distinctly discerned; whereby we learn to know what ideas are, and what are not resemblances of something really existing in the bodies we denominate from them.

CHAP. IX.

Of Perception.

Perception is the first idea we receive from reflection: it is by some called *thinking* in general: tho' *thinking* in the propriety of the *English* tongue, signifies that sort of operation of the mind about its ideas, wherein the mind is active; where it considers any thing with some degree of voluntary attention: for in bare *perception* the mind is for the most part only *passive*; and what it perceives it cannot avoid perceiving. What this is, we cannot otherwise know, than by reflecting on what passes in our minds when we *see, feel, hear*, &c.

Impressions made on the outward parts if they

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are not taken notice of within, cauſe no *perception*: as we ſee in thoſe whoſe minds are intently buſied in the contemplation of certain objects. A ſufficient impulſe there may be upon the organs of ſenſation: but if it reach not the obſervation of the mind, there follows no perception: ſo that where-ever there is ſenſe or perception, there ſome idea is actually produced and preſent in the underſtanding.

We may obſerve that the ideas we receive from ſenſation, are often in grown people alter'd by the judgment without our taking notice of it. Thus a globe of any uniform colour (as of gold or jet) being ſet before our eyes, the idea thereby imprinted is of a flat circle variouſly ſhadowed. But being accuſtomed to perceive what kind of appearances convex bodies are wont to make in us; the judgment alters the appearances into their cauſes; and from that variety of ſhadow or colour, frames to itſelf the perception of a convex figure of one uniform colour. This in many caſes by a ſettl'd habit is perform'd ſo readily, that we take that for the perception of our ſenſation, which is but an idea form'd by the judgment: ſo that one ſerves only to excite the other, and is ſcarce taken notice of itſelf. As a man who reads or hears with attention, takes little notice of the characters or ſounds, but of the ideas that are excited in him by them. Thus habits

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come at laſt to produce actions in us, which often eſcape our obſervation.

The faculty of *perception* ſeems to be that which puts the diſtinction between the animal kingdom and the inferior parts of nature: ſince vegetables many of them have ſome degrees of motion, and upon the different application of other bodies to them, do very briſkly alter their figures and motions, and thence have obtain'd the name of *ſenſitive plants*: which yet is, I ſuppoſe, but bare *mechaniſm*, and no otherways produced, than the ſhortning of a rope by the affuſion of water. But perception, I believe, is in ſome degree in all ſorts of animals: tho' I think we may from the make of an *Oyſter* or *Cockle*, reaſonably conclude that it has not ſo many nor ſo quick ſenſes as a man, or ſeveral other animals.

Perception is alſo the firſt ſtep and degree towards knowledge, and the inlet of all the materials of it: ſo that the fewer ſenſes any man has, and the duller the impreſſions that are made by them are, the more remote he is from that knowledge which is to be found in other men.

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CHAP. X.

Of Retention.

THE next faculty of the mind whereby it makes a farther progreſs towards knowledge, I call *Retention*: which is the keeping of thoſe ideas it has receiv'd: which is done two ways.

Firſt, By keeping the idea which is brought into the mind for ſome time actually in view, which is called *Contemplation*.

Secondly, By reviving thoſe ideas in our minds which have diſappear'd, and have been as it were, laid out of ſight: and this is *memory*, which is as it were the ſtore-houſe of our ideas; for the narrow mind of man not being capable of having many ideas under view at once, it was neceſſary to have a repoſitory to lay up thoſe ideas which at another time it may have uſe of. But our *ideas* being nothing but actual perceptions in the mind which ceaſe to be any thing, when there is no perception of them, this laying up of our *ideas* in the repoſitory of the memory ſignifies no more but this, that the mind has a power in many caſes to revive perceptions it has once had, with this additional perception annex'd to them, that it has had them before. And it is by the aſſiſtance of this faculty, that we are ſaid to have all thoſe ideas in our under-

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ſtandings, which we can bring in ſight, and make the objects of our thoughts, without the help of thoſe ſenſible qualities which firſt imprinted them there.

Attention and *repetition* help much to the fixing *ideas* in our memories: but thoſe which make the deepeſt and moſt laſting impreſſions are thoſe which are accompanied with *pleaſure* or *pain*. *Ideas* but once taken in and never again repeated are ſoon loſt; as thoſe of colours in ſuch as loſt their ſight when very young.

The memory in ſome men is tenacious, even to a miracle: but yet there ſeems to be a conſtant decay of all our *ideas*, even of thoſe which are ſtruck deepeſt; and in minds the moſt retentive: ſo that if they be not ſometimes renewed, the print wears out, and at laſt there remains nothing to be ſeen. Thoſe *ideas* that are often refreſh'd by a frequent return of the objects or actions that produce them, fix themſelves beſt in the memory, and remain longeſt there: ſuch are the *original qualities of bodies*, viz. Solidity, Extenſion, Figure, Motion, *&c.* and *thoſe that almoſt conſtantly affect us*, as heat and cold: and thoſe that are the *affections of all kinds of beings*, as Exiſtence, Duration, Number; theſe and the like are ſeldom quite loſt while the mind retains any *ideas* at all.

In memory the mind is oftentimes more than barely *paſſive*; for it often ſets itſelf on work to

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ſearch ſome hidden *ideas*; ſometimes they ſtart of their own accord: and ſometimes turbulent and tempeſtuous paſſions tumble them out of their cells.

The defects of the memory are *two*.

Firſt, that it loſes the *idea* quite, and ſo far it produces perfect *ignorance*.

Secondly. That it moves ſlowly, and retrieves not the *ideas* laid up in ſtore quick enough to ſerve the mind upon occaſions. This, if it be to a great degree, is *ſtupidity*. In the having *ideas* ready at hand on all occaſions, conſiſts what we call *Invention, Fancy*, and *quickneſs of parts*.

This faculty other *animals* ſeem to have to a great degree, as well as *Man*, as appears by birds learning of tunes, and their endeavour to hit the notes right. For it ſeems impoſſible that they ſhould endeavour to conform their voices (as 'tis plain they do) to notes, whereof they have no *ideas*.

CHAP. XI.

Of Diſcerning, and other operations of the mind.

ANother faculty of the mind is, that of *diſcerning between its ideas*: on this depends the evidence, and certainty of ſeveral even general propoſitions, which paſs for *innate truths*: whereas indeed they depend on this clear diſcerning facul-

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ty of the mind, whereby it perceives two *ideas* to be the same or different. In being able nicely to distinguish one thing from another, where there is the least difference, consists in a great measure that *exactness of judgment* and *clearness of reason*, which is to be observ'd in one man above another; which is quite opposite to *wit*, which consists most in the assemblage of *ideas*, and putting those together with quickness and variety, which have the least resemblance, to form agreeable visions: whereas judgment separates carefully those *ideas*, wherein can be found the least difference to prevent error and delusion.

To the well distinguishing our *ideas*, it chiefly contributes that they be clear and determinate; and when they are so, it will not breed any confusion or mistake about them, tho' the senses should convey them from the same object differently on different occasions.

The *comparing* of our *ideas* one with another in respect of *Extent*, *Degree*, *Time*, *Place*, or any other circumstances, is another operation of the mind about its *ideas*, which is the ground of *Relations*. Brutes seem not to have this faculty in any great degree. They have probably several *ideas* distinct enough; but cannot compare them farther than some sensible circumstances annex'd to the objects themselves. The power of comparing general *ideas*, which we may observe in men, we may probably conjecture *Beasts* have not at all.

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Compoſition is another operation of the mind, whereby it combines ſeveral of its ſimple *ideas* into *complex* ones: under which operation we may reckon that of *Enlarging*, wherein we put ſeveral *ideas* together of the ſame kind, as ſeveral unites to make a *dozen*. In this alſo I ſuppoſe brutes come far ſhort of Man, for tho' they take in and retain together ſeveral combinations of ſimple *ideas*, as poſſibly a dog does the *ſhape*, *ſmell* and *voice* of his Maſter; yet theſe are rather ſo many diſtinct marks, whereby he knows him than one *complex idea* made out of thoſe ſeveral ſimple ones.

Abſtraction is another operation of the mind, whereby the mind forms general *ideas* from ſuch as it receiv'd from particular objects, which it does by conſidering them as they are in the mind ſuch appearances, ſeparate from the circumſtances of real exiſtence, as *Time*, *Place*, &c. Theſe become general *repreſentatives* of all of the ſame kind, and their names applicable to whatever exiſts conformable to ſuch abſtract *ideas*. Thus the colour which I receive from *Chalk*, *Snow* and *Milk*, is made a repreſentative of all of that kind; and has a name given it (*Whiteneſs*) which ſignifies the ſame quality, wherever to be found or imagin'd. And thus *Univerſals*, both *ideas* and *terms*, are made.

This puts the great difference between Man and Brutes: they ſeem to reaſon about particular ob-

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jects, and *ideas*, but there appear no footsteps of *Abstraction* in them, or of making *general ideas*.

CHAP. XII.

Of Complex Ideas.

IN the reception of simple ideas the mind is only *passive*, having no power to frame any one to its self, nor have any idea which does not wholly consist of them. But about these simple ideas it exerts several acts of its own, whereby out of them as the materials and foundations of the rest, the other are fram'd: the acts of the mind, wherein it exerts its power over its simple ideas, are chiefly these three: first, it combines several simple ideas into one compound one, and thus all *complex ideas* are made. Secondly, it brings two ideas whether *simple* or *complex* together, and sets them by one another, so as to take a view of them at once without uniting them into one; by which way it gets all its ideas of relations. Thirdly, it separates them from all other ideas that accompany them in their real existence. And thus all its *general ideas* are made. I shall here begin with the first of these, and come to the other two in their due places. As *simple ideas* are observ'd to exist in several combinations united together, so the mind may consider them as united, not only as they are really united in external objects, but as it self has join'd

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them. *Ideas* thus made up of several ones put together, I call *complex*, as *Man*, *Army*, *Beauty*, *Gratitude*, &c. By this faculty of repeating and joyning together its *ideas*, the mind has great power in varying and multiplying the objects of its thoughts. But it is still confin'd to those simple *ideas* which it receiv'd from the two sources of *sensation* and *reflection*. It can have no other *ideas* of sensible qualities, than what come from without by the senses, nor any other *ideas* of the operations of a thinking substance, than what it finds in its self: but having once got these simple *ideas*, it can by its own power put them together and make new *complex ones*, which it never receiv'd so united.

Complex *ideas* however compounded, and decompounded, tho' their number be infinite, and their variety endless, may all be reduc'd under these three heads, first *Modes*, secondly *Substances*, thirdly *Relations*.

Modes, I call such complex *ideas* which contain not the supposition of subsisting by themselves, but are consider'd as dependences on, and affections of substances, as *Triangle*, *Gratitude*, *Murder*, &c. These modes are of two sorts, first *Simple*, which are combinations of the same simple *ideas*, as a *Dozen*, *Score*, &c. which are but the *ideas* of so many distinct unites put together. Secondly, *Mix'd*, which are compounded of simple *ideas* of several kinds, as *Beauty*, which consists in a certain com-

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position of colour and figure, causing delight in the beholder. *Theft*, which is the concealed change of the possession of any thing without the consent of the proprietor. *These* visibly contain a combination of *ideas*, of several kinds.

Secondly, *Substances*, the *ideas* of substances are only such combinations of simple *ideas* as are taken to represent distinct particular things subsisting by themselves; in which the confused *idea* of substance is always the chief. Thus a combination of the *ideas* of a certain figure, with the powers of Motion, Thought, and Reasoning joyn'd to substance, make the ordinary *idea* of Man.

These again are either of *single substances*, as *Man*, *Stone*; or of *collective*, or several put together, as *Army*, *Heap*: *Ideas* of several substances thus put together, are as much each of them one single *idea*, as that of a *Man*, or an *Unite*.

Thirdly, *Relations* which consist in the consideration and comparing one *idea* with another. Of these several kinds we shall treat in their order.

CHAP. XIII.

Of Simple Modes, and first of the Simple Modes of Space.

CONcerning *Simple Modes* we may observe that the modifications of any *Simple Idea*, are as

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perfectly different and distinct ideas in the mind, as those of the greatest distance or contrariety; thus *Two* is as distinct from *Three*, as *Blueness* from *Heat*. Under this head I shall first consider the modes of *Space*.

Space is a simple idea which we get both by our sight and touch. When we consider it barely in length between two bodies, 'tis called *Distance*; when in length, breadth and thickness it may be called *Capacity*. When consider'd between the extremities of matter, which fills the capacity of space with something solid, tangible and moveable, it is called *Extension*; and thus *Extension* will be an *idea* belonging to body: but *Space* may be conceiv'd without it.

Each different *distance* is a different modification of space; and each *idea* of any different space is a *Simple Mode* of this *idea*. Such are an *Inch*, *Foot*, *Yard*, &c. which are the *ideas* of certain stated lengths which men settle in their minds for the use, and by the custom of measuring. When these *ideas* are made familiar to mens thoughts, they can in their minds repeat them as often as they will, without joyning to them, the *idea* of body, and frame to themselves the *ideas* of Feet, Yards, or Fathoms beyond the utmost bounds of all bodies, and by adding these still one to another, enlarge their *idea* of space as much as they please. From this power of repeating any *idea* of Distance,

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without being ever able to come to an end, we come by the *idea* of immenſity.

Another modification of *Space* is taken from the *Relation* of the parts of the termination of Extenſion or circumſcrib'd ſpace amongſt themſelves: and this is what we call *Figure*. This the *Touch* diſcovers in ſenſible bodies, whoſe extremities come within our reach: and the *Eye* takes both from bodies and colours, whoſe boundaries are within its view; where obſerving how the extremities terminate either in ſtraight lines, which meet at diſcernible angles; or in crooked lines, wherein no angles can be perceiv'd; by conſidering theſe as they relate to one another in all parts of the extremities of any body or ſpace, it has that idea we call *Figure*: which affords to the mind infinite variety.

Another *Mode* belonging to this head, is that of *Place*. Our idea of *Place* is nothing but the relative poſition of any thing with reference to its diſtance from ſome fix'd and certain points. Whence we ſay, that a thing has or has not changed *Place*, when its diſtance either is or is not altered with reſpect to thoſe bodies with which we have occaſion to compare it. That this is ſo, we may eaſily gather from hence; that we can have no idea of the place of the *Univerſe*, tho' we can of all its parts. To ſay that the world is *ſomewhere*, means no more, than that it does *exiſt*. The word *Place* is ſometimes

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taken to signifie that *Space* which any body takes up; and so the Universe may be conceived in a Place.

CHAP. XIV.

Of Duration and its Simple Modes.

THERE is another sort of *Distance*, the *idea* of which we get from the fleeting, and perpetually perishing parts of succession, which we call *Duration*. The Simple Modes of it are any different lengths of it, whereof we have distinct *ideas*, as *Hours, Days, Years*, &c. *Time* and *Eternity*.

The *idea* of *Succession* is got by reflecting on that train of *ideas* which constantly follow one another in our minds as long as we are awake. The distance between any parts of this *Succession* is what we call *Duration*: and the continuation of the existence of our selves, or any thing else *commensurate* to the succession of any *ideas* in our minds, is what we call our *own Duration*, or *that* of another thing co-existing with our thinking. That this is so, appears from hence, that we have no perception of succession or duration, when that succession of our *ideas* ceases, as in *Sleep*: the moment that we sleep, and awake, how distant soever, seems to be joyn'd and connected. And possibly it would be so to a waking man, could he fix upon one *idea*

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without variation, and the succession of others. And we see that they whose thoughts are very intent upon one thing, let slip out of their account a good part of that *Duration*, and think that time shorter than it is. But if a man during his sleep *dream*, and variety of *ideas* make themselves perceptible in his mind, one after another he hath then, during such dreaming, a sense of duration and of the length of it.

A man having once got this *idea* of duration, can apply it to things which exist while he does not think: and thus we measure the time of our sleep, as well as that wherein we are awake.

Those who think we get the *idea* of *succession* from our observation of Motion, by our senses, will be of our opinion, when they consider that Motion produces in the mind an *idea* of Succession, no otherways than as it produces there a continu'd train of distinguishable *ideas*. A man that looks upon a body really moving perceives no motion, unless that motion produces a constant *train of successive ideas*. But wherever a man is, tho' all things be at rest about him, if he thinks, he will be *conscious* of *Succession* without perceiving any motion. Hence motions very *slow* are not perceived by us; because the change of distance is so slow, that it causes no new *ideas* in us, but after a long interval. The same happens in things that move very *swift*, which not affecting the sense with several distin-

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guishable distances of their motion, cause not any train of *ideas* in our minds, and consequently are not perceived. Thus any thing that moves round in a circle in less time than our *ideas* are wont to succeed one another in our minds, is not perceiv'd to move, but seems to be a perfect intire circle of that matter which is in motion. Such a part of duration as takes up the time of only one *idea* in our minds, wherein we perceive no succession, we call an *Instant*.

Duration, as mark'd by certain periods and measures, is what we most properly call *Time*: which we measure by the diurnal and annual *Revolutions* of the Sun, as being constant, regular, and universally observable by all mankind, and supposed equal to one another.

It is not necessary that time should be *measured by motion*: any constant periodical appearance in seemingly equidistant spaces, may as well distinguish the intervals of *Time* as what we make use of. For supposing the Sun to be lighted, and then extinguished every day: and that in the space of an annual revolution, it should sensibly encrease in brightness, and so decrease again; such a regular appearance would serve to measure out the distances of Duration, to all that could observe it, as well without, as with motion. The freezing of water, the blowing of a plant returning at equidistant periods in all the parts of the earth would serve for

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the ſame purpoſe. In effect, we find that a people of *America* counted their years by the *coming* and *going away* of Birds at certain ſeaſons.

The mind having once got ſuch a meaſure of *Time*, as the annual revolution of the Sun, can eaſily apply it to Duration wherein that meaſure it ſelf did not exiſt: and the *idea* of *Duration* equal to an *Annual Revolution of the Sun*, is as eaſily applicable in our thoughts to Duration where no Sun, nor motion was, as the *idea* of a *Foot* or *Yard* to diſtances beyond the confines of the world.

By the ſame means, and from the ſame original that we come to have the *idea* of Time, we have alſo that *idea* which we call *Eternity*: For having got the *ideas* of certain lengths of Duration, we can in our thoughts add them to one another as oft as we pleaſe, without ever coming to an end.

And thus it is plain, that from the two fountains of all knowledge before-mentioned, *viz. Senſation* and *Reflection*, we get the ideas of Duration, and the ſeveral meaſures of it. For,

1ſt. By obſerving what paſſes in our minds, how our ideas there in train conſtantly, ſome vaniſh, and others begin to appear, we come by the idea of *Succeſſion*.

2dly. By obſerving a diſtance in the parts of this Succeſſion we get the idea of *Duration*.

3dly. By obſerving certain appearances at regular and ſeemingly equidiſtant periods, we get the

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ideas of certain lengths or measures of Duration, as *Minutes*, *Hours*, *Days*, &c.

4thly. By being able to repeat those measures of Time, as often as we will, we can come to imagine *Duration*, *where nothing does really endure or exist*: Thus we imagine to morrow, next year, or seven years hence.

5thly. By being able to repeat any such idea of any length of time, as of a Minute, Year, &c. as often as we will, and add them one to another without ever coming to an end, we come by the idea of *Eternity*.

6thly. By considering any part of infinite Duration, as set out by periodical measures, we come by the idea of what we call *Time* in general.

CHAP. XV.

Of Duration and Expansion considered together.

TIME is to *Duration* as *Place* is to *Space* or *Expansion*. They are so much of those boundless oceans of *Eternity* and *Immensity* as is set out and distinguished from the rest: and so are made use of to denote the position of finite real beings in respect one to another, in those infinite oceans of Duration and Space. Each of these have a *twofold acceptation*.

First, Time in general is taken for so much of

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infinite Duration as is coexistent with the Universe, and measured out by the motions of its great bodies. Thus it is used in the phrases *before all time*, *when time shall be no more*.

Place is likewise taken for that *portion* of infinite space possessed by the material world, tho' this might be more properly called *Extension*. Within *these two* are confined the particular Time or Duration, Extension or place of all corporeal beings.

Secondly, Time is sometimes applied to parts of that infinite Duration that were not really measur'd out by real Existence, but such as we upon occasion do suppose equal to certain lengths of measur'd Time, as in the *Julian Period*, which makes an excursion of seven hundred sixty four years beyond the Creation. Thus we may speak of Place or Distance in the great *Inane*, wherein I can conceive a space equal to, or capable of receiving a body of any assigned dimensions.

CHAP. XVI.

Of Numbers.

THE complex *ideas* of *Number* are form'd by adding several *Unites* together. The *Simple Modes* of it are each several combinations, as, *Two*, *Three*, &c. These are of all others most distinct, the nearest being as clearly different from each o-

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ther as the moſt remote: *Two* being as diſtinct from *One*, as two hundred. But it is hard to form diſtinct *ideas* of every the leaſt exceſs in Extenſion. Hence demonſtrations in numbers are more general in their uſe, and more determinate in their application than thoſe of Extenſion.

Simple Modes of Numbers, being in our minds but ſo many combinations of Unites which have no variety, but more or leſs: *Names* for each diſtinct combination, ſeem more neceſſary than in any other ſort of *ideas*. For without a *name* or *mark*, to diſtinguiſh that preciſe collection, it will hardly be kept from being a heap of confuſion. Hence ſome *Americans* have no diſtinct *idea* of any number beyond twenty: ſo that when they are diſcourſed with of greater numbers, they ſhew the hairs of their head. So that to reckon right two things are required.

Firſt, That the mind diſtinguiſh carefully two *ideas* which are different one from another, only by the addition or ſubſtraction of one Unite.

Secondly, that it retain in memory the names or marks of the ſeveral combinations from a Unite to that number; and that in exact order, as they follow one another. In either of which if it fails, the whole buſineſs of *Numbring* will be diſturbed; and there will remain only the confuſed *idea* of *Multitude:* but the *ideas* neceſſary to diſtinct Numeration will not be attained to.

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CHAP. XVII.

Of Infinity.

THE *idea* ſignified by the name *Infinity*, is beſt examin'd, by conſidering to *what* Infinity is by the Mind attributed, and then *how* it frames it. *Finite* and *Infinite* then are look'd upon as the modes of Quantity, and attributed primarily to things that have parts, and are capable of increaſe or diminution, by the *Addition* or *Subſtraction* of any the leaſt part. Such are the *ideas* of *Space*, *Duration*, and *Number*.

When we apply this *idea* to the *Supreme Being*, we do it primarily in reſpect of his Duration and Ubiquity; more figuratively when to his *Wiſdom*, *Power*, *Goodneſs*, and other attributes which are properly *inexhauſtible* and *incomprehenſible*: for when we call them Infinite, we have no other *idea* of this Infinity, but what carries with it ſome reflection on the *Number*, or the *Extent* of the *acts* or *objects* of God's Power and Wiſdom, which can never be ſuppoſed ſo great or ſo many, that theſe attributes will not always ſurmount and exceed, tho' we multiply them in our thoughts, with the Infinity of *endleſs Number*. I do not pretend to ſay, how theſe attributes *are in God*, who is infinitely beyond the reach of our narrow capacities: but this

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is our way of *conceiving them*, and these our *ideas* of their Infinity.

The next thing to be considered, is *how we come* by the *idea* of Infinity. Every one that has any *idea* of any stated lengths of Space, as a *Foot*, *Yard*, &c. finds that he can repeat that *idea*, and join it to *another*, to a *Third*, and so on without ever coming to an end of his Additions: from this power of enlarging his *idea* of Space, he takes the *idea* of Infinite Space or *Immensity*. By the same power of repeating the *idea* of any length of Duration we have in our minds, with all the endless addition of Number, we come by the *idea* of *Eternity*.

If our *idea* of *Infinity* be got by repeating without end our own *ideas*; why do we not attribute it to other *ideas*, as well as those of *Space* and *Duration*; since they may be as easily and as often repeated in our minds as the other: yet no body ever thinks of infinite *Sweetness* or *Whiteness*, tho' he can repeat the *idea* of Sweet or White as frequently as those of *Yard* or *Day*. *I answer*, that those *ideas* that have parts, and are capable of increase, by the addition of any parts, afford us by their repetition an *idea* of Infinity; because with the endless repetition there is continued an enlargement, of which there is no end: but it is not so in other *ideas*: for if to the perfectest *idea* I have of *White*, I add another of equal whiteness; it enlarges not my *idea* at all. Those *ideas* that consist not

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of parts, cannot be augmented to what proportion men pleaſe, or be ſtretch'd beyond what they have receiv'd by their ſenſes, but *Space*, *Duration*, and *Number* being capable of increaſe by repetition, leave in the mind an *idea* of an endleſs room for more; and ſo thoſe *ideas* alone lead the mind towards the thought of Infinity.

We are carefully to diſtinguiſh between the *idea* of the *Infinity of Space*, and the *idea* of a *Space Infinite*. The firſt is nothing but a ſuppoſed endleſs progreſſion of the mind over any repeated *idea* of Space. But to have actually in the mind the *idea* of a Space Infinite, is to ſuppoſe the mind already paſſed over all thoſe repeated *ideas* of Space, which an endleſs repetition can never totally repreſent to it; which carries in it a plain contradiction.

This will be plainer, if we conſider *Infinity in Numbers*. The Infinity of numbers, to the end of whoſe addition every one perceives there is no approach, eaſily appears to any one that reflects on it: but how clear ſoever this *idea* of the Infinity of Number be, there is nothing yet more evident, than the abſurdity of the actual *idea* of Infinite Number.

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CHAP. XVIII.

Of other Simple Modes.

THE mind has ſeveral diſtinct *ideas* of *Sliding*, *Rowling*, *Walking*, *Creeping*, &c. which are all but the different modifications of motion. *Swift and Slow* are two different *ideas* of Motion, the meaſures whereof are made out of the diſtances of Time and Space put together.

The like variety we have in *Sounds*: every articulate word is a different modification of ſound: as are alſo notes of different length put together, which make that complex *idea* call'd *Tune*.

The modes of *Colours* might be alſo very various: ſome of which we take notice of, as the different degrees, or as they are term'd ſhades of the ſame colour. But ſince we ſeldom make aſſemblages of Colours, without taking in Figure alſo, as in Painting, *&c.* Thoſe which are taken notice of do moſt commonly belong to mix'd modes, as *Beauty*, *Rainbow*, &c.

All compounded *Taſtes* and *Smells* are alſo modes made up of the ſimple *ideas* of thoſe ſenſes: but they being ſuch as generally we have no names for, cannot be ſet down in writing, but muſt be left to the thoughts and experience of the reader.

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CHAP. XIX.

Of the Modes of Thinking.

WHEN the mind turns its view inwards upon its ſelf, *Thinking* is the firſt *idea* that occurs: wherein it obſerves a great variety of modifications; and thereof frames to its ſelf diſtinct *ideas*. Thus the perception annex'd to any impreſſion on the body made by an external object, is call'd *Senſation*. When an *idea* recurs without the preſence of the object, it is call'd *Remembrance*. When ſought after by the mind, and brought again in view, it is *Recollection*. When held there long under attentive conſideration, it is *Contemplation*. When *ideas* float in the mind without regard or reflection, 'tis call'd in French *Reſvery*, our language has ſcarce a name for it. When the *ideas* are taken notice of, and as it were regiſtred in the memory, it is *Attention*. When the mind fixes its view on any one *idea*, and conſiders it on all ſides, it is *Intention* and *Study*. *Sleep* without dreaming is reſt from all theſe. And *Dreaming* is the perception of *ideas* in the mind, not ſuggeſted by any external objects, or known occaſions; nor under any choice or conduct of the Underſtanding. Of theſe various modes of Thinking, the mind forms as diſtinct *ideas*, as it does of White and Red, a Square or a Circle.

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CHAP. XX.

Of the Modes of Pleaſure and Pain.

Pleaſure and *Pain* are ſimple *ideas* which we receive both from Senſation and Reflection. There are thoughts of the Mind, as well as ſenſations, accompany'd with Pleaſure or Pain. Their cauſes are term'd *Good* or *Evil*. For things are eſteem'd Good or Evil only in reference to Pleaſure or Pain. That we call *Good* which is apt to cauſe or increaſe Pleaſure, or diminiſh Pain in us: to procure or preſerve the poſſeſſion of any Good, or abſence of any Evil: and on the contrary, that we call *Evil*, which is apt to produce or increaſe any Pain, or diminiſh any Pleaſure in us; or elſe to procure us any Evil, or deprive us of any Good: by Pleaſure and Pain I would be underſtood to mean of *Body* or *Mind*, as they are commonly diſtinguiſh'd; tho' in truth they are only different conſtitutions of the mind, ſometimes occaſion'd by diſorder in the body, ſometimes by thoughts of the mind. *Pleaſure* and *Pain*, and their cauſes *Good* and *Evil*, are the hinges upon which our paſſions turn: by reflecting on the various modifications or tempers of mind, and the internal ſenſations which Pleaſure and Pain, Good and Evil produce in us, we may thence form to ourſelves the *ideas*

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of our Paſſions. Thus by reflecting upon the thought we have of the delight, which any thing is apt to produce in us, we have an *idea* we call *Love:* and on the contrary, the thought of the pain, which any thing preſent or abſent produces in us, is what we call *Hatred. Deſire* is that uneaſineſs which a man finds in himſelf upon the abſence of any thing, the preſent enjoyment of which carries the *idea* of Delight with it. *Joy* is a Delight of the mind ariſing from the preſent or aſſur'd approaching poſſeſſion of a Good. *Sorrow* is an uneaſineſs of the mind, upon the thought of a Good loſt, or the ſenſe of a preſent Evil. *Hope* is a Pleaſure in the mind upon the thought of a probable future enjoyment of a thing which is apt to delight. *Fear* is an uneaſineſs of the mind upon the thought of a future Evil likely to befal us. *Anger* is a diſcompoſure of mind upon the receipt of injury, with a preſent purpoſe of Revenge. *Deſpair* is the thought of the unattainableneſs of any Good. *Envy* is an uneaſineſs of mind, cauſed by the conſideration of a Good we deſire, obtained by one we think ſhould not have had it before us.

It is to be conſidered that in reference to the Paſſions, the removal or leſſening of a Pain, is conſider'd, and operates as a Pleaſure: and the loſs or diminiſhing of a Pleaſure, as a Pain. And farther, that the Paſſions in moſt perſons operate on the body, and cauſe various changes in it: but theſe being not al-

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ways ſenſible, do not make a neceſſary part of the *idea* of each Paſſion. Beſides theſe modes of Pleaſure and Pain which reſult from the various conſiderations of Good and Evil, there are many others, I might have inſtanced in, as the *Pain* of *Hunger* and *Thirſt*, and the Pleaſure of *Eating* and *Drinking*; and of *Muſick*, &c. but I rather choſe to inſtance in the Paſſions, as being of much more concernment to us.

CHAP. XXI.

Of Power.

THE mind being every day informed by the ſenſes, of the alteration of thoſe ſimple *ideas* it obſerves in things without: reflecting alſo on what paſſes within itſelf, and obſerving a conſtant change of its *ideas*, ſometimes by the impreſſions of outward objects upon the ſenſes; and ſometimes by the determination of its own choice: and concluding from what it has ſo conſtantly obſerv'd to have been, that the like changes will for the future be made in the ſame things, by the ſame agents, and by the like ways, conſiders in one thing, the poſſibility of having any of its ſimple *ideas* chang'd; and in another, the poſſibility of making that change, and ſo comes by that *idea* which we call *Power*. Thus we ſay *Fire* has a Power to

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melt Gold, and make it fluid; and *Gold* has a Power to be *melted*.

Power thus consider'd, is twofold, *viz.* as able to make, or able to receive any change: the one may be call'd *Active*, the other *Passive Power*. Of *Passive Power* all sensible things abundantly furnish us with *ideas*, whose sensible qualities and beings we find to be in a continual flux, and therefore with reason we look on them as liable still to the same change. Nor have we of *Active Power* fewer instances: since whatever change is observed, the mind must collect a power somewhere able to make that change. But yet if we will consider it attentively, bodies by our senses do not afford us so clear and distinct an *idea* of *Active* Power, as we have from reflection on the operations of our minds. For all power relating to Action, and there being but two sorts of *Action*, viz. *Thinking* and *Motion*, let us consider whence we have the clearest *ideas* of the powers which produce these actions.

Of *Thinking*, Body affords us no *idea* at all: it is only from Reflection that we have that; neither have we from Body any *idea* of the beginning of Motion. A Body at rest affords us no *idea* of any *Active* Power to move; and when it is set in Motion itself, that Motion is rather a Passion than an Action in it. The *idea* of the beginning of Motion we have only by reflection on what passes in our selves; where we find by experience that bare-

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ly by willing it, we can move the parts of our bodies which were before at rest.

We find in our selves a Power to begin or forbear, continue or end several actions of our minds, and motions of our bodies, barely by a thought or preference of the mind. This power which the mind has thus to order the consideration of any *idea*, or the forbearing to consider it; or to prefer the Motion of any part of the Body to its Rest, and *vice versa* in any particular instance, is that we call the *Will*. The actual exercise of that power, is that which we call *Volition* or *Willing*:

The forbearance or performance of that Action, consequent to such order or command of the mind, is called *Voluntary*: and whatsoever Action is performed without such a thought of the mind, is called *Involuntary*.

The Power of Perception is that we call the *Understanding*. *Perception*, which we make the Act of the Understanding, is of *three* sorts. *First*, The Perception of *ideas* in our minds. *Secondly*, The Perception of the Signification of Signs. *Thirdly*, The Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of any distinct *ideas*. These powers of the mind, *viz.* of perceiving and preferring are usually called by another name; and the ordinary way of speaking is that the Understanding and Will are two *faculties* of the mind. A word proper enough, if it be used so as not to breed any confusion in

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mens thoughts, by being ſuppoſed, (as I ſuſpect it has been) to ſtand for ſome real Beings in the Soul that performs thoſe actions of Underſtanding and Volition.

From the conſideration of the Extent of the power of the mind, over the actions of the man, which every one finds in himſelf, ariſe the *ideas* of *Liberty* and *Neceſſity*: ſo far as a man has a power to think or not to think; to move or not to move according to the preference or direction of his own mind, ſo far is a man *free*. Where-ever any performance or forbearance are not equally in a man's power; where-ever doing or not doing will not equally follow upon the preference of his mind, there he is not *free*, tho' perhaps the action may be *voluntary*. So that the *idea* of *Liberty* is the *idea* of a power in any agent, to do or forbear any action according to the determination or thought of the mind, whereby either of them is preferred to the other; where either of them is not in the power of the agent to be produc'd by him, according to his volition, there he is not at liberty: that agent is under *Neceſſity*. So that *Liberty* cannot be where there is no *Thought*, no *Volition*, no *Will*: but there may be Thought, there may be Will, there may be Volition where there is no *Liberty*. Thus a *Tennis-ball*, whether in motion by the ſtroke of a racket, or lying ſtill at reſt, is not by any one taken to be a free Agent; becauſe we conceive not

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a *Tennis-ball* to think, and consequently not to have any Volition or Preference of Motion to Rest, or *vice versa*. So a man striking himself or his friend by a convulsive motion of his arm, which it is not in his power by Volition or the direction of his mind, to stop or forbear; no body thinks he has in this *Liberty*, every one pities him as acting by *Necessity* and *Constraint*. Again, suppose a man be carried whilst fast asleep into a room where is a person he longs to see, and be there lock'd fast in beyond his power to get out; he awakes, and is glad to see himself in so desirable company, which he stays willingly in; that is, prefers his staying to going away. Is not this stay voluntary? I think no body will doubt it, and yet being lock'd fast in, he is not at liberty to stay, he has not freedom to be gone. So that *Liberty* is not an *idea* belonging to Volition or Preferring; but to the person having the power of doing or forbearing to do, according as the mind shall chuse or direct.

As it is in the motions of the body, so it is in the thoughts of our minds: where any one is such that we have power to take it up, or lay it by according to the Preference of the mind, there we are at liberty. A waking man is not at liberty to think or not to think, no more than he is at liberty whether his body shall touch any other or no: but whether he will remove his contemplation from one *idea* to another, is many times in his

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choice. And then he is in respect of his *ideas*, as much at liberty as he is in respect of bodies he rests on. He can at pleasure remove himself from one to another: but yet some *ideas* to the mind, like some motions to the body are such, as in certain circumstances it cannot avoid nor obtain their absence by the utmost effort it can use. Thus a man on the rack is not at liberty to-day by the *idea* of *Pain*, and entertain other contemplations.

Where-ever Thought is wholly wanting, or the power to act or forbear, according to the direction of Thought, there Necessity takes place. This in an agent capable of Volition, when the beginning or continuation of any action is contrary to the preference of his mind, is call'd *Compulsion*; when the hindring or stopping any action is contrary to his Volition, it is called *Restraint*. Agents that have no Thought, no Volition at all, are in every thing necessary agents.

And thus I have in a short draught given a view of our *original ideas*, from whence all the rest are deriv'd, and of which they are made up. And which may be all reduc'd to these few primary and original ones, *viz. Extension*, *Solidity*, and *Mobility* which by our senses we receive from body: *Thinking* and the *power of moving*, which by reflection we receive from our minds. *Existence*, *Duration*, *Number*, which belong both to the one and to the other. By these I imagine might be

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explain'd the nature of *Colours*, *Sounds*, *Tastes*, *Smells*, and all other *ideas* we have; if we had but faculties acute enough to perceive the several modify'd extensions and motions of these minute bodies which produce those several sensations in us.

CHAP. XXII.

Of Mixed Modes.

Mixed Modes are combinations of *simple ideas* of different kinds, (whereby they are distinguish'd from simple modes, which consist only of simple *ideas* of the same kind, put together by the mind) as *Virtue*, *Vice*, a *Lie*, &c. The mind being once furnish'd with simple *ideas*, can put them together in several compositions, without examining whether they exist so together in nature. And hence I think it is, that these ideas are called *Notions*; as if they had their original and constant existence more in the thoughts of men than in the reality of things: and to form such ideas it sufficed that the mind put the parts of them together, and that they were consistent in the understanding, without considering whether they had any real being. There are three ways whereby we get these complex ideas of *mixed Modes*.

First, By *experience* and observation of things

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themſelves: thus by ſeeing two men wreſtle, we get the *idea* of wreſtling.

Secondly, By *invention* or voluntary putting together of ſeveral ſimple *ideas* in our own minds; ſo he that firſt invented *Printing*, had an *idea* of it firſt in his mind, before it ever exiſted.

Thirdly, By *explaining* the names of actions we never ſaw, or notions we cannot ſee; and by enumerating all thoſe *ideas* which go to the making them up. Thus the mixed Mode which the word *Lie* ſtands for, is made up of theſe ſimple *ideas*: Firſt, *Articulate ſounds*. Secondly, *Certain* ideas *in the mind of the ſpeaker*. Thirdly, *Thoſe words*, *the ſigns of theſe* ideas. Fourthly, *Thoſe ſigns put together* by Affirmation or Negation, otherwiſe than the *ideas* they ſtand for, are in the mind of the ſpeaker. Since languages are made, *complex ideas* are uſually got by the explication of thoſe terms that ſtand for them: for ſince they conſiſt of ſimple *ideas* combined, they may by words ſtanding for thoſe ſimple *ideas* be repreſented to the mind of one who underſtands thoſe words, though that combination of ſimple *ideas* was never offer'd to his mind by the real exiſtence of things.

Mixed Modes have their *unity* from an act of the mind, combining thoſe ſeveral ſimple *ideas* together, and conſidering them as one complex one: The *mark* of this union is one *name* given to that combination. Men ſeldom reckon any number

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of *ideas* to make one complex one: but such collections as there be names for. Thus the *killing of an old man*, is as fit to be united into one *complex idea*, as that of *a father*: yet there being no name for it, it is not taken for a particular complex *idea*; nor a distinct species of action, from that of killing any other man.

Those collections of *ideas* have names generally affix'd, which are of frequent use in conversation: in which cases men endeavour to communicate their thoughts to one another with all possible dispatch. Those others which they have seldom occasion to mention, they tie not together, nor give them names.

This gives the reason, why there are words in every language, which cannot be rendred by any one single word of another. For the fashions and customs of one nation, make several combinations of *ideas* familiar in one, which another had never any occasion to make. Such were, Ὀστρακισμὸς among the *Greeks*, *Proscriptio* among the *Romans*. This also occasions the *constant change* of languages; because the change of custom and opinions, brings with it new combinations of *ideas*, which, to avoid long descriptions, have new names annex'd to them, and so they become *new species* of *mixed* modes.

Of all our simple *ideas*, those that have had most *mixed modes* made out of them, are *Thinking*, and

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Motion; (which comprehend in them all Action) and Power, from whence these actions are conceiv'd to flow. For actions being the great business of mankind, it is no wonder if the several modes of Thinking and Motion should be taken notice of, the *ideas* of them observ'd and laid up in memory, and have names assign'd them. For without such *complex ideas* with names to them, men cou'd not easily hold any communication about them. Of this kind are the modes of actions distinguish'd by their *Causes*, *Means*, *Objects*, *Ends*, *Instruments*, *Time*, *Place*, and other circumstances; as also of the powers fitted for those actions: thus *Boldness* is the power to do or speak what we intend without fear or disorder: which power of doing any thing, when it has been acquir'd by the frequent doing the same thing, is that *idea* we call *Habit*: when forward and ready upon every occasion to break into action, we call it *Disposition*. Thus *Testiness*, is a disposition or aptness to be angry.

Power being the source of all action, the substances wherein these powers are, when they exert this power, are call'd *Causes*: and the substances thereupon produc'd, or the simple *ideas* introduc'd into any subject, *effects*. The efficacy whereby the new substance or *idea* is produc'd, is call'd in the subject exerting that power, *Action*; in the subject wherein any simple *idea* is chang'd, or produc'd, *Passion*: which efficacy in *intellectual agents*, we

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can, I think, conceive to be nothing else but modes of Thinking and Willing: in *corporeal agents*, nothing else but modifications of motion. Whatever sort of action, besides these produces any effect; I confess my self to have no notion, or *idea* of. And therefore many words which seem to express some action, signifie nothing of the action, but barely the effect, with some circumstances of the subject wrought on, or cause operating. Thus *Creation*, *Annihilation*, contain in them no *idea* of the action or manner, whereby they are produc'd, but barely of the cause, and the thing done. And when a country-man says the cold *freezes water*, tho' the word *Freezing*, seem to import some action, yet it truly signifies nothing but the effect, *viz.* That water that was before *fluid*, is become *hard*, and *consistent*, without containing any *idea* of the action whereby it is done.

CHAP. XXIII.

Of our Complex Ideas of *Substances*.

THE mind observing several simple *ideas* to go constantly together, which being presum'd to belong to one thing, are call'd so united in one subject by one name, which we are apt afterward to talk of and consider as one simple *idea*, which indeed is a complication of many *ideas* to-

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gether. We imagine not these simple *ideas* to subsist by themselves, but suppose some *Substratum*, wherein they subsist, which we call *Substance*. The *idea* of pure substance is nothing but the suppos'd, but unknown support of these qualities, which are capable of producing simple *ideas* in us.

The *ideas* of *particular Substances* are compos'd out of this obscure and general *idea* of Substance, together with such combinations of simple *ideas*, as are observ'd to exist together, and suppos'd to flow from the internal constitution, and unknown essence of that substance. Thus we come by the *ideas* of *Man*, *Horse*, *Gold*, &c. Thus the sensible qualities of *Iron*, or a *Diamond* make the complex *ideas* of those substances, which a Smith or a Jeweller commonly knows better than a philosopher.

The same happens concerning the operations of the mind, *viz. Thinking*, *Reasoning*, &c. which we concluding not to subsist by themselves, nor apprehending how they can belong to body, or be produc'd by it; we think them the actions of some other substance, which we call *Spirit*: of whose substance or nature we have as clear a notion as of that of body; the one being but the suppos'd *Substratum* of the simple *ideas* we have from without; as the other of those operations which we experiment in our selves within: so that the *idea* of *corporeal Substance* in matter, is as remote from our conceptions as that of *spiritual Substance*.

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Hence we may conclude that he has the perfectest *idea* of any particular ſubſtance, who has collected moſt of thoſe ſimple *ideas* which do exiſt in it: among which we are to reckon its *active powers*, and *paſſive capacities*, tho' not ſtrictly *ſimple ideas*.

Secondary qualities for the moſt part ſerve to diſtinguiſh ſubſtances. For our ſenſes fail us in the diſcovery of the *Bulk*, *Figure*, *Texture*, &c. of the minute parts of bodies on which their real conſtitutions and differences depend: and ſecondary qualities are nothing but powers with relation to our ſenſes. The *ideas* that make our complex ones of corporeal ſubſtances, are of three ſorts. *Firſt*, The *ideas* of primary qualities of things, which are diſcover'd by our ſenſes: ſuch are *Bulk*, *Figure*, *Motion*, &c. *Secondly*, The ſenſible ſecondary qualities, which are nothing but powers to produce ſeveral *ideas* in us by our ſenſes. *Thirdly*, The aptneſs we conſider in any ſubſtance to cauſe, or receive ſuch alterations of primary qualities, as that the ſubſtance ſo alter'd, ſhould produce in us different *ideas*, from what it did before: and they are call'd *Active* and *Paſſive Powers*. All which, as far as we have any notice, or notion of them, terminate in *ſimple ideas*.

Had we ſenſes acute enough to diſcern the minute particles of bodies, it is not to be doubted, but they would produce quite different *ideas* in us;

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as we find in viewing things with *microſcopes*. Such bodies as to our naked eyes are colour'd and opaque, will through *microſcopes* appear pellucid. *Blood* to the naked eye appears all red; but by a good *microſcope* we ſee only ſome red globules ſwimming in a tranſparent liquor.

The *infinite wiſe Author* of our beings has fitted our organs, and faculties to the conveniences of life and the buſineſs we have to do here: we may by our ſenſes know and diſtinguiſh things ſo far as to accommodate them to the exigencies of this life. We have alſo inſight enough into their admirable contrivances, and wonderful effects to admire, and magnifie the wiſdom, power and goodneſs of their Author. Such a knowledge as this which is ſuited to our preſent condition, we want not faculties to attain; and we are fitted well enough with abilities to provide for the conveniences of living.

Beſides the complex *ideas* we have of material Subſtances; by the ſimple *ideas* taken from the operations of our own minds, which we experiment in ourſelves, as *Thinking*, *Underſtanding*, *Willing*, *Knowing*, &c. co-exiſting in the ſame ſubſtance, we are able to frame the complex *idea* of a *Spirit*. And this *idea* of an *immaterial ſubſtance*, is as clear as that we have of a *material*. By joining theſe with Subſtance, of which we have no diſtinct *idea*, we have the *idea* of a *Spirit*: and by putting together the *ideas* of coherent, ſolid parts, and power

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of being mov'd, join'd with Subſtance, of which likewiſe we have no poſitive *idea*, we have the *idea* of *Matter*. The one is as clear and diſtinct as the other. The ſubſtance of *Spirit* is unknown to us; and ſo is the ſubſtance of *Body* equally unknown to us: two primary qualities or properties of Body, *viz. Solid coherent parts*, and *impulſe*, we have diſtinct clear *ideas* of: ſo likewiſe have we, of two primary qualities or properties of Spirit, *Thinking* and a *power of Action*. We have alſo clear and diſtinct *ideas* of ſeveral qualities inherent in bodies, which are but the various modifications of the extenſion of cohering ſolid parts, and their motion. We have likewiſe the *ideas* of the ſeveral modes of Thinking, *viz.* Believing, Doubting, Hoping, Fearing, *&c.* as alſo of Willing and Moving the Body conſequent to it.

If this notion of Spirit may have ſome difficulties in it, not eaſie to be explain'd, we have no more reaſon to deny or doubt of the *exiſtence of Spirits*, than we have, to deny or doubt of the *exiſtence of Body*: becauſe the notion of Body is cumbred with ſome difficulties very hard, and perhaps impoſſible to be explain'd. The *diviſibility in infinitum*, for inſtance, of any finite extenſion involves us whether we grant or deny it in conſequences impoſſible to be explicated, or made conſiſtent. We have therefore as much reaſon to be ſatisfied with our notion of *Spirit*, as with our notion of *Body*;

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and the existence of the one, as well as the other. We have no other *idea* of the *Supream Being*, but a complex one of *Existence*, *Power*, *Knowledge*, *Duration*, *Pleasure*, *Happiness*, and of several other qualities, and powers which it is better to have than be without, with the addition of *infinite* to each of these.

In which complex *idea* we may observe that there is no simple one, bating *Infinity*, which is not also a part of our complex *idea* of other spirits; because in our *ideas*, as well of spirits as other things, we are restrain'd to those we receive from *Sensation* and *Reflection*.

CHAP. XXIV.

Of Collective Ideas *of Substances*.

THere are other *ideas* of Substances which may be call'd *Collective*, which are made up of many particular substances consider'd as united into one *idea*, as a *Troop*, *Army*, &c. which the mind makes by its power of composition. These *collective* ideas are but the artificial draughts of the mind bringing things remote, and independent into one view, the better to contemplate and discourse of them united into one conception, and signify'd by one name. For there are no things so

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remote, which the mind cannot by this art of compoſition, bring into one *idea*, as is viſible in that ſignified by the name *Univerſe*.

CHAP. XXV.

Of Relation.

THere is another ſet of *ideas* which the mind gets from the *comparing of one thing with another*. When the mind ſo conſiders one thing, that it does as it were bring it to, and ſet it by another, and carry its view from one to the other, this is *Relation* or *Reſpect*: and the denominations given to things intimating that Reſpect, are what we call *Relatives*, and the things ſo brought together *Related*. Thus when I call *Cajus*, *Husband*, or *Whiter*, I intimate ſome other perſon, or thing in both caſes, with which I compare him. Any of our *ideas* may be the foundation of Relation.

Where languages have fail'd to give cor-relative names, there the Relation is not ſo eaſily taken notice of: as in *Concubine*, which is a Relative name, as well as *Wife*.

The *ideas* of Relation may be the ſame, in thoſe men who have far different *ideas* of the things that are Related. Thus thoſe who have different *ideas*, of *Man*, may agree in that of *Father*.

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There is no *idea* of any kind, which is not capable of an almoſt infinite number of conſiderations, in reference to other things: and therefore this makes no ſmall part of mens words and thoughts. Thus one ſingle man may at once ſuſtain the Relations of *Father*, *Brother*, *Son*, *Huſband*, *Friend*, *Subject*, *General*, *European*, *Engliſhman*, *Iſlander*, *Maſter*, *Servant*, *Bigger*, *Leſs*, &c. to an almoſt infinite number; he being capable of as many Relations as there can be occaſions of comparing him to other things in any manner of agreement, diſagreement, or reſpect whatſoever.

The *ideas* of Relations are much *clearer* and more *diſtinct* than of the things related; becauſe the knowledge of one ſimple *idea* is oftentimes ſufficient to give me the notion of a Relation: but to the knowing of any ſubſtantial being, an accurate collection of ſundry *ideas* is neceſſary.

CHAP. XXVI.

Of Cauſe and Effect, and other Relations.

THE *ideas* of *Cauſe* and *Effect*, we get from our obſervation of the *viciſſitude of things*, while we perceive ſome qualities or ſubſtances begin to exiſt, and that they receive their exiſtence from the due application and operation of other beings: that which *produces*, is the *Cauſe*; that

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which is *produced* the *Effect*. Thus *Fluidity* in wax is the effect of a certain degree of heat, which we obſerve to be conſtantly produced by the application of ſuch heat.

We diſtinguiſh the originals of things into two ſorts.

Firſt, When the thing is wholly made new, ſo that no part thereof did ever exiſt before, as when a new particle of matter doth begin to exiſt, which had before no being; 'tis called *Creation*.

Secondly, When a thing is made up of particles which did all of them before exiſt, but the thing ſo conſtituted of pre-exiſting particles, which altogether make up ſuch a collection of ſimple *ideas*; had not any exiſtence before, as this *Man*, this *Egg*, this *Roſe*, *&c.* This, when referr'd to a ſubſtance, produced in the ordinary courſe of nature, by an internal principle, but ſet on work by ſome external agent, and working by inſenſible ways which we perceive not, is called *Generation*.

When the Cauſe is extrinſical, and the Effect produced by a ſenſible Separation or Juxta-poſition of diſcernible parts, we call it *Making*; and ſuch are all artificial things. When any ſimple *idea* is produced, which was not in that ſubject before, we call it *Alteration*.

The denominations of things taken from *Time*, are for the moſt part only Relations. Thus when it is ſaid that queen *Eliſabeth* lived ſixty-nine, and

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reigned forty-five years, no more is meant, than that the duration of her existence was equal to sixty-nine, and of her government to forty-five annual revolutions of the sun: and so are all words answering, *How long*.

Young and *Old*, and other words of Time, that are thought to stand for positive *ideas*, are indeed Relative; and intimate a Relation to a certain length of Duration, whereof we have the *idea* in our minds. Thus we call a Man Young or Old, that has lived little or much of that time that men usually attain to. This is evident from our application of these names to other things; for a *Man* is called Young at Twenty, but a *Horse* Old, *&c.* The Sun and Stars we call not Old at all, because we know not what period God has set to that sort of Beings.

There are other *ideas*, that are truly *Relative*, which we signifie by names, that are thought *Positive* and *Absolute*; such as *Great* and *Little*, *Strong* and *Weak*. The things thus denominated are referred to some standards with which we compare them. Thus we call an *Apple Great*, that is bigger than the ordinary sort of those we have been used to. And a Man *Weak*, that has not so much strength or power to move as men usually have, or those of his own size.

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CHAP. XXVII.

Of Identity and Diverſity.

ANother occaſion the mind takes of comparing, is the very *Being of Things:* when conſidering a thing as exiſting at any certain time, or place, and comparing it with it ſelf as exiſting at any other time, *&c.* it forms the *ideas* of *Identity* and *Diverſity.* When we ſee any thing in any certain time and place, we are ſure, it is that very thing; and can be no other, how like ſoever it may be in all other reſpects.

We conceiving it impoſſible, that two things of the ſame kind ſhould exiſt together in the ſame place, we conclude that whatever exiſts any where at the ſame time, excludes all of the ſame kind, and is there it ſelf alone. When therefore we demand whether any thing be the *ſame*, or no, it refers always to ſomething that exiſted ſuch a time, in ſuch a place, which it was certain at that inſtant was the ſame with it ſelf, and no other.

We have *ideas* of three ſorts of ſubſtances, *Firſt*, *Of God*, Secondly, *Finite Intelligences*, Thirdly, *Bodies.*

Firſt, God being Eternal, Unalterable, and every

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where concerning his *Identity*, there can be no doubt.

Secondly, Finite Spirits having had their determinate time and place of beginning to exist, the Relation to that time and place will always determine to each its *Identity*, as long as it exists.

Thirdly, The same will hold of every particle of matter to which no addition or subtraction is made. These three exclude not one another out of the same place, yet each exclude those of the same kind, out of the same place.

The Identity and Diversity of *Modes* and *Relations* are determined after the same manner that Substances are: only the Actions of Finite Beings, as *Motion* and *Thought*, consisting in Succession, they cannot exist in different times and places as permanent Beings: for no motion or thought considered as at different times can be the same, each part thereof having a different beginning of existence.

From whence it is plain, that Existence it self is the *Principium Individuationis*, which determines a Being to a particular time and place, incommunicable to two Beings of the same kind. Thus, suppose an *Atom* existing in a determin'd time, and place; it is evident that considered in any instant, it is the same with it self, and will be so, as long as its existence continues. The same may be said of two, or more, or any number of particles, whilst they continue together. The *Mass* will be the same

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however jumbled: but if one atom be taken away, it is not the same mass.

In *Vegetables*, the identity depends not on the same mass, and is not applyed to the same thing. The reason of this is the difference between an animate body, and mass of matter; *This* being only the cohesion of particles any how united; *The other*, such a disposition and organization of parts, as is fit to receive and distribute nourishment, so as to continue and frame the wood, bark, leaves, *&c.* (of an *Oak*, for instance) in which consists the vegetable life. That therefore which has such an organization of parts partaking of one common life, continues to be the same *Plant*, tho' that life be communicated to new particles of matter vitally united to the living plant. The case is not so much different in *Brutes*, but that any one may hence see what makes an *Animal*, and continues it the *same*.

The identity of the *same Man* likewise consists in a participation of the same continued life, in succeeding particles of matter vitally united to the same organized body.

To understand *Identity* aright, we must consider what *Idea* the word it is applied to stands for. It being one thing to be the *same Substance*, another the *same Man*, and a third the *same Person*.

An *Animal*, is a living organized body: and the same animal, is the same continued life communi-

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cated to different particles of matter, as they happen ſucceſſively to be united to that body, and our notion of *Man*, is but of a particular ſort of Animal.

Perſon ſtands for an intelligent being, that reaſons and reflects, and can conſider it ſelf the ſame thing in different times and places; which it doth by that *Conſciouſneſs* that is inſeparable from thinking. By this every one is to himſelf what he calls *Self*, without conſidering whether that *Self* be contin'd in the ſame, or divers ſubſtances. In this conſiſts *Perſonal Identity*, or the ſameneſs of a rational being: and ſo far as this conſciouſneſs extends backward to any paſt action, or thought, ſo far reaches the identity of that perſon. It is the ſame *Self* now, it was then: and it is by the ſame *Self*, with this preſent one, that now reflects on it, that that action was done.

Self is that conſcious thinking thing, whatever ſubſtance it matters not, which is conſcious of pleaſure or pain, capable of happineſs or miſery; and ſo is concerned for it ſelf, as far as that conſciouſneſs extends. That with which the conſciouſneſs of this preſent thinking thing, can join it ſelf, makes the ſame perſon, and is one ſelf with it; and ſo attributes to it ſelf, and owns all the actions of that thing, as its own, as far as that conſciouſneſs reaches.

This *Perſonal Identity* is the object of reward

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and punishment, being that by which every one is concerned for himself. If the *Consciousness* went along with the little finger, when that was cut off, it would be the same self that was just before concerned for the whole body.

If the same *Socrates*, waking and sleeping, did not partake of the same consciousness, they would not be the same *Person*. *Socrates* waking, could not be in justice accountable for what *Socrates* sleeping did, no more than one *Twin*, for what his brother *Twin* did, because their outsides were so like, that they could not be distinguished.

But suppose I wholly lose the memory of some parts of my life, beyond a possibility of retrieving them, so that I shall never be conscious of them again; am I not the *same Person* that did those actions, tho' I have now forgot them? I answer, that we must here take notice what the word *I* is applied to, which in this case is the man only: and the same man being presumed to be the same person, *I* is easily here suppos'd to stand also for the same person. But if it be possible for the same man, to have distinct incommunicable consciousness at different times, it is past doubt the same man would, at different times, make different persons. Which we see is the sense of mankind in the solemnest declaration of their opinions, human laws not punishing the madman for the sober man's actions, nor the sober man for what the madman did; thereby

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making them two perſons. Thus we ſay in *Engliſh*, ſuch a one *is not himſelf*, or *is beſides himſelf*, in which phraſes it is inſinuated, that *Self* is changed, and the *Self-ſame Perſon* is no longer in that man.

But is not a man drunk or ſober the ſame Perſon? why elſe is he puniſhed for the ſame fact he commits when drunk, tho' he be never afterwards conſcious of it? juſt as much the ſame perſon, as a man that walks, and does other things in his ſleep, is the ſame perſon, and is as anſwerable for any miſchief he ſhall do in it. Human laws puniſh both with a juſtice ſuitable to their way of knowledge: becauſe in theſe caſes they cannot diſtinguiſh certainly what is real, and what is counterfeit; and ſo the ignorance in drunkenneſs or ſleep is not admitted as a plea. For tho' puniſhment be annexed to perſonality, and perſonality to conſciouſneſs; and the drunkard perhaps is not conſcious of what he did; yet human judicatures juſtly puniſh him, becauſe the fact is proved againſt him; but want of conſciouſneſs cannot be proved for him. But in the great day wherein the *Secrets of all Hearts ſhall be laid open*, it may be reaſonable to think no one ſhall be made to anſwer for what he knows nothing of, but ſhall receive his doom, his *own Conſcience accuſing*, or elſe *excuſing him*.

To conclude, whatever ſubſtance begins to exiſt, it muſt during its exiſtence be the ſame: whatever compoſitions of ſubſtances begin to exiſt, during

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the union of those substances, the concrete must be the same. Whatsoever mode begins to exist, during its existence it is the same: and so if the composition be of distinct substances, and different modes, the same rule holds. Whence it appears that the difficulty or obscurity that has been about this matter, rather arises from *names ill us'd*, than from any *obscurity in the things* themselves. For whatever makes the specifick *Idea*, to which the name is applied, if that *Idea* be steadily kept to, the distinction of any thing into the *same*, and *divers*, will easily be conceived, and there can arise no doubt concerning it.

CHAP. XXVIII.

Of other Relations.

ALL simple *Ideas*, wherein are parts or degrees, afford an occasion of comparing the subjects wherein they are to one another in respect of those simple *Ideas*. As *Whiter*, *Sweeter*, *More*, *Less*, &c. these depending on the equality and excess of the same simple *Idea*, in several subjects may be called, *Proportional Relations*.

Another occasion of comparing things is taken from the circumstances of their origine, as *Father*, *Son*, *Brother*, &c. these may be called *Natural Relations*.

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Sometimes the foundation of considering things, is some act whereby any one comes by a moral right, power, or obligation to do something: such are *General, Captain, Burgher*; these are *Instituted*, and *Voluntary Relations*, and may be distinguished from the *Natural*, in that they are alterable and separable from the persons to whom they sometimes belonged, tho' neither of the substances so related be destroyed. But natural relations are not alterable, but are as lasting as their subjects.

Another relation is the conformity or disagreement of men's voluntary actions to a rule to which they are referred, and by which they are judged of: these may be called *Moral Relations*. It is this conformity or disagreement of our actions to some law (whereby good or evil is drawn on us from the will and power of the law-maker, and is what we call *Reward* or *punishment*) that renders our actions morally good, or evil.

Of these moral *Rules* or *Laws* there seem to be three sorts with their different enforcements. *First*, the *Divine Law*. Secondly, *Civil Law*. Thirdly, *The Law of Opinion* or *Reputation*. By their relation to the first, our actions are either *Sins* or *Duties*: to the second, *Criminal* or *Innocent*: to the third *Virtues* or *Vices*.

1*st*. By the *Divine Law*, I mean that law which God has set to the actions of men, whether promul-

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gated to them by the light of nature, or the voice of Revelation.

That God has given a law to mankind, ſeems undeniable, ſince he has, *Firſt*, A right to do it, we are his creatures. *Secondly*, Goodneſs and wiſdom to direct our actions to what is beſt. *Thirdly*, Power to enforce it by reward, and puniſhment of infinite weight, and duration. This is the only true touch-ſtone of moral rectitude, and by which men judge of the moſt conſiderable moral good or evil of their actions: that is, whether as duties or ſins they are like to procure them happineſs or miſery from the hands of the Almighty.

2*dly*. The *Civil Law*, is the rule ſet by the Common-wealth, to the actions of thoſe that belong to it. This law no body over-looks; the rewards and puniſhments being ready at hand to enforce it, extending to the protecting or taking away of life, liberty, and eſtate of thoſe who obſerve or diſobey it.

3*dly*. The law of Opinion or Reputation. *Virtue* and *Vice* are names ſuppoſed every where, to ſtand for actions in their own nature, Right and Wrong. As far as they are really ſo applied, they ſo far are co-incident with the divine law. But it is viſible that theſe names in the particular inſtances of their application, through the ſeveral nations and ſocieties of men, are conſtantly attributed only to ſuch actions as in each country and ſociety, are in reputation or diſcredit. So that the meaſure

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of what is every where called and esteemed Virtue and Vice, is the approbation or dislike, praise or blame, which by a tacit consent establishes it self in the societies and tribes of men in the world; whereby several actions come to find credit or disgrace amongst them, according to the judgment, maxims, or fashions of the place.

That this is so, appears hence: that tho' that passes for Virtue in one place, which is elsewhere accounted Vice; yet every *Virtue* and *Praise*, *Vice* and *Blame* go together; *Virtue* is every where that which is thought praise-worthy: and nothing else but that which has the allowance of publick esteem, is called *Virtue*. These have so close an alliance, that they are often called by the same name.

'Tis true, Virtue and Vice do in a great measure every where correspond with the unchangeable rule of Right and Wrong, which the laws of God have established; because the observation of these laws visibly secures and advances the general good of mankind, and the neglect of them breeds mischief and confusion: and therefore men without renouncing all sense and reason, and their own interest, could not generally mistake in placing their commendation and blame on that side that deserved it not.

They who think not commendation and disgrace sufficient motives to engage men to accom-

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modate themſelves to the opinions and rules of thoſe with whom they converſe, ſeem little ſkill'd in the hiſtory of mankind. The greateſt part whereof govern themſelves chiefly by this *law of Faſhion*.

The penalties that attend the breach of God's laws are ſeldom ſeriouſly reflected on, and thoſe that do reflect on them, entertain thoughts of future reconciliation. And for the puniſhment due from the laws of the common-wealth, men flatter themſelves with the hopes of impunity: but no man eſcapes cenſure and diſlike who offends againſt faſhion; nor is there one of ten thouſand ſtiff and inſenſible enough, to bear up under the conſtant diſlike and condemnation of his own club.

Morality then is nothing but a relation to theſe laws or rules; and theſe rules being nothing but a collection of ſeveral ſimple *ideas*; the conformity thereto is but ſo ordering the action, that the ſimple *ideas* belonging to it, may correſpond to thoſe which the law requires. By which we ſee how moral beings, and notions are founded on, and terminated in the ſimple *ideas* of ſenſation and reflection. For example, let us conſider the complex *idea* ſignified by the word *Murder*. Firſt from reflection, we have the *ideas* of *Willing*, *Conſidering*, *Purpoſing*, *Malice*, &c. Alſo of *Life*, *Perception*, and *Self-Motion*. Secondly from ſenſation, we have the *ideas* of *man*, and of ſome action where-

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by we put an end to that perception and motion in the man, all which simple *ideas*, are comprehended in the word *Murder*.

This collection of simple *ideas* being found to agree or disagree with the esteem of the country I have been bred in, and to be held worthy of praise or blame, I call the action *Virtuous*, or *Vicious*. If I have the will of a Supreme Invisible Law-maker for my rule, then, as I suppose the action commanded or forbidden by *God*, I call it Good or Evil, *Sin* or *Duty*: if I compare it with the Civil-Law of my Country, I call it *Lawful* or *Unlawful*, a Crime or no Crime.

Moral actions may be considered two ways.

First, as they are in themselves a collection of simple *ideas*, in which sense they are positive absolute *ideas*.

Secondly, As *Good* or *Bad*, or *Indifferent*: in this respect they are *Relative*, it being their conformity or disagreement with some rule that makes them be so. We ought carefully to distinguish between the positive *idea* of the action, and the reference it has to a rule: both which are commonly comprehended under one name, which often occasions confusion, and misleads the judgment.

Thus the taking from another what is his, without his consent, is properly called *Stealing*: but that name being commonly understood to signifie also the moral pravity of the action, men are apt to

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condemn whatever they hear called *Stealing* as an ill action, disagreeing with the rule of Right. And yet the private taking away his sword from a madman to prevent his doing mischief, tho' it be properly denominated *Stealing*, as the name of such a *mixed Mode*, yet when compared to the law of God, it is no sin or transgression, tho' the name *Stealing* ordinarily carries such an intimation with it.

It would be infinite to go over all sorts of Relations; I have here mentioned some of the most considerable, and such as may serve to let us see from whence we get our *ideas* of Relations, and wherein they are founded.

CHAP. XXIX.

Of clear, obscure, distinct and confused ideas.

HAving shewn the original of our *ideas*, and taken a view of their several sorts: I shall offer some few other considerations concerning them. The first is, that some are *clear*, others *obscure*: some *distinct*, and others *confused*.

Our simple *ideas* are clear, when they are such as the objects themselves from whence they were taken, did in a well-ordered sensation or perception present them. Whilst the memory retains

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them thus, and can produce them so to the mind when it has occasion to consider them, they are clear *ideas*.

Our *complex ideas* are clear when the *ideas* that go to their composition are clear: and the number and order of those simple *ideas*, that are their ingredients, is determinate and certain.

The cause of *Obscurity* in simple *ideas* seems to be either dull organs, or slight impressions made by the objects, or a weakness in the memory, not able to retain them as receiv'd.

A *distinct idea* is that wherein the mind perceives a difference from all other: and a *confused*, is such an one as is not sufficiently distinguishable from another from which it ought to be different. Obscurity is opposed to clearness, confusion to distinctness.

This confusion incident to ideas, is only in reference to their names. For every idea a man has being visibly what it is, and distinct from all other ideas but it self, that which makes it *confus'd* is, when it is such that it may as well be called by another name as that which it is expressed by, the difference which keeps the things distinct, and makes some of them to belong rather to the one, and some of them to the other of those names being left out; and so the distinction which was intended to be kept up by these different names is quite lost.

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Confusion is occasioned chiefly by the following defaults.

First, When any *complex idea* (for it is *complex ideas* that are most liable to confusion) is made up of too small a number of simple *ideas*, and such as are common to other things: whereby the differences that make it deserve a different name, are left out. Thus an *idea* of a *Leopard* being conceived only as a spotted beast, is confused, it not being thereby sufficiently distinguished from a *Panther*, and other sorts of beasts that are spotted. Where the *ideas* for which we use different terms, have not a difference answerable to their distinct names, and so cannot be distinguished by them, there it is that they are truly confus'd.

Secondly, When the *ideas* are so jumbled together in the complex one, that it is not easily discernible, whether it more belongs to the name given it, than to any other. We may conceive this confusion by a sort of pictures usually shewn, wherein the colours mark out very odd and unusual figures, and have no discernible order in their position. This, when said to be the picture of a *Man* or *Caesar*, we reckon confused, because it is not discernible in that state, to belong more to the name *Man* or *Caesar*, than to the name *Baboon* or *Pompey*. But when a cylindrical mirrour rightly placed, hath reduced those irregular lines on the table, into their due order and proportion, then

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are real *ideas* in us, whereby we distinguish the qualities that are really in things themselves.

Their reality lies in the steady correspondence they have with the distinct constitutions of real beings. But whether they answer to those constitutions as to *Causes* or *Patterns* it matters not; it suffices that they are constantly produced by them.

Complex ideas being arbitrary combinations of *simple ideas* put together, and united under one general name, in forming of which the mind uses its liberty; we must enquire which of these are real, and which imaginary combinations, and to this I say, that,

First, Mixed modes and relations having no other reality than what they have in the minds of men: nothing else is required to make them real, but a possibility of existing conformable to them. These *ideas* being themselves *Archetypes*, cannot differ from their *Archetypes*, and so cannot be chimerical; unless any one will jumble together in them inconsistent *ideas*. Those indeed that have names assigned them in any language, must have a conformity to the ordinary signification of the name that is given them, that they may not be thought fantastical.

Secondly, Our complex *ideas* of Substances being made, in reference to things existing without us, whose representations they are thought, are no farther real, than as they are such combinations of

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ſimple ideas, as are really united, and co-exiſt in things without-us. Thoſe are fantaſtical which are made up of ſeveral *ideas*, that never were found united, as *Centaur*, &c.

CHAP. XXXI.

Of Ideas *Adequate or Inadequate.*

REAL *ideas* are either *Adequate* or *Inadequate*; *Firſt*, *Adequate*, which perfectly repreſent thoſe Archetypes which the mind ſuppoſes them taken from, and which it makes them to ſtand for. *Secondly*, *Inadequate*, which are ſuch as do but partially or incompleatly repreſent thoſe Archetypes to which they are referred: whence it appears.

Firſt, That all our *ſimple ideas* are *Adequate*; for they being but the effects of certain powers in things fitted and ordained by God, to produce ſuch ſenſations in us, they cannot but be correſpondent and adequate to ſuch powers, and we are ſure they agree to the reality of things.

Secondly, Our *complex ideas of modes* being voluntary collections of *ſimple ideas*, which the mind puts together without reference to any real Archetypes, cannot but be *Adequate ideas*. They are referred to no other pattern, nor made by any original, but the good-liking and will of him that makes the combination. If indeed one would confirm his *ideas*, to thoſe which are formed by another

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perſon, they may be wrong or *Inadequate*, becauſe they agree not to that which the mind deſigns to be their archetype and pattern. In which reſpect only, any *ideas* of modes can be wrong, imperfect, or inadequate.

Thirdly, Our *ideas of Subſtances*, have in the mind a double reference; *Firſt*, They are ſometimes referred to a ſuppoſed real eſſence, of each ſpecies of things. *Secondly*, They are deſigned for repreſentations in the mind of things that do exiſt, by *ideas* diſcoverable in them: in both which reſpects they are *Inadequate*.

Firſt, If the names of Subſtances ſtand for things, as ſuppoſed to have certain real eſſences, whereby they are of this or that ſpecies, (of which real eſſences men are wholly ignorant and know nothing) it plainly follows that the *ideas* they have in their minds, being referred to real eſſences, as *Archetypes* which are unknown, they muſt be ſo far from being Adequate, that they cannot be ſuppoſed to be any repreſentation of them at all. Our complex *ideas* of Subſtances are, as have been ſhewn, nothing but certain collections of ſimple *ideas* that have been obſerved, or ſuppoſed conſtantly to exiſt together. But ſuch a complex *idea* cannot be the real eſſence of any Subſtance: for then the properties we diſcover in it would be deducible from it, and their neceſſary connexion with it be known, as all the properties

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of a *Triangle* depend on, and are deducible from the complex *idea* of *Three Lines including a Space*: but it is certain that in our complex *ideas* of Substances, are not contained such *ideas* on which all the other qualities that are to be found in them depend.

Secondly, Those that take their *ideas* of Substances from their sensible qualities, cannot form Adequate *ideas* of them: because their qualities and powers are so various, that no man's complex *idea* can contain them all. Most of our simple *ideas*, whereof our complex ones of Substances do consist, are powers which being relations to other Substances; we cannot be sure we know all the powers, till we have tryed what changes they are fitted to give and receive from other Substances, in their several ways of application: which being not possible to be tryed upon one body, much less upon all, it is impossible we should have Adequate *ideas* of any Substance, made of a collection of all its properties.

CHAP. XXXII.

Of True and False Ideas.

TRUTH and *Falshood* in propriety of speech belong only to propositions; and when *ideas* are termed *True* or *False*, there is some secret or tacit proposition, which is the foundation of that

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denomination. Our *ideas* being nothing but *Appearances* or *Perceptions* in the mind, can in ſtrictneſs of ſpeech no more be ſaid to be true or falſe, than ſingle names of things can be ſaid to be true or falſe. The *idea* of *Centaur* has no more falſhood in it, when it appears in our minds, than the name *Centaur* when it is pronounced or writ on paper. For truth or falſhood lying always in ſome affirmation or negation, our *ideas* are not capable any of them, of being falſe, till the mind paſſes ſome judgment on them; that is, affirms or denies ſomething of them. In a *metaphyſical* ſenſe they may be ſaid to be true, that is, to be really ſuch as they exiſt; tho' in things called true, even in that ſenſe, there is perhaps a ſecret reference to our *ideas*, look'd upon as the ſtandards of that truth; which amounts to a *mental propoſition*.

When the mind refers any of its *ideas* to any thing extraneous to it, they are then capable of being true or falſe; becauſe in ſuch a reference the mind makes a tacit ſuppoſition of their conformity to that thing; which ſuppoſition, as it is true or falſe, ſo the *ideas* themſelves come to be denominated. This happens in theſe caſes:

Firſt, When the mind ſuppoſes its *idea*, conformable to that in other mens minds; called by the ſame name, ſuch as that of *Juſtice*, *Virtue*, &c.

Secondly, When the mind ſuppoſes any *idea* conformable to ſome real exiſtence. Thus that of

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Man is true, that of *Centaur* falſe, the one having a conformity to what has really exiſted; the other not.

Thirdly, When the mind refers any of its *ideas* to that real conſtitution, and eſſence of any thing whereon all its properties depend: and thus the greateſt part, if not all our *ideas of Subſtances*, are falſe.

As to the *Firſt*, When we judge of our *ideas* by their conformity to thoſe of other men, they may be any of them falſe. But ſimple *ideas* are leaſt liable to be ſo miſtaken; we ſeldom miſtake *Green* for *Blue*, or *Bitter* for *Sweet*; much leſs do we confound the names belonging to different ſenſes, and call a *Colour* by the name of a *Taſte*. Complex *ideas* are much more liable to falſhood in this particular: and thoſe of Mixed Modes more than Subſtances. Becauſe in Subſtances their ſenſible qualities ſerve for the moſt part to diſtinguiſh them clearly: but in Mixed Modes we are more uncertain, and we may call that *Juſtice*, which ought to be called by another name. The reaſon of this is, that the abſtract *ideas* of Mixed Modes, being mens voluntary combinations of ſuch a preciſe collection of ſimple *ideas*, we have nothing elſe to refer our *ideas* of Mixed Modes as ſtandards to; but the *ideas* of thoſe who are thought to uſe names in their proper ſignifications: and ſo as our *ideas* conform or differ from them, they paſs for true or falſe.

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As to the *Second*, When we refer our *ideas* to the real existence of things, none can be termed false, but our complex *ideas* of Substances. For our simple *ideas* being nothing but perceptions in us answerable to certain powers in external objects, their truth consists in nothing but such appearances, as are produced in us suitable to those powers: neither do they become liable to the imputation of falsehood, whether we judge these *ideas* to be in the things themselves, or no. For God having set them as marks of distinguishing things, that we may be able to discern one thing from another; and thereby chuse them as we have occasion: it alters not the nature of our simple *ideas*, whether we think the *idea* of *Blue* (for instance) to be in the *Violet* it self, or in the mind only: and it is equally from that appearance to be denominated *Blue*, whether it be that real colour, or only a peculiar texture in it, that causes in us that *idea*: since the name *Blue* notes properly nothing but that mark of distinction, that is in a Violet, discernible only by our eyes, whatever it consists in.

Neither would our simple *ideas* be *false*, if by the different structure of our organs it were so ordered, that the same object should produce in several mens minds different *ideas*. For this could never be known, since objects would operate constantly after the same manner. It is most probable nevertheless, that the *ideas* produced by the same

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objects in different mens minds, are very near and undiscernibly like. Names of simple *ideas* may be misapplied, as a man ignorant in the *English* tongue may call *Purple*, *Scarlet*: but this makes no falshood in the *ideas*.

Complex *ideas* of modes cannot be false in reference to the essence of any thing really existing; because they have no reference to any pattern existing, or made by nature.

Our complex *ideas* of Substances, being all refer'd to patterns in things themselves, may be false. They are so, *First*, When look'd upon as representations of the unknown essences of things. *Secondly*, When they put together simple *ideas* which in the real existence of things, have no union: as in *Centaur*. *Thirdly*, When from any collection of simple *ideas*, that do always exist together, there is separated by a direct negation any one simple *idea*, which is constantly joined with them. Thus, if from extension, solidity, fixedness, malleableness, fusibility, *&c.* we remove the colour observed in *Gold*.

If this *idea* be only left out of the complex one of *Gold*, it is to be looked on as an inadequate and imperfect, rather than a false one: since, tho' it contains not all the simple *ideas*, that are united in nature; yet it puts none together, but what do really exist together.

Upon the whole, I think that our *ideas* as they

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are considered by the mind, either in reference to the proper signification of their names, or in reference to the reality of things, may more properly be called *Right* or *Wrong ideas*, according as they agree or disagree to those patterns to which they are referred. The *ideas* that are in mens minds simply considered, cannot be wrong, unless *complex ideas*, wherein inconsistent parts are jumbled together. All other *ideas* are in themselves right, and the knowledge about them right, and true knowledge. But when we come to refer them to any patterns, or archetypes, then they are capable of being wrong, as far as they disagree with such archetypes.

CHAP. XXXIII.

Of the Association of ideas.

THERE is scarce any one that does not observe something that seems odd to him, and is in it self really extravagant in the opinions, reasonings, and actions of other men. The least flaw of this kind, if at all different from his own, every one is quick-sighted enough to espy, and forward to condemn in another, tho' he be guilty of much greater unreasonableness in his own tenets and conduct, which he never perceives, and will very hardly be convinc'd of.

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This ſort of unreaſonableneſs is uſually imputed to Education and Prejudice, and for the moſt part truly enough; tho' that reaches not the bottom of the diſeaſe, nor ſhews diſtinctly enough whence it riſes, or wherein it lies. Education is often rightly aſſigned for the cauſe; and prejudice is a good general name for the thing it ſelf; but yet I think he ought to look a little farther who would trace it to the root it ſprings from, and ſo explain it, as to ſhew whence this flaw has its original in very ſober and rational minds, and wherein it conſiſts. For this being a weakneſs to which all men are liable, and a taint which univerſally infects mankind, the greater care ſhould be taken to lay it open.

Some of our *ideas* have a natural correſpondence and connexion one with another: it is the office and excellency of our reaſon to trace theſe, and hold them together in that union and correſpondence which is founded in their peculiar beings. Beſides this, there is another connexion of *ideas* wholly owing to chance or cuſtom: *ideas* that in themſelves are not at all of kin, come to be ſo united in ſome mens minds, that 'tis very hard to ſeparate them; they always keep company, and the one no ſooner comes into the underſtanding, but its aſſociate appears with it; and if they are more than two, the whole gang always inſeparable ſhew themſelves together. This ſtrong combina-

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tion of *ideas* not ally'd by nature, the mind makes in it ſelf either voluntarily, or by chance: and hence it comes in different men to be very different, according to their different *Inclinations*, *Educations*, *Intereſts*, &c. Cuſtom ſettles habits of Thinking in the Underſtanding as well as of Determining in the Will, and of motions in the Body; all which ſeem to be but trains of motion in the Animal Spirits, which once ſet a going, continue on in the ſame ſteps they have been us'd to; which by often treading are worn into a ſmooth path, and the motion in it becomes eaſie, and, as it were, natural. As far as we can comprehend Thinking, thus *ideas* ſeem to be produced in our minds; or if they are not, this may ſerve to explain their following one another in an habitual train, when once they are put into that track, as well as it does to explain ſuch motions of the Body.

This connexion in our minds of *ideas* in themſelves looſe and independent one of another, is of ſo great force to ſet us awry in our actions, as well moral as natural, paſſions, reaſonings, and notions themſelves, that perhaps there is not any one thing that deſerves more to be look'd after. Thus the *ideas* of *Goblins* and *Sprights* have really no more to do with Darkneſs than Light; yet let but a fooliſh Maid inculcate theſe often on the mind of a Child, and raiſe them there together, poſſibly he

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ſhall never be able to ſeparate them again ſo long as he lives; but Darkneſs ſhall ever afterwards bring with it theſe frightful *ideas*. A man has ſuffer'd pain or ſickneſs in any place; he ſaw his friend die in ſuch a room; tho' theſe have in nature nothing to do one with another, yet when the *idea* of the *place* occurs to his mind, it brings that of the Pain and Diſpleaſure with it, he confounds them in his mind, and can as little bear the one as the other.

Intellectual Habits and Defects this way contracted are not leſs frequent and powerful, tho' leſs obſerved. Let the *ideas* of *Being* and *Matter* be ſtrongly joined either by Education or much Thought, whilſt theſe are ſtill combined in the mind, what notions, what reaſonings will there be about ſeparate Spirits? Let Cuſtom from the very Childhood have joined Figure and Shape to the *idea* of God, and what abſurdities will that mind be liable to about the Deity? Let the *idea* of *Infallibility* be joined to any perſon, and theſe two conſtantly together poſſeſs the mind, and then one Body in two places at once, ſhall be ſwallowed for a certain truth, whenever that imagined Infallible Perſon dictates and demands aſſent without inquiry.

Some ſuch wrong combinations of *ideas* will be found to eſtabliſh the irreconcilable oppoſition between different ſects of philoſophy and religion;

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for we cannot imagine every one of their followers to impose wilfully on himself, and knowingly refuse truth offer'd by plain Reason. Interest, tho' it does a great deal in the case, yet cannot be thought to work whole societies of men to so universal a perverseness, as that every one of them should knowingly maintain falsehood: some at least must be allowed to do what all pretend to; *i. e.* to pursue truth sincerely. That therefore which captivates their reasons, and leads men of sincerity blindfold from common sense, will, when examined, be found to be, what we are speaking of: some independent *ideas*, are by education, custom, and the constant din of their party so coupled in their minds, that they always appear there together, and they can no more separate them in their thoughts, than if they were but one *idea*; and they operate as if they were so. This gives sense to jargon, demonstration to absurdities, and consistency to nonsense, and is the foundation of the greatest, I had almost said, of all the errors in the world: or if it does not reach so far, it is at least the most dangerous one, since so far as it obtains it hinders men from seeing and examining. The confusion of two different *ideas* which a customary connexion of them in their minds hath to them in effect made but one, cannot but fill mens heads with false views, and their reasonings with false consequences.

Having thus given an account of the *Original*

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Sorts and *Extent* of our *ideas*, which are the inſtruments or materials of our knowledge, I ſhould immediately proceed to ſhew, what uſe the underſtanding makes of them, and what knowledge we have by them. But upon a nearer approach I find that there is ſo cloſe a connexion between *ideas* and *words*; and our abſtract *ideas* and general *words* have ſo conſtant a relation one to another, that it is impoſſible to ſpeak clearly and diſtinctly of our knowledge, which all conſiſts in propoſitions, without conſidering firſt, the Nature, Uſe, and Signification of Language, which therefore muſt be the buſineſs of the next Book.

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BOOK III.

CHAP. I.

Of Words or Language in General.

GOD having design'd man for a sociable creature, made him not only with an inclination, and under a necessity to have fellowship with those of his own kind, but furnished him also with *Language*, which was to be the great instrument and common tye of society. Man therefore had by nature his organs so fashioned, as to be fit to frame *articulate sounds*, which we call Words.

But besides articulate sounds (which birds may be taught to imitate) it was further necessary that he should be able to use *these sounds* as signs of *Internal Conceptions*, and make them stand as marks of the *ideas* in his mind, whereby they might be made known to others.

But neither is it enough for the perfection of language, that sounds can be made signs of *ideas*, unless these can be made use of, so as to comprehend several particular things; for the multiplication of words would have perplexed their use, had every particular thing need of a distinct name to be signified by. To remedy this inconvenience,

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Language had yet a farther improvement in the use of *General Terms*, whereby one word was made to mark a multitude of particular existences, which advantageous use of sounds was obtained only by the difference of the *ideas* they were made signs of. Those names becoming *general*, which are made to stand for *general ideas*; and those remaining *particular*, where the *ideas* they are used for are *particular*. There are other words which signify the *want* or *absence* of *ideas*, as *Ignorance*, *Barrenness*, &c. which relate to *positive ideas*, and signify their absence.

It is observable that the words which stand for Actions and Notions, quite removed from sense, are borrowed from sensible *ideas*, *v. g.* to Imagine, Apprehend, Comprehend, Understand, Adhere, Conceive, Instill, Disgust, Disturbance, Tranquility, *&c.* which are all taken from the Operations of Things Sensible, and applied to *modes of Thinking*. *Spirit* in its primary signification is no more than breath; *Angel* a messenger. By which we may guess what kind of notions they were, and whence derived; which filled the minds of the first beginners of languages, and how nature, even in the naming of things unawares, suggested to men the originals of all their knowledge: whilst to give names that might make known to others any operations they felt in themselves, or any other *ideas*, that came not under

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their ſenſes, they were fain to borrow words from the ordinary and known *ideas* of *Senſation*.

The better to underſtand the *Uſe* and *Force* of Language, as ſubſervient to Knowledge, it will be convenient to conſider,

Firſt, To what it is that *Names* in the uſe of Language are immediately applied.

Secondly, Since all (except proper names) are *General*, and ſo ſtand not for this or that ſingle thing, but for *Sorts* and *Ranks*: it will be neceſſary to conſider what thoſe ſorts and kinds of things are; wherein they conſiſt, and how they come to be made. This ſhall be conſidered in the following chapters.

CHAP. II.

Of the Signification of Words.

MAN, tho' he have great variety of thoughts, yet are they all within his own breaſt, inviſible and hidden from others, nor can of themſelves be made to appear. It was neceſſary therefore, for the comfort and advantage of Society, that man ſhould find out ſome *External Signs*, whereby thoſe inviſible *ideas* might be made known to others. For which purpoſe nothing was ſo fit, either for plenty or quickneſs, as thoſe *Articulate Sounds* he found himſelf able to make. Hence *words* came

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to be made use of by men, as signs of their *ideas*: not upon the account of any *natural* connexion between articulate sounds, and certain *ideas*; for then there would be but one Language amongst all men; but by a voluntary imposition, whereby such a word is made *arbitrarily* the mark of such an *idea*. The use then of words, is to be sensible marks of our *ideas*; and the *ideas* they stand for, are their *proper* and *immediate Significations*: in which they stand for nothing more but the *ideas* in the mind of him that uses them. For when a man speaks to another, it is that he may be understood; that is, that his *sounds* may make known his *ideas* to the hearer.

Words being voluntary Signs cannot be imposed on things we know not: this would be to make them signs of nothing, sounds without significations. A man cannot make his words the signs either of *Qualities* in things, or of *Conceptions* in the mind of another, whereof he has no *ideas* in his own.

Words in all mens mouths (that speak with any meaning) stand for the *ideas* which those that use them have, and which they would express by them. Thus a *Child* that takes notice of nothing more in the metal he hears called *Gold*, than the *Yellow Colour*, calls the same *colour* in a Peacock's tail *Gold*. Another, that hath better observed, adds to shining Yellow, great Weight; and then the

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found. Gold ſtands, when he uſes it, for a complex *idea* of a ſhining Yellow, and very weighey Subſtance.

Tho' words ſignifie properly nothing but the *ideas* in mens minds, yet they are in their thoughts ſecretly referred to *things* other things.

Firſt, They ſuppoſe their words to be marks of *ideas*, in the minds of other men with whom they communicate; elſe they could not diſcourſe intelligibly with one another: In this caſe men ſtand not to examine whether their *ideas* and thoſe of other men be the ſame; they think it enough that they uſe the word in the common acceptation of that Language.

Secondly, They ſuppoſe their words to ſtand alſo for the *reality of things*.

Words then being immediately the ſigns of mens *ideas*, whereby they expreſs their thoughts and imaginations to others, there ariſes by conſtant uſe ſuch a connexion between certain *ſounds* and the *ideas* they ſtand for; that the names heard almoſt as readily excite certain *ideas*, as if the objects themſelves were preſent to the ſenſes.

And becauſe we examine not preciſely the ſignification of words, we often in attentive conſideration ſet our thoughts more on words than things: nay, ſome (becauſe we often learn words before we know the *ideas* they ſtand for) ſpeak ſeveral words no otherwiſe than *Parrots* do, without any

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meaning at all. But so far as words are of use and signification, so far there is a constant connexion between the *sound* and *idea*; and a designation that the one stand for the other, without which application of them, they are nothing but insignificant noise.

Since then words signify only mens peculiar *ideas*, and that by an *arbitrary imposition*, it follows that every man has an inviolable liberty to make words stand for what *ideas* he pleases. It is true, common use by a tacit consent appropriates certain sounds to certain *ideas* in all Languages; which so far limits the signification of each sound, that unless a man applies it to the same *ideas*, he cannot *speak properly*: and unless a man's words excite the same *ideas* in the hearer, which he makes them stand for in speaking, he cannot *speak intelligibly*. But whatever be the consequence of any man's use of words, different either from their publick use, or that of the persons to whom he addresses them, this is certain, their signification in his use of them is limited to his *ideas*, and they can be signs of nothing else.

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CHAP. III.

Of General Terms.

ALL things that exist being Particulars, it might be expected that words should be so too in their signification: but we find it quite contrary; for most of the words that make all Languages are *General Terms*. This is the effect of Reason and Necessity, for,

First, It is impossible that every particular thing should have a distinct peculiar name, because it is impossible to have distinct *ideas* of every particular thing, to retain its name, with its peculiar appropriation to that *idea*.

Secondly, It would be *useless*, unless all could be supposed to have those same *ideas* in their minds: For names applied to particular things, whereof I alone have the *ideas* in my mind, could not be significant or intelligible to another, who is not acquainted with all those particular things which had fallen under my notice.

Thirdly, It would be of no great *use* for the *Improvement* of *Knowledge*: which, tho' founded in particular things, enlarges it self by general views; to which things reduced into sorts under general names, are properly subservient. In things where we have occasion to consider and discourse of *Indi-*

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viduals, and particulars, we use *proper* names: as in *Persons*, *Countries*, *Cities*, *Rivers*, *Mountains*, &c. Thus we see that Jockeys have particular names for their horses, because they often have occasion to mention this or that particular horse when he is out of sight.

The next thing to be considered, is how *General Words* come to be made. Words become general by being made signs of *General Ideas*: *ideas* become general by separating from them, the circumstances of Time, Place, or any other *ideas* that may determine them to this or that particular existence. By this way of *Abstraction*, they become capable of representing more Individuals, than one: each of which having a conformity to that abstract *idea*, is of that sort.

But it may not be amiss to trace our notions and names, from their beginning; and observe by what degrees we proceed and enlarge our *ideas*, from our first infancy. It is evident that the first *ideas Children* get, are only particular, as of the *Nurse* or *Mother*, and the names they give them are confined to these Individuals. Afterwards observing that there are a great many other things in the world, that resemble them in shape, and other qualities, they frame an *idea* which they find those many particulars do partake in; to that they give with others the name *Man* for example; in this they make nothing *new*, but only leave out of the

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complex *idea* they find of *Peter, James, Mary*, &c. that which is peculiar to each, and retain only what is common to all. And thus they come to have a general *name*, and a general *idea*.

By the same method they advance to more general names and notions. For observing several things that differ from this *idea of Man*, and cannot therefore be comprehended under that name, to agree with Man in some certain qualities, by retaining only those qualities, and uniting them into one *idea*, they have another more general *idea*, to which giving a name, they make a *term* of a more comprehensive extension. Thus by leaving out the shape, and some other properties signified by the name *Man*, and retaining only a body with life, sense, and spontaneous motion, we form the *idea*, signified by the name *Animal*. By the same way the mind proceeds to *Body*, *Substance*, and at last to *Being*, *Thing*, and such universal Terms which stand for any *idea* whatsoever. Hence we see that the whole mystery of *Genus* and *Species*, is nothing else but *abstract ideas* more or less comprehensive, with *names* annexed to them.

This shews us the reason why in defining words we make use of the *Genus*: namely to save the labour of enumerating the several simple *ideas* which the next general term stands for. From what has been said it is plain that *General* and *U-*

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universal belong not to the *real* existence of things; but are inventions of the Understanding made by it for its own use, and concern only signs, either *words* or *ideas*.

It must be considered in the next place, what kinds of signification it is that general words have. It is evident that they do not barely signify one particular thing: for then they would not be general terms, but proper names: neither do they signify a *Plurality*: for then *Man* and *Men* would signify the same thing; but that which they signify, is a *sort* of things, and this they do, by being made a *sign* of an *abstract idea* in the mind, to which *idea*, as things existing are found to agree, so they come to be ranked under that name, or to be of that sort. The *essences* then of the sorts or species of things, are nothing but these *abstract ideas*.

It is not denied here that Nature makes things alike, and so lays the foundation of this sorting and classing: but the *sorts* or *species* themselves are the workmanship of Human Understanding: so that every distinct *abstract idea*, is a distinct *Essence*, and the names that stand for such distinct *ideas*, are the names of things essentially different. Thus *Oval*, *Circle*, *Rain* and *Snow* are essentially different. To make this clearer, it may not be amiss to consider the several significations of the word *Essence*.

First, It may be taken for the very being of any thing whereby it is, what it is, thus the real internal, (but unknown) constitution in *Substances*, may be called their *Essence*. This is the proper signification of the word.

Secondly, In the *Schools* the word Essence has been almost wholly applyed to the artificial constitution of *Genus* and *Species*; it is true, there is ordinarily supposed a real constitution of the sorts of things: and it is past doubt there must be some real constitution, on which any collection of *simple ideas*, co-existing, must depend. But it being evident, that things are ranked into sorts, under names only as they agree to certain *abstract ideas*, to which we have annexed those names, the essence of each *Genus* or *Species*, is nothing but the *abstract idea*, which the name stands for; this the word *Essence* imports in its most familiar use.

These two sorts of *Essence* may not unfitly be termed the one *Real*, the other *Nominal*. Between the nominal Essence and the name, there is so near a connexion, that the name of any sort of things, cannot be attributed to any particular being, but what has the Essence whereby it answers that *abstract idea*, whereof that name is the sign.

Concerning the real Essences of corporeal Substances, there are two opinions.

First, Some using the word *Essence* for they know not what, suppose a certain number of those *Es-*

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species, according to which all natural things are made, and of which they equally partake, and do become of this or of that species.

Secondly, Others look on all natural things to have a real, but unknown constitution of their insensible parts, from whence flow their sensible qualities, which serve us to distinguish them one from another; and according to which we rank them into sorts, under common denominations. The former supposition seems irreconcilable with the frequent production of monsters, in all the species of Animals: since it is impossible that two things partaking of the same real *Essence*, should have different *Properties*. But were there no other reason against it; yet the supposition of Essences which cannot be known, and yet the making them to be that which distinguisheth the species of things, is so wholly useless and unserviceable to any part of *Knowledge*, that that alone were sufficient to make us lay it by.

We may further observe that the nominal, and real Essences of *simple ideas* and *modes*, are always the same: but in *Substances* always quite different. Thus a figure including a space between three lines, is the real as well as nominal Essence of a triangle; it being that foundation from which all its properties flow, and to which they are inseparably annexed; but it is far otherwise in *Gold* or any other sort of *Substance*; it is the real consti-

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tution of its insensible parts, on which depend all those Properties that are to be found in it; which constitution since we know not, nor have any particular *idea* of, we can have no name that is the sign of it. But yet so is its *Colour*, *Weight*, *Fusibility*, and *Fixedness*, &c. which makes it to be *Gold*, or gives it a right to that name; which is therefore its *nominal Essence*, since nothing can be called *Gold* but what has a conformity to that abstract complex *idea*, to which that name is annexed.

That Essences are but abstract *ideas*, may farther appear by their being held ingenerable and incorruptible. This cannot be true of the real constitution of things. All things in Nature (save the *Author* of it) are liable to change: their *real Essences* and Constitutions are destroyed and perish: but as they are *ideas* established in the mind, they remain immutable. For whatever becomes of *Alexander* or *Bucephalus*, the *ideas* of man and horse remain the same. By these means the Essence of a *Species* rests safe and entire, without the existence of one *Individual* of that kind.

It is evident then that this doctrine of the immutability of Essences proves them to be only abstract *ideas*, and is founded on the relation established between them and certain sounds, as signs of them, and will always be true, as long as the same name can have the same signification.

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CHAP. IV.

Of the Names of Simple Ideas.

WORDS tho' they ſignifie nothing immediately, but the *ideas* in the mind of the Speaker; yet we ſhall find that the names of ſimple *Ideas*, mixed *Modes*, and natural *Subſtances* have each of them ſomething peculiar. And,

Firſt, The names of *ſimple Ideas* and *ſubſtances*, with the abſtract *Ideas* in the Mind, intimate ſome *real Exiſtence*, from which was derived their original pattern: but the names of *mixed Modes* terminate in the *idea* that is in the Mind.

Secondly, The names of *ſimple Ideas* and *Modes* ſignifie the *real* as well as *nominal* Eſſences of their ſpecies: the names of *ſubſtances* ſignifie rarely, if ever any thing, but barely the *nominal Eſſences* of thoſe ſpecies.

Thirdly, The names of *ſimple Ideas* are not capable of *Definitions*; thoſe of *complex Ideas* are: the reaſon of which I ſhall ſhew from the nature of our *ideas*, and the ſignification of *words*.

It is agreed that a *Definition* is nothing elſe but the ſhewing the meaning of one word, by ſeveral other, *not ſynonymous Terms*. The meaning of words being only the *ideas* they are made to ſtand

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for; the meaning of any term is then shewed, or the word defined, when by other words the *idea* it is made the sign of, is as it were, represented or set before the view of another, and thus its signification ascertained. The names then of *simple ideas* are incapable of being defined, because the several terms of a Definition signifying several *ideas*, they can altogether by no means represent an *idea* which has no composition at all, and therefore a Definition, which is but the shewing of the meaning of one word, by several others not signifying each the same thing, can in the names of simple *ideas* have no place.

The not observing this difference in our *ideas*, has occasioned those *trifling* Definitions which are given us of some simple *ideas*: such as is that of *motion*, viz. *The Act of a Being in Power, as far forth as in Power.*

The Atomists who define Motion to be a *Passage* from one place to another, what do they more than put one synonymous word for another? For what is *Passage* other than a Motion? Nor will the successive application of the parts of the superficies of one body to those of another, which the *Cartesians* give us, prove a much better definition of Motion when well examined.

The Act of Perspicuous, as far forth as perspicuous, is another Peripatetick definition of a simple *idea*, which it is certain can never make the mean-

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ing of the word *Light*, which it pretends to define, underſtood by a blind man. And when the *Carteſians* tell us, that Light is a great number of little globules ſtriking briſkly on the bottom of the eye; theſe words would never make the *idea* the word Light ſtands for, known to a man that had it not before.

Simple ideas then can only be got by the impreſſions objects make on our minds, by the proper *In-letts* appointed to each ſort. If they are not received this way, all the words in the world will never be able to produce in us the *ideas* they ſtand for. Words being ſounds, can produce in us no other ſimple *ideas* than of thoſe very ſounds, nor excite any in us, but by that voluntary connexion which they have with ſome *ideas* which common uſe has made them ſigns of: and therefore he that has not before received into his mind by the proper In-lett the ſimple *idea*, which any word ſtands for, can never come to know the ſignification of that word, by any other words or ſounds whatſoever.

But in *complex ideas* which conſiſt of ſeveral ſimple ones, the caſe is quite otherwiſe; for words ſtanding for thoſe ſeveral *ideas* that make up the compoſition, may imprint complex *ideas* in the mind, that never were there before, and ſo make their names be underſtood. In them definitions take place. Thus the word *Rainbow*; to one who

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knew all those colours, but yet had never seen that *Phoenomenon*, might, by enumerating the *Figure*, *Largeness*, *Position*, and *Order* of the *Colours*, be so well defined, that it might be perfectly understood.

The names of simple *Ideas*, *Substances*, and *mixed Modes* have also this difference, that those of *mixed Modes* stand for *ideas* perfectly arbitrary: Those of *Substances* are not perfectly so, but refer to a pattern, tho' with some latitude; and those of simple *ideas* are perfectly taken from the existence of things, and are not arbitrary at all.

The names of *simple modes* differ little from those of *simple ideas*.

CHAP. V.

Of the Names of Mixed Modes *and Relations.*

THE names of *mixed Modes* being general, stand for *abstract ideas* in the mind, as other general names do; but they have something peculiar which may deserve our attention.

And *First*, the *ideas* they stand for, or if you please the essences of the several species of mixed *Modes*, are made by the understanding; wherein they differ from those of *simple ideas*.

Secondly, They are made arbitrarily, without patterns, or reference to any real existence, where-

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in they differ from those of *Substances*. The mind unites and retains certain collections, as so many distinct specifick *ideas*, whilst other combinations that as often in nature occur, and are as plainly suggested by outward things, pass neglected without particular names, or specifications.

The mind in forming those complex *ideas*, makes no new *idea*, but only puts together those which it had before, wherein it does *three* things. *First*, It chuses a certain number. *Secondly*, It gives them connexion, and combines them into one *idea*. *Thirdly*, It ties them together by a name; all this may be done before any one individual of that species of Modes ever existed: as the *ideas* of *Sacrilege* or *Adultery* might be framed, before either of them was committed; and we cannot doubt but law-makers have often made laws about species of Actions, which were only the creatures of their own understanding.

But tho' *mixed Modes* depend on the mind, and are made arbitrarily; yet they are not made at random, and jumbled together without any reason at all, but are always made for the convenience of communication, which is the chief end of language, and therefore such combinations are only made, as men have frequent occasion to mention. Thus men having joined to the *idea* of killing the *idea* of *Father* and *Mother*, and so made a distinct species from the killing a man's *Son* or *Neighbour*,

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becauſe of the different heinouſneſs of the crime, and the diſtinct puniſhment due to it, found it neceſſary to mention it by a diſtinct name, which is the end of making that diſtinct combination.

In *mixed Modes* it is the *name* that ſeems to preſerve their Eſſences, and to give them their laſting duration. The collection of *ideas* is made by the mind, but the name is as it were the *Knot* which ties them faſt together: hence we ſeldom take any other for diſtinct ſpecies of *mixed Modes*, but ſuch as are ſet out by names. We muſt obſerve that the names of *mixed Modes* always ſignifie the real Eſſences of their ſpecies, which being nothing but the abſtract complex *ideas*, and not referred to the real exiſtence of things; there is no ſuppoſition of any thing more ſignified by any name of a *mixed Mode*, but barely that *complex idea* the mind it ſelf has formed: which when the mind has formed, is all it would expreſs by it, and is that on which all the properties of the *ſpecies* depend, and from which alone they flow; and ſo in theſe the *real* and *nominal* Eſſence is the ſame.

This alſo ſhews the reaſon why the *names* of *mixed Modes* are commonly got, before the *ideas* they ſtand for are perfectly known: becauſe there being no ſpecies of theſe ordinarily taken notice of, but ſuch as have names, and thoſe ſpecies being *complex ideas* made arbitrarily by the mind, it is convenient, if not neceſſary, to know the names,

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before we learn the *complex ideas*; unless a man will fill his head with a company of abstract *complex ideas*, which others having no names for, he has nothing to do with, but to lay by, and forget again. In the beginning of languages it was necessary to have the *idea* before one gave it the *name*; and so it is still, where a *new complex idea* is to be made, and a name given it. In *simple ideas* and *substances* I grant it is otherwise; which being such *ideas* as have real existence and union in nature, the *ideas* or names are got, one before the other, as it happens.

What has been said here of *mixed Modes*, is with very little difference applicable to *Relations* also; which since every man himself may observe, I may spare my self the pains to enlarge on.

CHAP. VI.

Of the Names of Substances.

THE common *names* of *Substances* stand for sorts as well as other general terms; that is, for such *complex ideas*, wherein several particular Substances do, or might agree, by virtue of which they are capable to be comprehended in one common conception, and be signified by one name; I say, *do* or *might agree*, for tho' there be but one

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Sun existing, yet the *idea* of it being abstracted, *is* as much a *sort*, as if there were as many Suns as there are stars.

The measure and boundary of each sort whereby it is constituted that *particular sort*, and distinguished from others, is what we call its *Essence*; which is nothing but that abstract *idea* to which that name is annexed, so that every thing contained in that *idea*, is essential to that sort. This I call *Nominal Essence*, to distinguish it from that real constitution of *substances*, on which this *Nominal Essence*, and all the properties of that sort depend, and may be called its *real Essence*: thus the *nominal Essence* of *Gold* is that *complex idea* the word *Gold* stands for, let it be for instance a *Body*, Yellow, Weighty, Malleable, Fusible, and Fixed: but its real *Essence* is the constitution of its insensible parts, on which those qualities, and all its other properties depend; which is wholly unknown to us.

That *Essence* in the ordinary use of the word relates to *Sorts*, appears from hence, that if you take away the abstract *ideas* by which we sort Individuals, and rank them under common names, then the thought of any thing essential to any of them instantly vanishes: we have no notion of the one without the other, which plainly shews their Relation. No property is thought essential to any Individual whatsoever, till the mind re-

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fers it to ſome ſort or *ſpecies* of Things, and then preſently, according to the abſtract *idea* of that ſort, ſomething is found eſſential; ſo that eſſential or not eſſential, relates only to our abſtract *ideas*, and the names annexed to them, which amounts to no more but this, that whatever particular thing has not in it thoſe qualities contained in the *abſtract idea* which any general term ſtands for, cannot be ranked under that ſpecies, nor be called by that name; ſince that *abſtract idea* is the very Eſſence of that *ſpecies*. Thus if the *idea* of *Body* with ſome people be bare Extenſion, or Space, then *Solidity* is not eſſential to *Body*: if others make the *idea*, to which they give the name *Body* to be Solidity and Extenſion; then Solidity is eſſential alſo to *Body*. That alone therefore is conſidered as eſſential, which makes a part of the *complex idea* the name of a Sort ſtands for, without which no particular thing can be reckoned of that ſort, nor be entituled to that name.

Subſtances are diſtinguiſhed into *Sorts* and *Species* by their *nominal Eſſence*; for it is that alone, that the name which is the mark of the Sort ſignifies: and the *ſpecies* of Things to us are nothing but the ranking them under diſtinct names, according to the *complex ideas* in *Us*, and not according to preciſe, diſtinct, *real Eſſences* in *Them*.

We cannot rank and ſort Things by their *real Eſſences*, becauſe we know them not: our facul-

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ties carry us no farther in the knowledge of Substances, than a collection of those sensible *ideas* we observe in them. But the internal Constitution whereon their properties depend, is utterly unknown to us. This is evident when we come to examine but the *stones* we tread on, or the *iron* we daily handle: we soon find that we know not their make, and can give no reason of the different qualities we find in them; and yet how infinitely these come short of the fine contrivances and unconceivable real Essences of *Plants* and *Animals*, every one knows. The workmanship of the All-wise and Powerful *God* in the great fabrick of the Universe, and every part thereof farther exceeds the comprehension of the most inquisitive and intelligent man, than the best contrivance of the most ingenious man, doth the conceptions of the most ignorant of rational creatures. In vain therefore do we pretend to range things into *sorts*, and dispose them into certain *Classes*, under names by their *real Essences*, that are so far from our discovery or comprehension.

But tho' the *nominal Essences* of Substances are made by the mind, they are not yet made so arbitrarily as those of mixed Modes. To the making of any *nominal Essence*, it is necessary,

First, That the *ideas* whereof it consists, have such an union as to make but one *idea*, how compounded soever.

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Secondly, That the particular *ideas* so united be exactly the same, neither more or less: for if two abstract complex *ideas* differ either in *number* or *sorts* of their component parts, they make two different, and not one and the same Essence.

In the *First* of these, the mind in making its *complex ideas* of Substances, only follows *Nature*, and puts none together which are not supposed to have an union in nature. For men observing certain qualities always joined and existing together therein copy nature, and of *ideas* so united, make their complex ones of Substances.

Secondly, Tho' the mind in making its complex *ideas* of Substances, never puts any together that do not *really*, or are not supposed to co-exist: yet the number it combines depends upon the various care, industry or fancy of him that makes it. Men generally content themselves with some few obvious qualities, and often leave out others as material and as firmly united as those that they take in.

In Bodies organized and propagated by Seeds, as *Vegetables* and *Animals*, the *shape* is that which to us is the leading quality, and most characteristical part that determines the *species*: in most other bodies not propagated by seed, it is the *colour* we chiefly fix on, and are most led by. Thus where we find the colour of *Gold*, we are apt to imagine all the other qualities comprehended in our complex *idea* of *Gold*, to be there also.

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Tho' the *nominal* Eſſences of Subſtances are all ſuppoſed to be copied from Nature, yet they are all, or moſt of them, very imperfect: and ſince the compoſition of thoſe complex *ideas* is in ſeveral men very different, we may conclude that theſe boundaries of ſpecies are as *Men*, and not as *Nature* makes them; if at leaſt there are in Nature any ſuch prefixed bounds.

It is true, that many particular Subſtances are ſo made by Nature, that they have an agreement and likeneſs one with another, and ſo afford a foundation of being ranked into Sorts: but the *ſorting* of things by us, being in order to naming and comprehending them under general terms, I cannot ſee how it can be properly ſaid, that Nature ſets the *boundaries* of the ſpecies of things. But if it be ſo, our *boundaries* of ſpecies, are not exactly conformable to Nature.

If the firſt ſorting of Individuals depends on the mind of man, variouſly collecting the ſimple *ideas*, that make the *nominal* Eſſence of the loweſt ſpecies; it is much more evident, that the more *comprehenſive Claſſes*, called *Genera*, do ſo. In forming more general *ideas* that may comprehend different ſorts, the mind leaves out thoſe qualities that diſtinguiſh them, and puts into its new collection only ſuch *ideas* as are common to ſeveral ſorts. Thus by leaving out thoſe qualities which are peculiar to Gold, Silver, *&c.* and retaining a complex *idea*,

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made up of thoſe that are common to each ſpecies, there is a new *Genus* conſtituted, to which the name *Metal* is annexed.

So that in this whole buſineſs of *Genera* and *Species*, the *Genus* or more comprehenſive, is but a partial conception of what is in the *Species*, and the *ſpecies* but a partial *idea* of what is to be found in each *Individual*. In all which there is no new thing made, but only more or leſs comprehenſive ſigns, whereby we may be enabled to expreſs in a few ſyllables great numbers of particular things, as they agree in more or leſs general conceptions, which we have framed to that purpoſe. If theſe *abſtract general ideas* be thought to be compleat, it can only be in reſpect of a certain eſtabliſhed relation between them, and certain names, which are made uſe of to ſignifie them, and not in reſpect of any thing exiſting as made by Nature.

This is adjuſted to the true end of Speech, which is to be the eaſieſt and ſhorteſt way of communicating our notions. This is the proper buſineſs of *Genus* and *Species*: and this men do without any conſideration of real eſſences, and ſubſtantial forms, which come not within the reach of our knowledge, when we think of thoſe things; nor within the ſignification of our words when we diſcourſe with others.

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CHAP. VII.

Of Particles.

BEſides words which are the names of *ideas* in the mind, there are others made uſe of to ſignifie the *Connexion* that the mind gives to *ideas* or propoſitions one with another, and to intimate ſome particular *Action* of its own at that time relating to thoſe *ideas*. This it does ſeveral ways; as *is*, *is Not*, are marks of the mind affirming or denying: beſides which, the mind does in declaring its ſentiments to others connect not only the parts of propoſitions, but whole ſentences one to another with their ſeveral relations, and depehdencies to make a coherent diſcourſe.

The words ſignifying that connexion the mind gives to ſeveral affirmations and negations, that it unites in one continued Reaſoning or Narration, are called *Particles*. And it is in the right uſe of theſe, that more particularly conſiſts the clearneſs and beauty of a *Good Stile*. To expreſs the dependence of his Thoughts and Reaſonings one upon another, a man muſt have words to ſhew what connexion, reſtriction, diſtinction, oppoſition, emphaſis, *&c.* he gives to each reſpective part of his diſcourſe.

Theſe cannot be underſtood rightly, without a clear view of the poſtures, ſtands, turns, limitati-

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ons, exceptions, and ſeveral other thoughts of the mind: of theſe there are a great variety, much exceeding the number of Particles that moſt languages have to expreſs them by; for which reaſon it happens, that moſt of theſe Particles have divers, and ſometimes almoſt oppoſite ſignifications. Thus the particle *But* in *Engliſh*, has ſeveral very different ſignifications; as, *But to ſay no more:* here it intimates a ſtop of the mind in the courſe it was going, before it came to the end of it. *I ſaw but two Planets*: here it ſhews that the mind limits the ſenſe to what is expreſſed with a Negation of all other: *You pray, but it is not that God would bring you to the true Religion, but that he would confirm you in your own.* The former of theſe intimates a ſuppoſition in the mind of ſomething otherwiſe than it ſhould be: the latter ſhews, that the mind makes a direct oppoſition between that and what goes before. *All Animals have ſenſe, but a Dog is an Animal.* Here it ſignifies the connexion of the latter propoſition with the former. To theſe, divers other ſignifications of this Particle might be added, if it were my buſineſs to examine it in its full latitude.

I intend not here a full explication of this ſort of Signs, the inſtances I have given in this one, may give occaſion to reflect on their uſe and force in language, and lead us into the contemplation of ſeveral actions of our minds in diſcourſing,

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which it has found a way to intimate to others by theſe *Particles*, ſome whereof conſtantly, and others in certain conſtructions, have the ſenſe of a whole ſentence contained in them.

CHAP. VIII.

Of abſtract and concrete Terms.

THE Mind, as has been ſhewn, has a power to *abſtract* its *idea*, whereby the Sorts of Things are diſtinguiſhed: now each *abſtract idea* being diſtinct, ſo that the one can never be the other, the mind will, by its intuitive knowledge perceive their difference; and therefore in propoſitions, no two whole *ideas* can ever be affirmed one of another: nor does the common uſe of language permit that any two abſtract words or names of *abſtract ideas*, ſhould be affirmed one of another. All our affirmations are only in *Concrete*, which is the affirming one *abſtract idea* to be joined to another: which abſtract *ideas* in *Subſtances*, may be of any ſort, tho' the moſt of them are of *Powers*: in all the reſt theſe are little elſe but Relations.

All our ſimple *ideas* have *abſtract* as well as *concrete* names, as *Whiteneſs White*, *Sweetneſs Sweet*, &c. The like alſo holds in our *ideas* of Modes and Relations, as *Juſtice Juſt*, *Equality Equal*, &c. But as to our *ideas* of Subſtances, we have very few abſtract names at all. Thoſe few that the

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ſchools have forged, as *Animalitas*, *Humanitas*; &c. hold no proportion with the infinite number of names of ſubſtances, and could never get admittance into common uſe, or obtain the licence of publick approbation; which ſeems to intimate the confeſſion of all mankind, that they have no *ideas* of the real Eſſences of Subſtances, ſince they have not names for ſuch *ideas*. It was only the doctrine of *ſubſtantial Forms*, and the confidence of miſtaken Pretenders to a Knowledge they had not, which firſt coin'd, and then introduced *Animalitas*, *Humanitas*, and the like: which yet went very little farther than their own ſchools, and could never get to be current amongſt underſtanding men.

CHAP. IX.

Of the Imperfection of Words.

TO examine the *Perfection* or *Imperfection* of Words, it is neceſſary to conſider their uſe and end, which is twofold, *Firſt*, to *record* our own thoughts: *Secondly*, to *communicate* our thoughts to others: the *Firſt* is for the help of our own memories, whereby we do as it were talk to our ſelves: for this purpoſe any Words may ſerve the turn: words being *arbitrary ſigns*, we may uſe which we pleaſe for this purpoſe; and there will be no Imperfection in them, if we conſtantly uſe the ſame *ſign* for the ſame *idea*.

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Secondly, As to *Communication* by Words; that too has a double uſe: *Firſt*, Their *Civil Uſe*, which is ſuch a Communication of thoughts and *ideas* by Words, as may ſerve in common Converſation and Commerce, about the ordinary Affairs and Conveniencies of civil Life. *Secondly*, The *philoſophical* uſe of Words, by which I mean ſuch an uſe of them, as may ſerve to convey the preciſe notions of things, and to expreſs certain Truths in general Propoſitions, theſe two uſes are very diſtinct, and a great deal leſs exactneſs will ſerve in the one, than in the other.

The end of Language in Communication is to be *underſtood*; that is, to excite by ſounds in the *hearer*, the ſame *idea* which they ſtand for in the mind of the *ſpeaker*. The doubtfulneſs and uncertainty of their ſignification, which is the imperfection we are here ſpeaking of, has its cauſe more in the *ideas* themſelves than in any incapacity in the *ſounds* to ſignifie them; for in that regard they are all equally perfect. That then which makes the difference, is the difference of *ideas* they ſtand for, which muſt be learned and retained by thoſe, who would diſcourſe together intelligibly. Now this is difficult in theſe caſes,

Firſt, Where the *ideas* they ſtand for are very complex. Hence the names of *mixed Modes* are liable to great uncertainty and obſcurity in their ſignification. For here the *idea* being made up of

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many parts, it is not easy to form and retain it exactly; of this sort chiefly are moral Words, which have seldom in two different men, the same precise signification.

Secondly, Where the *ideas* they stand for, have no certain connexion in nature, and therefore no settled *standard* to rectifie and adjust them by. This again is the case of the names of *mixed Modes*, which are assemblages of *ideas* put together at pleasure. Common use indeed regulates the meaning of Words pretty well for common Conversation: but it is not sufficient to adjust them to philosophical discourses, there being scarce a name of any very *complex idea*, which in common use has not a great latitude; and is not made the sign of far different *ideas*.

The way of learning these names does not a little contribute to the doubtfulness of their signification. For we may observe that children are taught the names of simple *ideas*, and substances, by having the things shewn them; and then they repeat the name that stands for it; as *White*, *Sweet*, *Milk*, *Sugar*, &c. But in mixed *Modes* the sounds are learned first, and men are to learn afterwards their signification, by their own observation and industry, or the explication of others: which is the reason that these words are little more than *bare sounds* in the minds of most, because few are at the pains to settle their *ideas* and notions precisely;

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and those which are, make them the signs of *ideas*, different from what others understand by them, which is the occasion of most disputes.

Thirdly, Where the signification of a word is referred to a *standard* which is not easily known: this is the case of the names of *substances*, which being supposed to stand for their *real Essences*, must needs be of uncertain application, because these Essences are utterly unknown; and it will be impossible to know what is, or is not *Antimony*, *v. g.* when that word is to stand for the real Essence of it; whereof we have no *idea* at all.

Or suppose these names only stand for simple *ideas*, found to co-exist in *substances*, yet thus they will be liable to great uncertainty too: because these simple *ideas* being very numerous, men frame different *ideas* of the same subjects, by putting different *ideas* into their complex one, of such substances several men observe several properties in the same substance, and none of them all; who having but imperfect descriptions of things, can have but uncertain significations of words.

Fourthly, Where the signification of the word, and the real Essence of the thing, are not the same, which is still the case of substances, from hence we may observe,

First, That the names of simple *ideas* are least liable to mistakes: *First*, Because the *ideas* they stand for, being each but one single perception, are

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easier got, and more clearly retained, than the more complex ones of Substances and mixed Modes. *Secondly*, Because they are not referred to any other Essence, but barely that perception they immediately signify.

Secondly, Names of *simple Modes* are next to *simple ideas* least liable to doubt or uncertainty, especially those of *Figure* and *Number*, of which men have so clear and distinct *ideas*.

Thirdly, In *mixed Modes*, when they are composed of a few and obvious *ideas*, their names are clear and distinct enough; otherwise doubtful and uncertain.

Fourthly, The names of *substances* being annexed to *ideas*, that are neither the real Essences, nor exact Representations of things, are liable yet to greater Imperfection, when we come to a philosophical use of them.

CHAP. X.

Of the Abuse of Words.

BEside the natural and unavoidable Imperfections of Languages, there are *wilful Faults* and *Neglects*, which men are often guilty of in their use of words. For,

First, They use words *without clear and distinct* Ideas, or, which is worse, signs without any thing signified; such are for the most part introduced by

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ſects of Philoſophy and Religion, either out of an affectation of *ſingularity*, or to ſupport ſome ſtrange *Opinion*; or to cover the weakneſs of their *Hypotheſis*. Theſe are commonly ſuch as had no determinate collection of *ideas* annexed to them, when they were firſt invented; or at leaſt ſuch, as if well examined will be found inconſiſtent, and therefore may juſtly be called inſignificant terms: inſtances of this kind may eaſily be had from the *ſchool-men* and *metaphyſicians*. Others learn words which the propriety of language has affixed to very important *ideas*, and often upon occaſion uſe them without any diſtinct meaning at all: whence their notions being unſteady and confuſed, their diſcourſe muſt be filled with empty unintelligible *Noiſe* and *Jargon*, eſpecially in moral matters where the words ſtand for arbitrary, and numerous collections of *ideas*, not regularly and permanently united in Nature.

Secondly, Another Abuſe is *Inconſtancy in the uſe of Words*; it is hard to find a diſcourſe on any ſubject wherein the ſame words are not uſed ſometimes for one collection of *ideas*, ſometimes for another. The wilful doing whereof can be imputed to nothing but great folly, or greater diſhoneſty: and a man in his accompts with another, may with as much fairneſs make the characters of numbers, ſtand ſometimes for one, and ſometimes for another collection of *Unites*; as in his

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diſcourſe, or reaſoning, make the ſame words ſtand for different collections of ſimple *ideas*.

Thirdly, Another is an *affected obſcurity*, either by uſing old words in new ſignifications, or by introducing new and ambiguous terms, without defining them; or putting them together, ſo as to confound their ordinary meaning. Tho' the *Peripatetick philoſophy* has been moſt eminent in this way, yet other ſects have not been wholly clear of it. The admir'd *art of diſputing* hath added much to the natural imperfection of Languages, whilſt it has been made uſe of, and fitted to perplex the ſignification of words, more than to diſcover the Knowledge and Truth of things: and he that will look into that ſort of learned writings, will find the words there much more obſcure, uncertain, and undetermined in their meaning, than they are in ordinary Converſation.

Fourthly, Another is the *taking words for things*: this, tho' it in ſome degree concerns all names in general; yet more particularly affects thoſe of Subſtances. Thus in the *Peripatetick Philoſophy*, *Subſtantial Forms*, *Abhorrence of Vacuum*, &c. are taken for ſomething real. To this Abuſe thoſe men are moſt ſubject, who confine their thoughts to any one *ſyſtem*; and give themſelves up into a firm belief of the perfection of any received *Hypotheſis*; whereby they come to be perſuaded, that the terms of that ſect, are ſo ſuited to the nature of

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things, that they perfectly correſpond with their real exiſtence.

Fifthly, Another is the *ſetting them in the place of things which they can by no means ſignify*. We may obſerve that in the general names of Subſtances, whereof the nominal Eſſences are only known to us, when we affirm or deny any thing about them, we do moſt commonly tacitly ſuppoſe or intend they ſhould ſtand for the real Eſſence of a certain ſort of Subſtances. Thus when a man ſays *Gold* is *malleable*, he would inſinuate ſomething more than this, what I call *Gold* is *malleable*, (tho' truly it amounts to no more) *namely*, that what has the real Eſſence of *Gold* is *malleable*, that is, that *malleableneſs* depends on, and is inſeparable from the real Eſſence of *Gold*. But a man not knowing wherein that real Eſſence conſiſts, the connexion in his mind of *malleableneſs*, is not truly with an *Eſſence* he knows not, but with the ſound *Gold* he puts for it. It is true, the names of Subſtances would be much more uſeful; and Propoſitions expreſt by them much more certain, were the real Eſſences of Subſtances the *ideas* in our minds, which thoſe words ſignified. And it is for want of thoſe real Eſſences that our words convey ſo little knowledge, or certainty in our diſcourſes about them. But to ſuppoſe theſe names to ſtand for a thing, having the real Eſſence on which the properties depend, is ſo far from diminiſhing the im-

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perfection of our words, that by a plain abuse it adds to it; when we would make them stand for something, which not being in our complex *ideas*, the name we use can no way be the sign of it. In *mixed Modes*, any *idea* of the complex one being left out, or changed, it is allowed to be another thing, that is, to be of another *species*, as is plain in *Chance-medley*, *Man-slaughter*, *Murder*, &c. because the complex *idea* signified by that name, is the *real* as well as *nominal* Essence; and there is no secret reference of that name to any other Essence, but that. But in Substances it is not so; for tho' in that called *Gold*, one puts in his complex *idea*, what another leaves out, and *vice versa*, yet men do not usually think the species changed, because they refer the name in their minds to a real immutable Essence of a thing existing, on which those properties depend: but this reference of the name to a thing we have not the *idea* of, is so far from helping us at all, that it only serves the more to involve us in difficulties. This reference is grounded on this supposition, namely, that the same precise internal constitution goes always with the same specifick name: in which are contained these two false *Suppositions*.

First, That there are certain precise *Essences*, according to which Nature makes all particular things, and by which they are distinguished into *species*.

Secondly, This tacitly insinuates as if we had *i-*

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deas of these Essences; for why do we enquire, whether this or that thing have the real Essence of that species *man* for instance, if we did not suppose it known, which yet is utterly false; and therefore such applications of names as would make them stand for *ideas* we have not, must needs cause great disorder in discourse and reasonings about them; and be a great inconvenience in our communication by words.

Sixthly, Another more general, tho' less observed, abuse of words, is, that men having by long and familiar use, annexed to them certain *ideas*, they *are apt to imagine so near and necessary a connexion, between the names, and the significations they use them in, that they forwardly suppose one cannot but understand what their meaning is*; as if it were past doubt, that in the use of these common received sounds, the speaker and hearer had necessarily the same precise *ideas*. And so likewise taking the words of others, as naturally standing for just, what they themselves have been accustomed to apply them to, they never trouble themselves to explain their own, or understand another's meaning: from whence commonly proceeds noise, and wrangling without improvement or information; whilst men take words to be the constant regular marks of agreed notions, which in truth are no more but the voluntary and unsteady signs of their own *ideas*.

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Thus *life*, is a term, none more familiar: any one almoſt would take it for an affront, to be aſked what he meant by it, and yet if it comes in queſtion, whether ſuch a thing has *life*, or not, it is eaſy to perceive, that a clear diſtinct ſettled *idea*, does not always accompany the uſe of ſo known a word.

Seventhly, *Figurative Speech* is alſo an abuſe of Language: for tho' in diſcourſes, where we ſeek rather pleaſure and delight, than information and improvement, ſuch ornaments, as are borrowed from figurative ſpeeches and alluſions, can ſcarce paſs for faults; yet if we would ſpeak of things as they are, we muſt allow, that all the *art of rhetorick*, beſides order and clearneſs, all the artificial and figurative application of words, eloquence hath invented, are for nothing elſe but to inſinuate wrong *ideas*, move the paſſions, and thereby miſlead the judgment, and ſo indeed are perfect cheat. And therefore however allowable they may be in harangues and popular addreſſes; they are certainly in all diſcourſes that pretend to inform and inſtruct, wholly to be avoided; and where truth and knowledge are concerned, cannot but be thought a great fault, either of the language or perſon that makes uſe of them.

To conclude this conſideration, the *ends* of *language* in our diſcourſe with others, are chiefly theſe *three*.

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First, To make our thoughts or *ideas* known to another; this we fail in 1*st*, When we use names without clear and distinct *ideas* in our minds. 2*dly*, When we apply received names to *ideas*, to which the common use of that language does not apply them. 3*dly*, When we apply them unsteadily, making them stand now for one, and by and by for another *idea*.

Secondly, To make known our thoughts *with as much ease* and quickness as is possible. This men fail in when they have complex *ideas*, without having distinct names for them, which may happen either through the defect of a language, which has none, or the fault of that man who has not yet learned them.

Thirdly, To convey the knowledge of things: this cannot be done, but when our *ideas* agree to the reality of things.

He that hath *names* without *ideas*, wants meaning in his words, and speaks only empty sounds: he that hath *complex ideas*, without names for them, wants dispatch in his expression. He that uses his words loosely and unsteadily, will either not be minded, or not understood. He that applies his names to *ideas*, different from their common use, wants *propriety* in his language, and speaks gibberish. And he that hath *ideas* of *substances*, disagreeing with the real existence of things, so far wants the materials of true knowledge in his

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underſtanding, and has inſtead thereof, *chimeras*.

Language being the great conduit whereby men convey their diſcoveries, reaſonings, and knowledge from one to another; he that makes an ill uſe of it, tho' he does not corrupt the fountains of knowledge which are in things themſelves, yet he does as much as in him lies, break or ſtop the pipes whereby it is diſtributed to the publick uſe and advantage of mankind. He that uſes words without any clear and ſteady meaning, what does he but lead himſelf and others into errors? And he that deſignedly does it, ought to be look'd on as an enemy to truth and knowledge.

If we look into books of controverſie of any kind, we ſhall ſee that the effect of obſcure, unſteady and equivocal terms, is nothing but noiſe and wrangling about ſounds, without convincing or bettering a man's underſtanding. For if the *idea* be not agreed on between ſpeaker and hearer, for which the words ſtand, the argument is not about *things* but *names*.

It deſerves to be conſidered, and carefully examined, whether the greateſt part of the diſputes in the world, are not merely *verbal*, and about the ſignification of words; and that if the terms they are made in were defined and reduced in their ſignifications, to the ſingle *ideas* they ſtand for, thoſe diſputes would not end of themſelves, and immediately vaniſh.

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CHAP. XI.

Of the Remedies of the foregoing Imperfections and Abuſes.

TO remedy the defects of ſpeech above-mentioned, the following rules may be of uſe.

Firſt, A man ſhould take care to uſe no word without a ſignification, no *name* without an *idea* for which he makes it ſtand. This rule will not ſeem needleſs to any one, who will take the pains to recollect how often he has met with ſuch words, as *Inſtinct*, *Sympathy*, *Antipathy*, &c. ſo made uſe of, as he might eaſily conclude, that thoſe that uſed them had no *ideas* in their minds to which they applied them.

Secondly, Thoſe *ideas* he annexes them to ſhould be *clear* and *diſtinct*, which in complex *ideas* is by knowing the particular ones that make that compoſition; of which, if any one be again complex, we muſt know alſo the preciſe collection that is united in each, and ſo till we come to ſimple ones. In Subſtances the *ideas* muſt not only be diſtinct, but alſo conformable to *things* as they exiſt.

Thirdly, He muſt apply his words, as near as may be, to ſuch *ideas*, as common uſe has annexed them to: for words, eſpecially of languages already framed, are no man's private poſſeſſion, but

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the common measure of commerce and communication; and therefore it is not for any one to change the stamp they are current in, nor alter the *ideas* they are affixed to; or at least, when there is a necessity to do so, he is bound to give notice of it. And therefore,

Fourthly, When common use has left the signification of a word uncertain and loose, or where it is to be used in a peculiar sense; or where the term is liable to any doubtfulness or mistake, there it ought to be defined, and its signification ascertained.

Words standing for *simple ideas* being not *definable*, their signification must be shewn either, *First*, By a synonymous word. *Secondly*, By naming a subject, wherein that simple *idea* is to be found. *Thirdly*, By presenting to the senses that subject, which may produce it in the mind, and make him actually have the *idea* that word stands for. *Mixed Modes* may be perfectly defined, by exactly enumerating those *ideas* that go to each composition. This ought more especially to be done in mixed Modes belonging to *Morality*: since definition is the only way whereby the precise meaning of *moral Words* can be known: and yet a way whereby their precise meaning may be known certainly, and without leaving any room for any contest about it.

For the explaining the signification of the names

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of substances, both the fore-mentioned ways, *viz.* of shewing, and defining are requisite in many cases to be made use of; their names are best defined by their *leading Qualities*, which are mostly *shape* in animals and vegetables; and *colour* in inanimate bodies; and in some, both together. Now these leading Qualities are best made known by shewing, and can hardly be made known otherwise. The shape of a *Horse* or *Cassowary* will be but imperfectly imprinted on the mind by words: the sight of the animals doth it much better. And the *idea* of the particular colour of *Gold* is not to be got by any description of it, but only by the frequent exercise of the eyes about it. The like may be said of those other simple *ideas*, peculiar in their kind to any substance, for which precise *ideas* there are no peculiar names.

But because many of the simple *ideas*, which make up our specifick *ideas* of substances, are powers which lie not obvious to our sense in the things, as they ordinarily appear; therefore in the signification of our names of Substances, some part of the signification will be better made known, by enumerating those simple *ideas*, than in shewing the substance it self. For he that to the *Yellow shining colour* of Gold, got by sight, shall from my enumerating them have the *ideas* of great *Ductibility*, *Fusibility*, *Fixedness*, and *Solubility* in *Aqua Regia* will have a perfecter *idea* of *Gold*,

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than he can have by ſeeing a piece of *Gold*, and thereby imprinting in his mind only its obvious qualities.

It were to be wiſhed that words ſtanding for things, which are known and diſtinguiſhed by their outward ſhapes, ſhould be expreſſed by little draughts and prints made of them. A Vocabulary made after this faſhion, would perhaps with more eaſe, and in leſs time, teach the true ſignification of many terms, eſpecially in languages of remote countries, or ages; and ſettle truer *ideas* in mens minds of ſeveral things, whereof we read the names in ancient authors, than all the large and laborious comments of learned criticks. *Naturaliſts* that treat of *Plants* and *Animals*, have found the benefit of this way: and he that conſults them will find that he has a clearer *idea* of *Apium* and *Ibex* from a little print of that herb or beaſt, than he could have from a long definition of the names of either of them; and ſo no doubt he would have of *Strigil*, and *Siſtrum*, if inſtead of a *Curry-comb* or *Cymbal*, which are the Engliſh names dictionaries render them by, he could ſee ſtamped in the margin ſmall pictures of theſe inſtruments, as they were in uſe amongſt the ancients.

Fifthly, The laſt rule that I ſhall mention is, that in all diſcourſes wherein one man pretends to inſtruct or convince another, he ſhould uſe the ſame word conſtantly in the ſame ſenſe; if this

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were done (which no body can refuſe, without great diſingenuity) many of the books extant might be ſpared; many of the controverſies in diſpute, would be at an end; ſeveral of thoſe great volumes ſwollen with ambiguous words, now uſed in one ſenſe, and by and by in another, would ſhrink into a very narrow compaſs: and many of the *Philoſophers* (to mention no other) as well as *Poets* works, might be contained in a *Nutſhel*.

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BOOK IV.

CHAP. I.

Of Knowledge in General.

SINCE the mind in all its thoughts and reasonings, has no other immediate object but its own *ideas*, which alone it does or can contemplate; it is evident that our knowledge is only conversant about them. *Knowledge* then seems to be nothing but the perception of the connexion and agreement, or disagreement and repugnancy of any of our *ideas*: where this perception is, there is knowledge; and where it is not, there, tho' we fancy, guess, or believe, yet we always come short of *Knowledge*. When we know that *White* is not *Black*, what do we but perceive that these two *ideas* do not agree? Or that the three angles of a *Triangle*, are equal to two right ones; what do we more but perceive that equality to two right ones, does necessarily agree to, and is inseparable from the three angles of a Triangle? But to understand a little more distinctly, wherein this agreement or disagreement consists; we may reduce it all to these *four sorts*; First, *Identity* or

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Diverſity; Secondly, *Relation*; Thirdly, *Co-exiſtence*; Fourthly, *Real Exiſtence*.

1. *Identity* or *Diverſity*: 'tis the firſt act of the mind, *to perceive its* ideas; and ſo far as it perceives them, to know each what it is, and thereby to perceive their difference, that is, the one not to be the other: by this the mind clearly perceives each *idea* to agree with it ſelf, and to be what it is; and all diſtinct *ideas* to diſagree. This it does without any pains or deduction, by its natural power of perception and diſtinction. This is what men of art have reduced to thoſe general rules, *viz. What is, is.* And *it is impoſſible for the ſame thing to be, and not to be.* But no *maxim* can make a man know it clearer, that *Round* is not *Square*, than the bare perception of thoſe two *ideas*, which the mind at firſt ſight perceives to diſagree.

2. The next ſort of agreement or diſagreement the mind perceives in any of its *ideas*, may be called *Relative*, and is nothing but the perception of the Relation, between any two *ideas* of what kind ſoever: that is, their agreement or diſagreement one with another in ſeveral ways the mind takes of comparing them.

3. The third ſort of agreement or diſagreement to be found in our *ideas*, is *Co-exiſtence*, or *Non-co-exiſtence* in the ſame ſubject; and this belongs particularly to Subſtances. Thus when we pronounce concerning *Gold*, that it is fixed, it amounts to no

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more but this, that fixedneſs, or a power to remain in the fire unconſumed, is an *idea* that always accompanies that particular ſort of *Yellowneſs*, *Weight*, *Fuſibility*, &c. which make our complex *idea*, ſignified by the word *Gold*.

4. The fourth ſort is that of actual and *real Exiſtence* agreeing to any *idea*. Within theſe four ſorts of agreement or diſagreement, I ſuppoſe is contained all the knowledge we have, or are capable of. For all that we know or can affirm concerning any *idea*, is, that it is, or is not the ſame with ſome other: as that *Blew is not Yellow*. That it does, or does not co-exiſt with another in the ſame ſubject: as that *Iron is ſuſceptible of Magnetical Impreſſions*: that it has that or this Relation to ſome other *ideas*: as that *two Triangles upon equal baſes between two parallels are equal*; or that it has a real Exiſtence without the mind: as *that God is*.

There are ſeveral ways wherein the mind is poſſeſs'd of truth, each of which is called Knowledge. *Firſt*, There is *actual Knowledge*, when the mind has a preſent view of the agreement or diſagreement of any of its *ideas*, or of the Relation they have one with another. *Secondly*, A man is ſaid to know any propoſition, when having once evidently perceived the agreement or diſagreement of the *ideas* whereof it conſiſts, and ſo lodged it in his memory, that whenever it comes to be reflected on

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again, the mind assents to it without doubt or hesitation, and is certain of the truth of it. And this may be called *habitual Knowledge*: and thus a man may be said to know all those truths which are lodged in his memory, by a foregoing, clear, and full perception.

Of *habitual Knowledge* there are two sorts: the one is of such truths laid up in the memory, as whenever they occur to the mind, it actually perceives the Relation that is between those *ideas*. And this is in all those truths, where the *ideas* themselves, by an immediate view, discover their agreement or disagreement one with another. The other is of such truths, whereof the mind having been convinced, it retains the memory of the conviction, without the proofs. Thus a man that remembers certainly, that he once perceiv'd the demonstration, that the three angles of a Triangle are equal to two right ones, knows it to be true, when that demonstration is gone out of his mind, and possibly cannot be recollected: but he knows it in a different way from what he did before; namely, not by the intervention of those intermediate *ideas*, whereby the agreement or disagreement of those in the proposition was at first perceiv'd; but by remembring, *i. e.* knowing that he was once certain of the truth of this proposition, that the three angles of a Triangle are equal to two right ones. The immutability of the same Re-

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ations between the ſame immutable things, is now the *idea* that ſhews him, that if the three angles of a Triangle were once equal to two right ones, they will always be ſo. And hence he comes to be certain, that what was once true, is always true; what *ideas* once agreed, will always agree; and conſequently, what he once knew to be true, he will always know to be true, as long as he can remember that he once knew it.

CHAP. II.

Of the Degrees of our Knowledge.

ALL our Knowledge conſiſting in the view the mind has of its own *ideas*, which is the utmoſt light, and greateſt certainty we are capable of; the *different clearneſs of our Knowledge*, ſeems to lie in the different way of perception the mind has of the agreement or diſagreement of any of its *ideas*.

When the mind perceives this agreement or diſagreement of two *ideas immediately* by themſelves, without the intervention of any other; we may call it *intuitive Knowledge*, in which caſes the mind perceives the truth, as the eye does light, only by being directed towards it. Thus the mind perceives that *White is not Black*, that *Three are more than Two*, and *equal to One and Two*. This

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part of Knowledge is irresistible, and like the bright sun-shine, forces it self immediately to be perceived as soon as ever the mind turns its view that way. It is on this *intuition*, that depends all the certainty and evidence of our other Knowledge; which certainty every one finds to be so great, that he cannot imagine, and therefore not require a greater.

The next degree of Knowledge is, where the mind perceives not this agreement or disagreement immediately, or by the *Juxta-position* as it were of the *ideas*, because those *ideas* concerning whose agreement or disagreement the enquiry is made, cannot by the mind be so put together, as to shew it. In this case the mind is fain to discover the agreement or disagreement which it searches, by the intervention of other *ideas*: and this is that which we call *Reasoning*: and thus if we would know the agreement or disagreement in bigness, between the three angles of a Triangle, and two right Angles; we cannot by an immediate view, and comparing them do it; because the three angles of a Triangle cannot be brought at once, and be compared with any other one, or two angles. And so of this, the mind has no immediate or intuitive Knowledge. But we must find out some other Angles, to which the three Angles of a Triangle have equality, and finding those equal to two right ones, we come to know the equality of

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these three Angles to two right ones. Those intervening *ideas*, which serve to shew the agreement of any two others, are called *Proofs*. And where the agreement or disagreement is by this means plainly and clearly perceived, it is called *Demonstration*. A quickness in the mind to find those Proofs, and to apply them right, is, I suppose, that which is called *Sagacity*.

This Knowledge, tho' it be certain, is not so clear and evident as *intuitive* Knowledge. It requires pains and attention, and steady application of mind, to discover the agreement or disagreement of the *ideas* it considers, and there must be a progression by steps and degrees, before the mind can in this way arrive at certainty. Before Demonstration there was a doubt, which in *intuitive Knowledge* cannot happen to the mind, that has its faculty of Perception left to a degree capable of distinct *ideas*, no more than it can be a doubt to the Eye (that can distinctly see *White* and *Black*) whether this Ink and Paper be all of a Colour.

Now in every step that Reason makes in *demonstrative Knowledge*, there is an *intuitive Knowledge* of that agreement or disagreement it seeks with the next intermediate *idea*, which it uses as a Proof; for if it were not so, that yet would need a Proof; since without the Perception of such agreement or disagreement, there is no Knowledge pro-

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duced. By which it is evident, that every ſtep in Reaſoning, that produces Knowledge, has *intuitive Certainty*; which when the mind perceives, there is no more required but to remember it, to make the agreement or diſagreement of the *ideas* concerning which we enquire, viſible and certain. This *intuitive Perception* of the agreement or diſagreement of the intermediate *ideas* in each ſtep and progreſſion of the Demonſtration, muſt alſo be exactly carried in the mind; and a man muſt be ſure that no part is left out; which becauſe in long deductions, the memory cannot eaſily retain; this Knowledge becomes more imperfect than *intuitive*; and men often embrace Falſhoods, for Demonſtrations.

It has been generally taken for granted, that *Mathematicks* alone are capable of demonſtrative Certainty. But to have ſuch an agreement or diſagreement as may be *intuitively* perceived, being as I imagine not the privilege of the *ideas* of *Number*, *Extenſion* and *Figure* alone; it may poſſibly be the want of due method and application in us, and not of ſufficient evidence in things, that Demonſtration has been thought to have ſo little to do in other parts of Knowledge. For in whatever *ideas* the mind can perceive the agreement or diſagreement immediately, there it is capable of *intuitive Knowledge*: and where it can perceive the agreement or diſagreement of any two *ideas*, by an *in-*

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tuitive Perception of the agreement or disagreement they have with any intermediate *ideas*, there the mind is capable of Demonstration, which is not limited to the *ideas* of Figure, Number, Extension, or their Modes. The reason why it has been generally supposed to belong to them only, is because in comparing their Equality or Excess, the *Modes of Numbers* have every the least difference very clear and perceivable: and in *Extension*, tho' every the least Excess is not so perceptible, yet the mind has found out ways to discover the just Equality of two Angles, Extensions, or Figures; and both, that is, Numbers and Figures, can be set down by visible and lasting marks.

But in other simple *ideas*, whose Modes and Differences are made and counted by Degrees, and not Quantity, we have not so nice and accurate a distinction of their Differences, as to perceive or find ways to measure their just Equality, or the least Differences. For those other simple *ideas* being Appearances or Sensations produced in us, by the *Size*, *Figure*, *Motion*, &c. of minute Corpuscles singly insensible; their different Degrees also depend on the variation of some, or all of those causes; which since it cannot be observed by us in Particles of Matter, whereof each is too subtile to be perceived, it is impossible for us to have any exact measures of the different degrees of these simple *ideas*. Thus, for instance, not knowing what num-

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ber of Particles, nor what Motion of them is fit to produce any precise degree of *Whiteness*; we cannot demonstrate the certain equality of any two degrees of *Whiteness*, because we have no certain standard to measure them by, nor means to distinguish every the least difference: the only help we have being from our senses, which in this point fail us.

But where the difference is so great as to produce in the mind *ideas* clearly distinct; there *ideas of Colours*, as we see in different kinds, *Blue* and *Red* (for instance) are as capable of Demonstration, as *ideas* of Number and Extension. What is here said of Colours, I think, holds true in all secondary Qualities. These two then, *Intuition* and *Demonstration*, are the degrees of our *Knowledge*: whatever comes short of one of these, is but *Faith* or *Opinion*, not *Knowledge*, at least in all *general Truths*. There is indeed another Perception of the mind employed about the *particular Existence of finite Beings*, without us, which going beyond Probability, but not reaching to either of the foregoing degrees of Certainty, passes under the name of Knowledge.

Nothing can be more certain, than that the *ideas* we receive from an external Object is in our minds: this is *intuitive Knowledge*; but whether we can thence certainly infer the Existence of any thing without us, correspondent to that *idea*, is

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that whereof ſome men think there may be a queſtion made, becauſe men may have ſuch an *idea* in their minds, when no ſuch thing exiſts, no ſuch Object affects their ſenſes. But 'tis evident that we are invincibly conſcious to our ſelves of a different Perception, when we look upon the *Sun* in the day, and think on it by night; when we actually taſte *Wormwood*, or ſmell a *Roſe*, or only think on that *Savour* or *Odour*: ſo that I think we may add to the two former ſorts of Knowledge, this alſo of the Exiſtence of particular external Objects, by that Perception and Conſciouſneſs we have, of the actual entrance of *ideas* from them, and allow theſe three degrees of Knowledge, *viz. intuitive, demonſtrative, and ſenſitive*.

But ſince our Knowledge is founded on, and employed about our *ideas* only: will it follow thence that it muſt be conformable to our *ideas*, and that where our *ideas* are clear and diſtinct, obſcure and confuſed, there our Knowledge will be ſo too? *I anſwer*, No: for our Knowledge conſiſting in the Perception of the agreement or diſagreement of any two *ideas*; its clearneſs or obſcurity conſiſts in the clearneſs or obſcurity of that Perception, and not in the clearneſs or obſcurity of the *ideas* themſelves. A man (for inſtance) that has a clear *idea* of the angles of a Triangle, and of Equality to two right ones, may yet have but an obſcure Perception of their agreement; and ſo

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have but a very obſcure Knowledge of it. But obſcure and confuſed *ideas* can never produce any clear or diſtinct Knowledge; becauſe, as far as any *ideas* are obſcure or confuſed, ſo far the mind can never perceive clearly, whether they agree or diſagree: or, to expreſs the ſame thing in a way leſs apt to be miſunderſtood: he that hath not determin'd *ideas* to the words he uſes, cannot make propoſitions of them, of whoſe truth he can be certain.

CHAP. III.

Of the Extent of Human Knowledge.

FROM what has been ſaid concerning Knowledge, it follows that, *Firſt*, That we can have no Knowledge farther than we have *ideas*.

Secondly, That we have no Knowledge farther than we can have Perception of that agreement or diſagreement of our *ideas*, either by *Intuition*, *Demonſtration*, or *Senſation*.

Thirdly, We cannot have an *intuitive* Knowledge that ſhall extend it ſelf to all our *ideas*, and all that we would know about them; becauſe we cannot examine and perceive all the relations they have one to another, by Juxta-poſition, or an immediate Compariſon one with another. Thus we cannot *intuitively* perceive the equality of two Extenſions, the difference of whoſe figures makes

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their parts uncapable of an exact immediate application.

Fourthly, Our *rational* Knowledge cannot reach to the whole extent of our *ideas*; because between two different *ideas* we would examine, we cannot always find such *Proofs* as we can connect one to another, with an *intuitive Knowledge* in all the parts of the Deduction.

Fifthly, *Sensitive* Knowledge reaching no farther than the Existence of things actually present to our Senses, is yet much narrower than either of the former.

Sixthly, From all which it is evident, that the *extent of our Knowledge*, comes not only short of the reality of *Things*, but even of the extent of our own *ideas*. We have the *ideas* of a *Square*, a *Circle* and *Equality*, and yet perhaps shall never be able to find a *Circle equal to a Square*.

The Affirmations or Negations we make concerning the *ideas* we have, being reduced to the four sorts above-mentioned, *viz*. *Identity*, *Co-existence*, *Relation*, and *real Existence*; I shall examine how far our Knowledge extends in each of these.

First, As to *Identity and Diversity*, our *intuitive Knowledge* is as far extended as our *ideas* themselves; and there can be no *idea* in the mind, which it does not presently by an *intuitive Knowledge*, perceive to be what it is, and to be different from any other.

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Secondly, As to the agreement or disagreement of our *ideas* in *Co-existence*: in this our Knowledge is very short, tho' in this consists the greatest and most material part of our Knowledge, concerning *Substances*: for our *ideas* of *Substances*, being, as I have shewed, nothing but certain *Collections of simple* ideas, *co-existing in one subject*, (our *idea* of *Flame*, for instance, is a Body *hot*, *luminous* and *moving upward*.) When we would know any thing farther concerning this or any other sort of Substance, what do we but enquire what other qualities or powers these Substances have or have not? which is nothing else but to know what other simple *ideas* do, or do not *co-exist* with those that make up that complex *idea*. The reason of this is, because the simple *ideas* which make up our complex *ideas* of Substances, have no visible necessary connexion or inconsistence with other simple *ideas*, whose Co-existence with them we would inform our selves about. These *ideas* being likewise for the most part *secondary Qualities* which depend upon the *primary* Qualities of their minute or insensible parts, or on something yet more remote from our comprehension; it is impossible we should know which have a necessary Union, or Inconsistency one with another, since we know not the Root from whence they spring, or the Size, Figure, and Texture of Parts on which they depend, and from which they result.

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Beſides this, there is no *diſcoverable Connexion* between any *ſecondary* Quality, and thoſe *primary* Qualities that it depends on. We are ſo far from knowing what Figure, Size, or Motion produces (for inſtance) a *yellow Colour*, or *ſweet Taſte*, or a *ſharp Sound*, that we can by no means conceive how any *Size*, *Figure*, or *Motion* can poſſibly produce in us the *idea* of any *Colour*, *Taſte*, or *Sound* whatſoever; and there is no conceivable Connexion between the one and the other.

Our knowledge therefore of Co-exiſtence reaches little farther than *Experience*. Some few indeed of the *primary* Qualities have a neceſſary Dependence, and viſible Connexion one with another: as *Figure* neceſſarily ſuppoſes *Extenſion*, *receiving or communicating Motion by Impulſe*, ſuppoſes *Solidity*. But Qualities co-exiſtent in any ſubject, without this Dependence and Connexion, cannot certainly be known to co-exiſt any farther, than experience by our ſenſes informs us. Thus, tho' upon trial we find *Gold* Yellow, Weighty, Malleable, Fuſible and Fixed, yet becauſe none of theſe have any evident Dependence, or neceſſary Connexion with the other; we cannot certainly know, that where any *four* of theſe are, the *fifth* will be there alſo, how highly probable ſoever it may be: but the higheſt degree of *Probability*, amounts not to *Certainty*; without which there can be no true Knowledge: for this Co-exiſtence can be no fur-

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ther known, than it is perceived; and it cannot be perceived, but either in *particular* ſubjects, by the obſervation of our ſenſes; or in *general*, by the neceſſary Connexion of the *ideas* themſelves.

As to *Incompatibility*, or *Repugnancy to Co-exiſtence*, we may know that any ſubject can have of each ſort of *primary* Qualities, but one particular at once. One Extenſion, one Figure; and ſo of ſenſible *ideas* peculiar to each ſenſe: for whatever of each kind is preſent in any ſubject, excludes all other of that ſort: for inſtance, one ſubject cannot have *two Smells*, or *two Colours* at the ſame time.

As to *Powers of Subſtances*, which makes a great part of our enquiries about them, and is no inconſiderable branch of our Knowledge: Our Knowledge as to theſe reaches little farther than *Experience*; becauſe they conſiſt in a Texture and Motion of parts, which we cannot by any means come to diſcover; and I doubt whether with thoſe *Faculties* we have, we ſhall ever be able to carry our general Knowledge much farther in this part. *Experience* is that which in this part we muſt depend on; and it were to be wiſhed that it were more improved: we find the advantages ſome mens generous pains, have this way brought to the ſtock of *natural Knowledge*. And if others, eſpecially the *Philoſophers by fire* who pretend to it, had been ſo wary in their Obſervations, and ſincere in their Reports, as thoſe who call them-

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ſelves *Philoſophers* ought to have been: our acquaintance with the Bodies here about us, and our inſight into their powers and operations had been yet much greater.

As to the third ſort the *agreement or diſagreement of our* ideas *in any other Relation:* this is the largeſt field of Knowledge, and it is hard to determine how far it may extend. This part depending on our ſagacity in finding intermediate *ideas*, that may ſhew the Habitudes and Relations of *ideas*; it is an hard matter to tell when we are at an end of ſuch diſcoveries. They that are ignorant of *Algebra*, cannot imagine the wonders in this kind, are to be done by it: and what farther improvements and helps, advantageous to other parts of Knowledge, the ſagacious mind of man may yet find out, it is not eaſy to determine. This at leaſt I believe that the *ideas* of *Quantity*, are not thoſe alone that are capable of Demonſtration and Knowledge: and that other, perhaps more uſeful parts of Contemplation, would afford us Certainty, if Vices, Paſſions, and domineering intereſt did not oppoſe or menace endeavours of this kind.

The *idea* of a *ſupream Being*, infinite in Power, Goodneſs, and Wiſdom, whoſe Workmanſhip we are, and on whom we depend; and the *idea* of *our ſelves*, as underſtanding rational Creatures, would I ſuppoſe, if duly conſidered, afford ſuch Foundations of our *Duty*, and *Rules of Action*, as might

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place *Mordlity* among the Sciences capable of Demonſtration: wherein I doubt not but from principles as inconteſtable as thoſe of the *Mathematicks*, by neceſſary conſequences, the meaſure of *Right* and *Wrong* might be made out, to any one that will apply himſelf with the ſame indifferency, and attention to the one, as he does to the other of theſe Sciences. The Relations of other Modes may certainly be perceived as well as thoſe of Number and Extenſion. *Where there is no Property, there is no Injuſtice*, is a Propoſition as certain as any Demonſtration in *Euclid*: for the *idea* of *Property* being a right to any thing; and the *idea* of *Injuſtice*, being the invaſion or violation of that right: it is evident that theſe *ideas* being thus eſtabliſhed, and theſe names annexed to them, I can as certainly know this Propoſition to be true, as that a *Triangle has three Angles equal to two right ones*. Again, *no Government allows abſolute Liberty*. The *idea* of *Government* being the eſtabliſhment of Society upon certain rules or laws, which require conformity to them; and the *idea* of *abſolute Liberty*, being for any one to do whatever he pleaſes, I am as capable of being certain of the truth of this Propoſition, as of any in *Mathematicks*.

What has given the advantage to the *ideas* of *Quantity*, and made them thought more capable of Certainty and Demonſtration, is,

Firſt, That they can be repreſented by ſenſible

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marks, which have a nearer correſpondence with them, than any Words or Sounds. *Diagrams* drawn on paper, are copies of the *ideas*; and not liable to the uncertainty that words carry in their ſignification. But we have no ſenſible Marks that reſemble our *moral ideas*, and nothing but words to expreſs them by; which tho', when written, they remain the ſame; yet the *ideas* they ſtand for, may change in the ſame man; and it is very ſeldom that they are not different in different perſons.

Secondly, *moral ideas* are commonly more complex than figures: whence theſe two inconveniencies follow: *Firſt*, That their names are of more uncertain Signification; the preciſe collection of ſimple *ideas* they ſtand for, not being ſo eaſily agreed on, and ſo the Sign that is uſed for them in Communication always, and in thinking often, does not ſteadily carry with it the ſame *idea*. *Secondly*, The Mind cannot eaſily retain thoſe preciſe combinations ſo exactly and perfectly as is neceſſary; in the examination of the Habitudes and Correſpondencies, agreements or diſagreements of ſeveral of them one with another, eſpecially where it is to be judged of by long deductions, and the Intervention of ſeveral other complex *ideas*, to ſhew the agreement or diſagreement of two remote ones.

Now one part of theſe diſadvantages in *moral ideas*, which has made them be thought not capable of Demonſtration, may in a good meaſure be reme-

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died by *Definitions*, ſetting down that collection of ſimple *ideas* which every term ſhall ſtand for, and then uſing the terms ſteadily and conſtantly for that preciſe collection.

As to the fourth ſort of Knowledge, *viz. Of the real actual Exiſtence of things*, we have an *intuitive* Knowledge of our *own Exiſtence*: a *demonſtrative* Knowledge of the *Exiſtence of God*; and a *ſenſitive* Knowledge of the *Objects that preſent themſelves to our Senſes*.

From what has been ſaid we may diſcover the *Cauſes of our Ignorance*, which are chiefly theſe three, *Firſt*, Want of *ideas*; *Secondly*, Want of a diſcoverable connection between the *ideas* we have: *Thirdly*, Want of tracing and examining our *ideas*.

Firſt, There are ſome things we are ignorant of for *want of ideas*. All the ſimple *ideas* we have, are confined to the Obſervation of our Senſes, and the Operations of our own Minds, that we are conſcious of in our ſelves. What other *ideas* it is poſſible other creatures may have, by the aſſiſtance of other ſenſes and faculties more or perfecter than we have, or different from ours, it is not for us to determine; but to ſay or think there are no ſuch, becauſe we conceive nothing of them, is no better an argument, than if a blind man ſhould be poſitive in it, that there was no ſuch thing as ſight and colours, becauſe he had no manner of *idea*

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of any ſuch thing. What faculties therefore other ſpecies of creatures have to penetrate into the nature and inmoſt conſtitutions of things, we know not. This we know, and certainly find, that we want other views of them, beſides thoſe we have to make diſcoveries of them more perfect. The *intellectual* and *ſenſible* world are in this perfectly alike, that the parts which we ſee of either of them, hold no proportion with that we ſee not; and whatſoever we can reach with our eyes, or our thoughts of either of them, is but a point, almoſt nothing, in compariſon of the reſt.

Another great cauſe of Ignorance, is *the want of* ideas *that we are capable of*. This keeps us in ignorance of things we conceive capable of being known. Bulk, Figure and Motion we have *ideas* of: yet not knowing what is the particular bulk, motion and figure of the greateſt part of the bodies of the Univerſe, we are ignorant of the ſeveral Powers, Efficacies and Ways of Operation, whereby the Effects we daily ſee, are produced. Theſe are hid from us in ſome things, by being *too remote*, in others by being *too minute*.

When we conſider the vaſt diſtance of the known and viſible parts of the world, and the reaſons we have to think that what lies within our ken, is but a ſmall part of the immenſe Univerſe; we ſhall then diſcover an huge Abyſs of Ignorance. What are the particular fabricks of the great maſ-

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ſes of Matter, which make up the whole ſtupenduous frame of corporeal Beings, how far they are extended, and what is their motion, and how continued; and what influence they have upon one another, are contemplations that at firſt glimpſe our thoughts loſe themſelves in. If we confine our thoughts to this little Canton, I mean this Syſtem of our Sun, and the groſſer Maſſes of Matter that viſibly move about it; what ſeveral ſorts of Vegetables, Animals, and Intellectual corporeal Beings, infinitely different from thoſe of our little ſpot of Earth, may probably be in other *Planets*, to the knowledge of which, even of their outward figures and parts, we can no way attain, whilſt we are confined to this Earth, there being no natural means, either by Senſation or Reflection, to convey their certain *ideas* into our minds?

There are other Bodies in the Univerſe, no leſs concealed from us by their *minuteneſs*. Theſe inſenſible Corpuſcles being the active parts of Matter, and the great inſtruments of Nature, on which depend all their *ſecondary* Qualities and Operations, our want of preciſe diſtinct *ideas* of their *primary* Qualities, keeps us in incurable Ignorance of what we deſire to know about them. Did we know the mechanical affections of *Rhubarb* or *Opium*, we might as eaſily account for their Operations of *Purging* and *cauſing Sleep*, as a Watch-maker can for the motions of his watch. The diſſolving

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of Silver in *Aqua Fortis*, or Gold in *Aqua Regia*, and not *vice verſa*, would be then perhaps no more difficult to know, than it is to a *Smith*, to underſtand why the turning of one key will open a lock, and not the turning of another. But whilſt we are deſtitute of ſenſes, acute enough to diſcover the minute particles of Bodies, and to give us *ideas* of their mechanical affections, we muſt be content to be ignorant of their Properties and Operations; nor can we be aſſured about them any farther, than ſome few trials we make, are able to reach: but whether they will ſucceed again another time, we cannot be certain. This hinders our certain knowledge of univerſal truths concerning natural Bodies: and our reaſon carries us herein very little beyond particular matter of fact. And therefore I am apt to doubt, that how far ſoever human Induſtry may advance uſeful and *experimental Philoſophy* in phyſical things, yet *ſcientifical* will ſtill be out of our reach; becauſe we want perfect and adequate *ideas* of thoſe very Bodies which are neareſt to us, and moſt under our command.

This at firſt ſight ſhews us how diſproportionate our knowledge is to the whole extent, even of *material* Beings: to which, if we add the conſideration of that infinite number of Spirits that may be, and probably are, which are yet more remote from our Knowledge, whereof we have no cogni-

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zance: we ſhall find this cauſe of Ignorance, conceal from us in an impenetrable obſcurity, almoſt the whole *intellectual* world: a greater certainly and a more beautiful world than the *material*. For bating ſome very few *ideas* of Spirit, we get from our own mind by reflection, and from thence the beſt we can collect, of the *Father of all Spirits*, the Author of them, and us, and all things: we have no certain Information, ſo much as of the Exiſtence of other Spirits but by Revelation: much leſs have we diſtinct *ideas* of their different Natures, States, Powers, and ſeveral Conſtitutions, wherein they agree or differ one from another, and from us. And therefore in what concerns their different Species and Properties, we are under an abſolute Ignorance.

The *ſecond* Cauſe of Ignorance is the *want of diſcoverable connection* between thoſe *ideas* we have; where we want that, we are utterly incapable of univerſal and certain Knowledge; and are, as in the former caſe, left only to *Obſervation* and *Experiment*. Thus the mechanical affections of Bodies, having no affinity at all with the *ideas* they produce in us, we can have no diſtinct Knowledge of ſuch Operations beyond our Experience; and can reaſon no otherwiſe about them, than as the effects or appointment of an infinitely *wiſe Agent*, which perfectly ſurpaſs our comprehenſions.

The Operation of our minds upon our bodies, is

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as unconceivable. How any *Thought* ſhould produce a motion in *Body*, is as remote from the nature of our *ideas*, as how any *Body* ſhould produce any *thought* in the *mind*. That it is ſo, if experience did not convince us, the conſideration of the things themſelves, would never be able in the leaſt to diſcover to us.

In ſome of our *ideas* there are certain Relations, Habitudes, and Connexions, ſo viſibly included in the nature of the *ideas* themſelves, that we cannot conceive them ſeparable from them by any power whatſoever: in theſe only we are capable of certain and univerſal knowledge. Thus the *idea* of a *right-lined Triangle*, neceſſarily carries with it an *Equality of its Angles to two right ones*. But the coherence and continuity of the parts of matter; the production of Senſation in us, of *Colours* and *Sounds*, &c. by Impulſe, and Motion, being ſuch wherein we can diſcover no natural Connexion with any *ideas* we have, we cannot but aſcribe them to the arbitrary will and good pleaſure of the wiſe Architect.

The things that we obſerve conſtantly to proceed regularly, we may conclude do act by a law ſet them; but yet by a law that we know not; whereby, tho' cauſes work ſteadily, and effects conſtantly flow from them; yet their connexions and dependencies being not diſcoverable in our *ideas*, we can have but an experimental know-

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ledge of them. Several effects come every day within the notice of our *Senſes*, of which we have ſo far *ſenſitive* Knowledge. But the Cauſes, Manner, and Certainty of their Production, we muſt for the foregoing reaſons be content to be ignorant of. In theſe we can go no farther than particular *Experience* informs us of matter of fact, and by *Analogy*, gueſs what effects the like Bodies are upon other Trials like to produce. But as to perfect ſcience of *natural Bodies* (not to mention *ſpiritual* Beings) we are, I think, ſo far from being capable of any ſuch thing, that I conclude it loſt labour to ſeek after it.

The *third* cauſe of Ignorance is our *want of tracing thoſe* ideas *we have*, or may have; and finding out thoſe intermediate *ideas* which may ſhew us what Habitude of Agreement or Diſagreement they may have one with another: and thus many are ignorant of *mathematical* Truths, for want of application in enquiring, examining, and by due ways comparing thoſe *ideas*.

Hitherto we have examined the *Extent* of our Knowledge, in reſpect of the ſeveral ſorts of Beings that are. There is another *Extent* of it, in reſpect of *Univerſality*, which will alſo deſerve to be conſidered; and in this regard our Knowledge follows the Nature of our *ideas*. If the *ideas* are *abſtract*, whoſe agreement or diſagreement we perceive, our Knowledge is *univerſal*. For what is known

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of ſuch general *ideas*, will be true of every particular thing in which that *Eſſence*, that is, that *abſtract idea* is to be found: and what is once known of ſuch *ideas*, will be perpetually, and for ever true. So that as to all general Knowledge, we muſt ſearch and find it only in our own minds: and it is only the examining of our own *ideas*, that furniſhes us with that. Truths belonging to Eſſences of things (that is, to *abſtract ideas*) are *eternal*, and are to be found out by the Contemplation only of thoſe Eſſences; as the Exiſtence of things is to be known only from Experience. But I ſhall ſay more of this in the following Chapters, where I ſhall ſpeak of *general*, and *real* Knowledge.

CHAP. IV.

Of the Reality of our Knowledge.

I Doubt not but my Reader by this time, may be apt to think that I have been all this while only building a *Caſtle* in the Air; and be ready to object, If it be true, that all Knowledge lies only in the perception of the agreement or diſagreement of our own *ideas*, the viſions of an *Enthuſiaſt*, and the reaſonings of a *ſober* man will be equally certain: it is no matter how things are, ſo a man obſerve but the agreement of his own imaginations, and talk conformably, It is all Truth, all Cer-

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tainty. That an *Harpy* is not a *Centaur*, is by this way as certain Knowledge, and as much Truth, as that a Square is not a Circle. But of what uſe is all this Knowledge of mens own Imaginations, to a man that enquires after the reality of things?

To which *I anſwer*, That if our Knowledge of our *ideas* ſhould terminate in them, and reach no farther, where there is ſomething farther intended, our moſt ſerious thoughts would be of little more uſe, than the *Reveries* of a crazy brain. But I hope, before I have done, to make it evident, that this way of *Certainty* by the Knowledge of our own *ideas*, goes a little farther than bare Imagination: and that all the Certainty of general Truths a man has, lies in nothing elſe but this Knowledge of our *ideas*.

'Tis evident that the mind knows not things immediately, but by the intervention of the *ideas* it has of them. Our Knowledge therefore is *real*, only ſo far as there is a conformity between our *ideas*, and the reality of things. But how ſhall we know when our *ideas* agree with things themſelves? I anſwer, there be *two ſorts* of *ideas* that we may be aſſured agree with things: theſe are,

Firſt, *Simple* ideas; which ſince the mind can by no means make to it ſelf, muſt be the effect of things operating upon the mind in a natural way; and producing therein thoſe perceptions, which by the will of our Maker, they are ordained and a-

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dapted to. Hence it follows, that *ſimple ideas* are not fictions of our fancies, but the natural and regular productions of things without us, really operating upon us; which carry with them all the conformity our ſtate requires, which is to repreſent things under thoſe appearances they are fitted to produce in us. Thus the *idea* of *Whiteneſs*, as it is in the mind, exactly anſwers that power which is in any body to produce it there. And this conformity between our *ſimple ideas*, and the exiſtence of things is ſufficient for real Knowledge.

Secondly, All our *complex ideas*, except thoſe of Subſtances, being *Archetypes* of the mind's own making, and not referred to the exiſtence of things as to their originals, cannot want any conformity neceſſary to real Knowledge. For that which is not deſigned to repreſent any thing but it ſelf, can never be capable of a wrong repreſentation. Here the *ideas* themſelves are conſidered as *Archetypes*, and things no otherwiſe regarded, than as they are conformable to them. Thus the *Mathematician* conſiders the Truth and Properties belonging to a *Rectangle* or *Circle* only, as they are *ideas* in his own mind, which poſſibly he never found exiſting mathematically, that is, preciſely true: yet his knowledge is not only certain, but *real*; becauſe real things are no farther concern'd nor intended to be meant by any ſuch propoſitions, than as things really agree to thoſe *Archetypes* in his

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mind. It is true of the *idea* of a *Triangle, that its three Angles are equal to two right ones*; it is true alſo of a *Triangle* where-ever it *exiſts*: what is true of thoſe Figures, that have barely an *ideal* exiſtence in his mind, will hold true of them alſo, when they come to have a *real* exiſtence in Matter.

Hence it follows, that *moral* Knowledge is as capable of *real Certainty* as *Mathematicks*. For *Certainty* being nothing but the Perception of the agreement or diſagreement of our *ideas*, and *Demonſtration* nothing but the Perception of ſuch agreement by the intervention of other *ideas*; our *moral ideas* as well as *mathematical*, being *Archetypes* themſelves, and ſo adequate or complete *ideas*, all the agreement or diſagreement we ſhall find in them, will produce *real* Knowledge as well as in *mathematical Figures*. That which is requiſite to make our Knowledge *certain*, is the clearneſs of our *ideas*; and that which is required to make it *real*, is, that they anſwer their *Archetypes*.

But it will here be ſaid, that if *moral* Knowledge be placed in the Contemplation of our own *moral ideas*; and thoſe be of our own making, what ſtrange notions will there be of *Juſtice* and *Temperance*? What confuſion of *Virtues* and *Vices*, if every man may make what *ideas* of them he pleaſes? *I anſwer*, No confuſion nor diſorder at all,

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in the things themselves, nor the reasonings about them, no more than there would be a change in the properties of Figures, and their Relations one to another, if a man should make a *Triangle* with four Corners, or a *Trapezium* with four Right Angles; that is, in plain English, change the names of the Figures, and call that by one name, which is called ordinarily by another. The change of name will indeed at first disturb him, who knows not what *idea* it stands for: but as soon as the Figure is drawn, the consequences and demonstration are plain and clear. Just the same is it in *moral* Knowledge: let a man have the *idea* of taking from others, without their consent, what they are justly possessed of, and call this Justice if he pleases; he that takes the name here, without the *idea* put to it, will be mistaken by joining another *idea* of his own to that name; but *strip* the *idea* of that name, or take it such as it is in the Speaker's mind; and the same things will agree to it, as if you called it Injustice.

One thing we are to take notice of, That where *God*, or any other Law-maker, has defined any *moral names*, there they have made the Essence of that *Species* to which that name belongs: and there it is not safe to apply, or use them otherwise. But in other cases it is bare impropriety of Speech, to apply them contrary to the common usage of the country they are used in.

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mined; we reflect on the *names* themselves, as being more clear, certain, and distinct, and readier to occur to our thoughts, than pure *ideas*: and so we make use of these *words* instead of the *ideas* themselves, even when we would meditate and reason within our selves, and make tacit *mental Propositions*.

We must then observe two sorts of *Propositions*, that we are capable of making. *First*, *mental Propositions*, wherein the *ideas* in our Understandings are put together, or separated by the mind, perceiving or judging of their agreement or disagreement. *Secondly*, *Verbal Propositions*, which are words put together, or separate in affirmative or negative Sentences: so that *Proposition* consists in joining or separating Signs: and *Truth* consists in putting together, or separating these Signs, according as the things they stand for agree or disagree.

Truth as well as Knowledge may well come under the Distinction of *Verbal* and *Real*; that being only *verbal Truth*, wherein Terms are joined according to the agreement or disagreement of the *ideas* they stand for, without regarding whether our *ideas* are such as really have, or are capable of having an Existence in Nature. But then it is they contain *real Truth*, when these Signs are joined, as our *ideas* agree; and when our *ideas* are such as we know, are capable of having an Existence in Nature; which in *Substances* we cannot know, but by

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knowing that ſuch have exiſted. *Truth* is the marking down in words the agreement or diſagreement of *ideas*, as it is. *Falſhood* is the marking down in words the agreement or diſagreement of *ideas*, otherwiſe than it is; and ſo far as theſe *ideas* thus marked by Sounds, agree to their *Archetypes*, ſo far only is the *Truth real*. The Knowledge of this *Truth* conſiſts in knowing what *ideas* the words ſtand for, and the Perception of the agreement or diſagreement of thoſe *ideas*, according as it is marked by thoſe words.

Beſides *Truth* taken in the ſtrict Senſe beforementioned, there are other ſorts of *Truths*: as, 1*ſt*, *Moral Truth*, which is, ſpeaking things according to the perſuaſion of our own minds. 2*dly*, *Metaphyſical Truth*, which is nothing but the real Exiſtence of things conformable to the *ideas* to which we have annexed their names.

Theſe Conſiderations of *Truth* either having been before taken notice of, or not being much to our preſent purpoſe, it may ſuffice here only to have mentioned them.

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CHAP. VI.

Of univerſal Propoſitions, their Truth and Certainty.

THE prevailing cuſtom of uſing *Sounds* for *ideas*, even when men think and reaſon within their own breaſts, makes the conſideration of *Words* and *Propoſitions* ſo neceſſarty a part of the Treatiſe of Knowledge, that it is very hard to ſpeak intelligibly of the one, without explaining the other. And ſince *general Truths*, which with reaſon are moſt ſought after, can never be well made known, and are ſeldom apprehended, but as conceived and expreſſed in words; it is not out of our way in the examination of our own Knowledge, to enquire into the *Truth* and *Certainty* of *univerſal Propoſitions*. But it muſt be obſerved, that Certainty is two-fold, Certainty of *Truth*, and Certainty of *Knowledge*.

Certainty of *Truth* is, when words are ſo put together in *Propoſitions*, as exactly to expreſs the agreement or diſagreement of the *ideas* they ſtand for; as really it is. Certainty of *Knowledge*, is to perceive the agreement or diſagreement of *ideas* as expreſſed in any *Propoſitions*. Thus we uſually call *Knowing*, or being certain of the Truth of any *Propoſition*.

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Now becauſe we cannot be certain of the Truth of any *general Propoſition*, unleſs we know the preciſe bounds and extent of the *Species* its terms ſtand for; it is neceſſary we ſhould know the Eſſence of each *Species*, which is that which conſtitutes and bounds it. This in all *ſimple ideas* and *modes* is not hard to do: for in theſe the *real* and *nominal* Eſſence being the ſame, there can be no doubt how far the *Species* extends, or what things are comprehended under each Term: which it is evident are all that have an exact Conformity with the *ideas* it ſtands for, and no other. But in *ſubſtances* wherein a *real* Eſſence, diſtinct from the *nominal*, is ſuppoſed to conſtitute, and bound the *Species*, the extent of the general word is very uncertain; becauſe not knowing this real Eſſence, we cannot know what is, or is not of that *Species*, and conſequently what may, or may not with Certainty be affirmed of it.

Hence we may ſee that the names of Subſtances, when made to ſtand for *Species*, ſuppoſed to be conſtituted by *real Eſſences*, which we know not, are not capable of conveying Certainty to the Underſtanding. Of the *truth* of *general Propoſitions* made up of ſuch Terms, we cannot be ſure. For how can we be ſure that this or that Quality is in *Gold*, for inſtance, when we know not what is, or is not *Gold*; that is, what has, or has not the *real Eſſence* of *Gold*, whereof we have no *idea* at all.

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On the other ſide, the names of Subſtances when made uſe of for the *complex ideas* men have in their minds; tho' they carry a clear and determinate Signification with them, will not yet ſerve us to make many univerſal *Propoſitions*, of whoſe truth we can be certain: becauſe the *ſimple ideas*, out of which the *complex* are combined, carry not with them any diſcoverable Connection or Repugnancy, but with a very few other *ideas*. For inſtance, *All Gold is fixed*, is a Propoſition we cannot be certain of, how univerſally ſoever it be believed: for if we take the term *Gold* to ſtand for a *real Eſſence*, it is evident we know not what particular Subſtances are of that *Species*, and ſo cannot with Certainty affirm any thing univerſally of *Gold*. But if we make the term *Gold* ſtand for a *Species*, determined by its *nominal Eſſence*, be its *complex idea* what it will; for inſtance, a body *Yellow*, *Fuſible*, *Malleable*, and *very heavy*; no Quality can with Certainty be denied or affirmed univerſally of it, but what has a diſcoverable connection, or inconſiſtency with that *nominal Eſſence*: *Fixedneſs*, for inſtance, having no neceſſary connection that we can diſcover with any *ſimple idea* that makes the *complex* one, or with the whole combination together; it is impoſſible that we ſhould certainly know the truth of this Propoſition, *All is Gold fixed*.

But is not this an univerſal certain Propoſition, *All Gold is malleable?* I anſwer, it is ſo, if *Malle-*

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ableneſs be a part of the *complex idea*, the word *Gold* ſtands for: but then here is nothing affirmed of *Gold*, but that, that Sound ſtands for an *idea*, in which *Malleableneſs* is contained. And ſuch a ſort of Truth and Certainty it is, to ſay, a *Centaur is four-footed*. I imagine amongſt all the ſecondary Qualities of Subſtances, and the Powers relating to them, there cannot any two be named, whoſe neceſſary Co-exiſtence or Repugnance to co-exiſt can be certainly known, unleſs in thoſe of the ſame Senſe, which neceſſarily exclude one another. Thus by the Colour we cannot certainly know what *Smell*, *Taſte*, &c. any body is of. 'Tis no wonder then that Certainty is to be found but in very few general Propoſitions concerning Subſtances: our Knowledge of their Qualities and Properties goes very ſeldom farther than our Senſes reach, or inform us. Inquiſitive and obſerving men may by Strength of Judgment, penetrate farther; and on Probabilites taken from wary Obſervations, and Hints well laid together, often gueſs right at what Experience has not yet diſcovered to them: but this is but *gueſſing* ſtill; it amounts only to *Opinion*; and has not that Certainty which is requiſite to *Knowledge*.

To conclude: general Propoſitions of what kind ſoever, are then only capable of Certainty, when the Terms uſed in them, ſtand for ſuch *ideas*, whoſe agreement or diſagreement, as there

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expreſſed, is capable to be diſcovered by us. And we are then certain of their Truth or Falſhood, when we perceive the *ideas* they ſtand for, to agree or not agree, according as they are affirmed or denied one of another; whence we may take notice, that general Certainty is never to be found but in our *ideas*. Whenever we go to ſeek it elſewhere in Experiment or Obſervations without us, our Knowledge goes not beyond particulars.

CHAP. VII.

Of Maxims.

THERE are a ſort of Propoſitions, which under the name of *Maxims* and *Axioms*, have paſſed for Principles of Science: and becauſe they are ſelf-evident, have been ſuppoſed *innate*. It may be worth while to enquire into the reaſon of their Evidence, and examine how far they influence our other Knowledge.

Knowledge being but the Perception of the agreement or diſagreement of *ideas*, where that agreement or diſagreement is perceived immediately by it ſelf, without the Intervention or Help of any other *ideas*, there our *Knowledge is ſelf-evident*: which being ſo, not only *Maxims*, but an infinite number of other Propoſitions partake equally with them in this Self-evidence. For,

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In reſpect of *Identity* and *Diverſity*, we may have as many ſelf-evident Propoſitions as we have diſtinct *ideas*. 'Tis the firſt act of the mind, to know every one of its *ideas* by it ſelf, and diſtinguiſh it from others. Every one finds in himſelf, that he knows the *ideas* he has; that he knows alſo when any one is in his Underſtanding, and what it is; and that when more than one are there, he knows them diſtinctly and unconfuſedly, one from another; ſo that all affirmations, or negations concerning them, are made without any poſſibility of Doubt or Uncertainty; and muſt neceſſarily be aſſented to as ſoon as underſtood: that is, as ſoon as we have in our minds the *ideas* clear and diſtinct, which the Terms in the Propoſition ſtand for. Thus a *Circle is a Circle*, *Blue is not Red*, are as ſelf-evident Propoſitions, as thoſe general ones, *What is is*, and *'tis impoſſible for the ſame thing to be and not to be*; nor can the Conſideration of theſe *Axioms* add any thing to the Evidence, or Certainty of our Knowledge of them.

As to the agreement or diſagreement of *Co-exiſtence*, the mind has an immediate Perception of this, but in very few. And therefore, in this ſort we have very little *intuitive* Knowledge: tho', in ſome few Propoſitions we have. *Two Bodies cannot be in the ſame Place*, I think is a ſelf-evident Propoſition. The *idea* of fitting a place equal to

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the contents of its ſuperficies being annexed to our *idea* of Body.

As to the Relations of *Modes*, Mathematicians have framed many Axioms concerning that one Relation of Equality, as *Equals taken from Equals, the Remainder will be equal*, &c. which however received for Axioms, yet I think have not a clearer ſelf-evidence than theſe, that *One and One are equal to Two*: that if from the five Fingers of one Hand, you take two, and from the five Fingers of the other Hand two, the remaining Numbers will be equal. Theſe and a thouſand other ſuch Propoſitions may be found in Numbers, which carry with them an equal, if not greater clearneſs than thoſe mathematical Axioms.

As to *real Exiſtence*, ſince that has no connection with any other of our *ideas*, but that of our ſelves, and of a *firſt Being*; we have not ſo much as a demonſtrative, much leſs a ſelf-evident Knowledge, concerning the *real Exiſtence* of other Beings.

In the next place let us conſider what influence theſe Maxims have upon the other parts of our Knowledge. The rules eſtabliſhed in the ſchools, that all reaſonings are *ex praecognitis et praeconceſſis*, ſeem to lay the Foundation of all other Knowledge in theſe Maxims, and to ſuppoſe them to be *praecognita*; whereby I think is meant two things: *1ſt*, That theſe Axioms are thoſe truths that are

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first known to the mind; 2*dly*, That upon them the other parts of our Knowledge depend.

First, That these Axioms are not the truths first known to the mind, is evident from experience: for who knows not that a *child perceives that a stranger is not its mother*, long before he knows, that it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be. And how many truths are there about Numbers, which the mind is perfectly acquainted with, and fully convinced of, before it ever thought on these general Maxims? Of this the Reason is plain; for that which makes the mind assent to such Propositions, being nothing but the Perception it has of the agreement or disagreement of its *ideas*, according as it finds them affirmed or denied in words one of another; and every *idea* being known to be what it is, and every two distinct *ideas* not to be the same, it must necessarily follow, that such self-evident truths must be first known, which consist of *ideas*, that are first in the mind; and the *ideas* first in the mind, it is evident, are those of particular things; from whence, by slow degrees the Understanding proceeds to some few general ones, which being taken from the ordinary and familiar objects of Sense, are settled in the mind, with general names to them. Thus particular *ideas* are first received and distinguished, and so Knowledge got about them; and next to them the less

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general or ſpecifick, which are next to particular ones.

For *abſtract ideas* are not ſo obvious or eaſy to *Children*, or the yet unexerciſed mind, as particular ones. If they ſeem ſo to grown *Men*, 'tis only becauſe by conſtant and familiar uſe they are made ſo.

Secondly, From what has been ſaid, it plainly follows, that theſe magnified *Maxims* are not the principles and foundations of all our other Knowledge: for if there be a great many other truths, as ſelf-evident as they, and a great many that we know before them, it is impoſſible that they ſhould be the Principles, from which we deduce all other Truths. Thus, that *One and Two are equal to Three*, is as evident, and eaſier known than that the *Whole is equal to all its Parts*. Nor after the Knowledge of this Maxim, do we know that *One and Two are equal to Three*, better, or more certainly than we did before. For if there be any odds in theſe *ideas*, the *ideas* of *Whole, and Parts*, are more obſcure, or at leaſt more difficult to be ſettled in the mind, than thoſe of *One, Two* and *Three*. Either therefore all Knowledge does not depend on certain *Pruecognita*, or general Maxims, called Principles; or elſe, ſuch as theſe, (*That One and One are Two, that Two and Two are Four*, &c.) and a great part of Numeration will be ſo. To which if we add all the ſelf-evident propoſitions

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that may be made about all our distinct *ideas*; Principles will be almost infinite, at least innumerable, which men arrive to the Knowledge of, at different ages; and a great many of those innate Principles, they never come to know all their lives. But whether they come in view early or later, they are all known by their native evidence, and receive no light, nor are capable of any proof one from another; much less the more particular, from the more general; or the more simple from the more compounded: the more simple and less abstract, being the most familiar, and the easier and earlier apprehended.

These *general Maxims* then, are only of use in disputes, to stop the mouths of wranglers; but not of much use to the discovery of unknown Truths; or to help the mind forwards in its search after Knowledge. Several general Maxims, are no more than bare verbal Propositions; and teach us nothing but the respect and import of names, one to another; as, *The Whole is equal to all its Parts*: what real Truth does it teach us more, than what the signification of the word *Totum* or *whole* does of it self import?

But yet, *Mathematicians* do not without reason place this, and some other such amongst their *Maxims*; that their scholars having in the entrance perfectly acquainted their thoughts with these Propositions made in such general Terms, may have

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them ready to apply to all particular cases: not that if they be equally weighed, they are more clear and evident, than the particular instances they are brought to confirm; but that being more familiar to the mind, the very naming them is enough to satisfy the Understanding. But this I say, is more from our custom of using them, than the different evidence of the things.

So that, if rightly consider'd, I think we may say, that where our *ideas* are clear and distinct, there is little, or no use at all of these *Maxims*, to prove the agreement or disagreement of any of them. He that cannot discern the truth, or falsehood of such Propositions, without the help of these and the like Maxims, will not be helped by these Maxims to do it. He that needs any proof to make him certain, and give his assent to this Proposition, that *Two are equal to Two*, or that *White is not Black*, will also have need of a proof to make him admit that, *What is, is*, or, *That it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be*.

And as these *Maxims* are of little use, where we have clear and distinct *ideas*; so they are of dangerous use, where our *ideas* are confused, and where we use words that are not annexed to clear and distinct *ideas*; but to such as are of a loose and wandering signification, sometimes standing for one, and sometimes for another *idea*, from which follows Mistake and Error, which these Ma-

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xima (brought as proofs to eſtabliſh Propoſitions wherein the terms ſtand for confuſed and uncertain *ideas*) do by their authority confirm and rivet.

CHAP. VIII.

Of trifling Propoſitions.

THERE are univerſal Propoſitions, which tho' they be certainly true, yet add no light to our Underſtandings, bring no increaſe to our Knowledge: ſuch are,

Firſt, All *purely identical Propoſitions*. Theſe at firſt *bluſh*, appear to contain no Inſtruction in them: for when we affirm the ſame term of it ſelf, it ſhews us nothing but what we muſt certainly know before, whether ſuch a Propoſition be either made by, or propoſed to us.

Secondly, Another ſort of trifling Propoſitions is, when a *part of the complex* idea *is praedicated of the name of the whole*; a part of the definition, of the word defined, as, *Lead is a Metal, Man an Animal*. Theſe carry no information at all, to thoſe who know the complex *ideas*, the names *Lead*, and *Man* ſtand for: indeed to a man that knows the ſignification of the word *Metal*, and not of the word *Lead*, it is a ſhorter way to explain the ſignification of the word *Lead*, by ſaying it is a *Metal*,

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than by enumerating the ſimple *ideas* one by one, which make up the complex *idea* of *Metal*.

Alike trifling it is to praedicate any one of the ſimple *ideas* of a complex one, of the name of the whole complex *idea*; as *all Gold is fuſible*; for fuſibility being one of the ſimple *ideas* that goes to the making up the complex one, the ſound *Gold* ſtands for; what can it be but playing with ſounds, to affirm that of the name *Gold*, which is comprehended in its received ſignification? What inſtruction can it carry, to tell one that which he is ſuppoſed to know before? for I am ſuppoſed to know the ſignification of the word another uſes to me, or elſe he is to tell me. . . . . .

The general Propoſitions that are made about Subſtances, if they are certain, are for the moſt part but *trifling*; and if they are inſtructive, uncertain; and ſuch as we have no Knowledge of their real truth, how much ſoever conſtant Obſervation and Analogy may aſſiſt our Judgments in *Gueſſing*. Hence it comes to paſs, that one may often meet with very clear and coherent diſcourſes, that amount yet to nothing. For names of ſubſtantial Beings, as well as others, having ſettled Significations affixed to them, may with great truth be joined negatively and affirmatively in Propoſitions, as their Definitions make them fit to be ſo joined; and Propoſitions conſiſting of ſuch terms, may with the ſame clearneſs be deduced

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one from another, as those that convey the most real truths; and all this without any Knowledge of the nature or reality of things existing without us. Thus he that has learnt the following words, with their ordinary acceptations annexed to them, *viz. Substance, Man, Animal, Form, Soul, Vegetative, Sensitive, Rational*, may make several undoubted Propositions about the Soul, without any Knowledge at all of what the Soul really is. And of this sort a man may find an infinite number of Propositions, Reasonings and Conclusions in books of *Metaphysicks, School-Divinity*, and some part of *Natural Philosophy*; and after all, know as little of *God, Spirits*, or *Bodies*, as he did before he set out.

Thirdly, The worst sort of *Trifling* is, to *use words loosely and uncertainly*, which sets us yet farther from the certainty of Knowledge we hope to attain to by them, or find in them. That which occasions this, is, that men may find it convenient to shelter their ignorance or obstinacy, under the obscurity or perplexedness of their terms; to which, perhaps, inadvertency and ill custom does in many men much contribute.

To conclude, barely *verbal Propositions* may be known by these following marks.

First, All Propositions, wherein two abstract terms are affirmed one of another, are barely about the signification of Sounds. For since no abstract

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idea can be the same with any other, but it self; when its abstract name is affirmed of any other term, it can signify no more but this, that it may or ought to be called by that name; or that these two names signify the same *idea*.

Secondly, All Propositions, wherein a part of the complex *idea*, which any term stands for, is predicated of that term, are only *verbal*: and thus all Propositions wherein more comprehensive terms called *Genera*, are affirmed of subordinate, or less comprehensive, called *Species*, or *Individuals*; are barely *verbal*. When by these two rules we examine the Propositions that make up the discourses we ordinarily meet with, both in and out of books; we shall, perhaps find, that a greater part of them, than is usually suspected, are purely about the Signification of words, and contain nothing in them but the use and application of these Signs.

CHAP. IX.

Of our Knowledge of Existence.

HITHERTO we have only consider'd the *Essences* of things, which being only *abstract ideas*, and thereby removed in our thoughts from particular Existence, give us no Knowledge of *Existence* at all. We proceed now to enquire con-

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cerning our *Knowledge of the Exiſtence* of things and how we come by it.

I ſay then, that we have the Knowledge of our *own Exiſtence*, by *Intuition*; of the *Exiſtence of God*, by *Demonſtration*; and of *other Things*, by *Senſation*. As for our own *Exiſtence*, we perceive it ſo plainly, that it neither needs, nor is capable of any proof. I think, I reaſon; I feel pleaſure and pain: can any of theſe be more evident to me than my *own Exiſtence?* If I doubt of all other things, that very *Doubt* makes me perceive my *own Exiſtence*, and will not ſuffer me to doubt of that. If I know I doubt, I have as certain a Perception of the *Thing* Doubting, as of that *Thought* which I call *Doubt*. Experience then convinces us that we have an *intuitive Knowledge of our own Exiſtence*; and an internal infallible Perception that we are. In every act of Senſation, Reaſoning or Thinking, we are conſcious to our ſelves of our own Being, and in this matter come not ſhort of the higheſt degree of *Certainty*.

CHAP. X.

Of our Knowledge of the Exiſtence of a God.

THO' *God* has given us no *innate ideas* of himſelf, yet having furniſhed us with thoſe faculties our minds are endowed with, he hath not *left himſelf without a witneſs*, ſince we have Senſe,

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Perception, and Reaſon, and cannot want a clear proof of him, as long as we carry ourſelves about us: nor can we juſtly complain of our ignorance in this great point, ſince he has ſo plentifully provided us with means to diſcover, and know him, ſo far as is neceſſary to the end of our Being, and the great concernment of our Happineſs. But tho' this be the moſt obvious truth that Reaſon diſcovers, yet it requires Thought and Attention; and the mind muſt apply it ſelf to a regular deduction of it, from ſome part of our *intuitive* Knowledge; or elſe we ſhall be as ignorant of this as of other Propoſitions which are in themſelves capable of clear Demonſtration. To ſhew therefore, that we are capable of knowing, that is, *being certain*, that *there is a God*; and how we may come by this certainty, I think we need go no farther than our ſelves, and that undoubted Knowledge we have of our own *Exiſtence*. I think it is beyond queſtion, that *man has a clear perception of his own being:* he knows certainly that he exiſts, and that he is ſomething. In the next place, man knows by an *intuitive* Certainty, that *bare nothing can no more produce any real being, than it can be equal to two right Angles*. If therefore we know there is ſome real Being, it is an evident Demonſtration, that *from Eternity there has been ſomething*; ſince what was not from Eternity, had a beginning; and what had a beginning, muſt be

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produced by ſomething elſe. Next it is evident, *that what has its being from another, muſt alſo have all that which is in, and belongs to its being from another too:* all the powers it has muſt be owing to, and received from the ſame ſource. This eternal ſource then of all Being muſt be alſo the ſource and original of all Power; and ſo this *Eternal Being* muſt be alſo the *moſt Powerful.*

Again, man finds in himſelf *Perception* and *Knowledge:* we are certain then that there is not only ſome Being, but ſome knowing, intelligent Being in the world. There was a time then, when there was no knowing Being, or elſe there has been a knowing Being from Eternity. If it be ſaid, there was a time when that Eternal Being had no Knowledge; I reply, that then it is impoſſible there ſhould have ever been any Knowledge. It being as impoſſible that things wholly void of Knowledge, and operating blindly, and without any Perception, ſhould produce a knowing Being, as it is that a Triangle ſhould make it ſelf three Angles, bigger than two right ones.

Thus from the conſideration of ourſelves, and what we infallibly find in our own conſtitutions, our reaſon leads us to the knowledge of this certain and evident Truth, that *there is an eternal, moſt powerful, and knowing Being*, which, whether any one will call God, it matters not. The thing is evident, and from this *idea* duly conſide-

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red, will eaſily be deduced all thoſe other *Attributes* we ought to aſcribe to this *eternal Being*.

From what has been ſaid, it is plain to me, we have a more certain knowledge of the Exiſtence of a *God*, than of any thing our ſenſes have not immediately diſcovered to us. Nay, I preſume I may ſay, that we more certainly know that there is a God, than that there is any thing elſe without us. When I ſay, we know, I *mean*, there is ſuch a Knowledge within our reach, which we cannot miſs, if we will but apply our minds to that, as we do to ſeveral other Enquiries.

It being then unavoidable for all rational Creatures to conclude, that *ſomething has exiſted from Eternity*; let us next ſee what *kind of Thing* that muſt be. There are but two ſorts of Beings in the world, that man knows or conceives: 1*ſt*, Such as are purely material, without ſenſe or perception, as the clippings of our beards, and parings of our nails. 2*dly*, Senſible perceiving Beings; ſuch as we find our ſelves to be. Theſe two ſorts we ſhall hereafter call *Cogitative* and *Incogitative* Beings: which to our preſent purpoſe are better than *material* and *immaterial*.

If then there muſt be ſomething *Eternal*, it is very obvious to Reaſon, that it muſt neceſſarily be a *Cogitative* Being; becauſe it is as impoſſible to conceive that ever bare *Incogitative* Matter ſhould produce a *thinking* intelligent Being, as that nothing

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ſhould of it ſelf produce Matter. Let us ſuppoſe any parcel of matter *Eternal*, we ſhall find it in it ſelf unable to produce any thing. Let us ſuppoſe its parts firmly at reſt together: if there were no other Being in the world, muſt it not eternally remain ſo, a dead unactive lump? Is it poſſible to conceive it can add motion to it ſelf, or produce any thing? *Matter* then by its own ſtrength cannot produce in it ſelf, ſo much as *Motion*. The motion it has, muſt alſo be from Eternity, or elſe added to Matter by ſome other Being, more powerful than Matter. But let us ſuppoſe Motion eternal too, yet Matter, *Incogitative* Matter and Motion could never produce *Thought*: *Knowledge* will ſtill be as far beyond the power of *motion* and *matter* to produce, as matter is beyond the power of Nothing to produce. Divide *matter* into as minute parts as you will, vary the figure and motion of it, as much as you pleaſe, it will operate no otherwiſe upon other Bodies of proportionable bulk, than it did before this diviſion. The minuteſt particles of Matter, knock, impel, and reſiſt one another, juſt as the greater do, and that is all they can do, ſo that if we will ſuppoſe *Nothing Eternal*, *Matter can never begin to be*. If we ſuppoſe *bare Matter* without Motion *Eternal*, *Motion can never begin to be*. If we ſuppoſe only *Matter* and Motion *Eternal*, *Thought can never begin to be*: for it is impoſſible to conceive, that Matter, either with or without

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Motion, could have originally in and from it ſelf, Senſe, Perception, and Knowledge, as is evident from hence, that then Senſe, Perception, and Knowledge, muſt be a Property eternally inſeparable from Matter, and every particle of it. Since therefore whatſoever is the firſt eternal being, muſt neceſſarily be *Cogitative:* and whatſoever is firſt of all things, muſt neceſſarily contain in it, and actually have, at leaſt, all the perfections that can ever after exiſt, it neceſſarily follows, that the *Firſt Eternal Being cannot be Matter.*

If therefore it be evident that ſomething neceſſarily muſt exiſt from Eternity, it is alſo as evident that, that *Something muſt neceſſarily be a cogitative Being.* For it is as impoſſible that *incogitative Matter* ſhould produce a *cogitative Being*, as that nothing, or the negation of all Being ſhould produce a poſitive Being or Matter.

This diſcovery of the neceſſary Exiſtence of an eternal Mind, does ſufficiently lead us into the Knowledge of God. For it will hence follow, that all other knowing Beings, that have a beginning, muſt depend on him, and have no other ways of Knowledge or extent of Power, than what he gives them: and therefore if he made thoſe, he made alſo the leſs excellent pieces of this Univerſe, all *inanimate Bodies*, whereby his *Omniſcience*, *Power*, and *Providence* will be eſtabliſh'd; and from thence all his other attributes neceſſarily follow.

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CHAP. XI.

Of our Knowledge of the Existence of other Things.

THE Knowledge of our own Being we have by *Intuition:* the Existence of a God, *Reason* clearly makes known to us, as has been shewn: the *Knowledge of the Existence* of any other thing, we can have only by Sensation; for there being no necessary Connection of *real Existence* with any *idea* a man hath in his memory; nor of any other Existence, but that of God, with the Existence of any particular man; no particular man can know the Existence of any other Being, but only, when by actually operating upon him, it makes it self be perceived by him. The having the *idea* of any thing in our mind, no more proves the Existence of that thing, than the picture of a man evidences his being in the world, or the visions of a dream, make thereby a true history. It is therefore the actual receiving of *ideas* from without, that gives us notice of the Existence of other things, and makes us know that something doth exist at that time without us, which causes that *idea* in us, tho' perhaps we neither know nor consider how it does it; for it takes not from the *Certainty* of our Senses, and the *ideas* we receive by

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them, that we know not the manner wherein they are produced. This *Notice* we have by our *Senſes* of the exiſting of things without us, tho' it be not altogether ſo certain as *Intuition* and *Demonſtration*, deſerves the name of Knowledge, if we perſuade our ſelves that our faculties act and inform us right, concerning the Exiſtence of thoſe objects that affect them. But beſides the aſſurance we have from our *Senſes* themſelves, that they do not err in the Information they give us of the Exiſtence of things without us, we have other concurrent Reaſons: as, *Firſt*, It is plain thoſe Perceptions are produced in us, by exteriour Cauſes affecting our Senſes, becauſe thoſe that want the *Organs* of any *ſenſe*, never can have the *ideas* belonging to that ſenſe produced in their minds. This is too evident to be doubted, and therefore we cannot but be aſſured, that they come in by the Organs of that Senſe, and no other way.

Secondly, Becauſe we find ſometimes that we cannot avoid the having thoſe *ideas* produced in our minds; when my eyes are ſhut, I can at pleaſure recall to my mind the *ideas* of *Light* or the *Sun*, which former Senſations had lodged in my memory; but if I turn my eyes towards the *Sun*, I cannot avoid the *ideas* which the *Light* or the *Sun* then produces in me: which ſhews a manifeſt difference between thoſe *ideas* laid up in the memory, and ſuch as force themſelves upon us, and we

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cannot avoid having. And therefore it muſt needs be ſome *exterior* cauſe, whoſe efficacy I cannot reſiſt, that produces thoſe *ideas* in my mind, whether I will or no.

Beſides, there is no body who doth not perceive the difference in himſelf, between actually looking upon the *Sun*, and contemplating the *idea* he has of it in his memory; and therefore he hath certain Knowledge, that they are not both memory or fancy; but that actual ſeeing has a cauſe without.

Thirdly, Add to this, that many *ideas* are produced in us with pain, which we afterwards remember without the leaſt offence. Thus the pain of *Heat* or *Cold*, when the *idea* of it is received in our minds, gives us no diſturbance; which when felt was very troubleſome; and we remember the pain of *Hunger*, *Thirſt*, *Head-Ach*, &c. without any pain at all; which would either never diſturb us, or elſe conſtantly do it, as often as we thought of it, were there nothing more but *ideas* floating in our minds, and appearances entertaining our fancies, without the real Exiſtence of things affecting us from abroad.

Fourthly, Our ſenſes in many caſes bear witneſs to the truth of each others report, concerning the Exiſtence of ſenſible things without us: he that doubts when he ſees a *Fire*, whether it be *real*, may, if he pleaſe, feel it too; and by the exquiſite

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pain he will be convinced, that it is not a bare *idea* or *phantom*.

If after all this, any one will be ſo *ſceptical*, as to diſtruſt his ſenſes, and to queſtion the Exiſtence of all things, or our Knowledge of any thing; let him conſider that the Certainty of things exiſting in *rerum natura*, when we have the teſtimony of our ſenſes for it, is not only as great as our frame can attain to, but as our condition needs. For our *faculties* being not ſuited to the full Extent of Being, nor a clear comprehenſive knowledge of all things, but to the preſervation of us, in whom they are, and accommodated to the uſe of life; they ſerve our purpoſe well enough, if they will but give us certain notice of thoſe things, that are convenient or inconvenient to us. For he that ſees a *Candle* burning, and has experimented the force of the flame, by putting his finger in it, will little doubt, that this is ſomething exiſting without him, which does him harm and puts him to pain, which is aſſurance enough; when no man requires greater certainty to govern his actions by, than what is as certain as his actions themſelves: ſo that this evidence is as great as we can deſire, being as certain to us as our pleaſure or pain, that is, *Happineſs* or *Miſery*, beyond which we have no concernment either of Knowing, or Being.

In fine, when our ſenſes do actually convey into

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our Underſtandings any *idea*, we are aſſured that there is ſomething at that time *really exiſting* without us. But this Knowledge extends only as far as the preſent teſtimony of our ſenſes, employed about particular Objects, that do then affect them, and no farther. My ſeeing a *Man* a minute ſince, is no certain argument of his preſent Exiſtence.

As when our ſenſes are actually employed about any Object, we know that it does exiſt; ſo by our memory we may be aſſured, that heretofore things that affected our *ſenſes, have exiſted*: and thus we have the Knowledge of the paſt Exiſtence of ſeveral things; whereof our *ſenſes* having inform'd us, our memories ſtill retain the *ideas*: and of this we are paſt all doubt, ſo long as we remember well.

As to the Exiſtence of ſpirits, our having *ideas* of them, does not make us know, that any ſuch things do exiſt without us; or that there are any *finite ſpirits*; or any other ſpiritual beings but the Eternal God. We have ground from *Revelation*, and ſeveral other reaſons, to believe with aſſurance, that there are ſuch Creatures: but our ſenſes not being able to diſcover them, we want the means of knowing their particular Exiſtence; for we can no more know that there are *finite ſpirits* really exiſting, by the *idea* we have of ſuch Beings, than by the *ideas* any one has of *Faries* or *Centaurs*, he

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can come to know that things anſwering thoſe *ideas*, do really exiſt.

Hence we may gather, that there are *two ſorts* of Propoſitions, *One* concerning the Exiſtence of any thing anſwerable to ſuch an *idea*; as that of an *Elephant*, *Phoenix*, *Motion*, or *Angel*, *viz.* Whether ſuch a thing does any where exiſt: and this Knowledge is only of *Particulars*, and not to be had of any thing without us, but only of God, any other way than by our *ſenſes*.

Another ſort of Propoſition is, wherein is expreſſed the agreement or diſagreement of our *abſtract ideas*, and their dependence one on another. And theſe may be *univerſal* and certain: ſo having the *idea* of *God*, and my *ſelf*, of *Fear* and *Obedience*, I cannot but be ſure that *God is to be feared and obeyed by me*; and this Propoſition will be certain concerning *Man* in general; if I have made an *abſtract idea* of ſuch a *ſpecies*, whereof I am one particular. But ſuch a Propoſition, how certain ſoever, proves not to me the Exiſtence of men in the world; but will be true of all ſuch Creatures, whenever they do exiſt: which *Certainty* of ſuch general Propoſitions, depends on the agreement or diſagreement diſcoverable in thoſe *abſtract ideas*. In the former caſe, our Knowledge is the conſequence of the *Exiſtence of things*, producing *ideas* in our minds by our ſenſes: in the latter, the con-

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ſequence of the *ideas* that are in our *minds*, and producing theſe general Propoſitions, many whereof are called *Eternae veritates*; and all of them indeed are ſo, not from being written all, or any of them in the minds of all men, or that they were any of them Propoſitions in any ones mind, till he having got the *abſtract ideas*, joined or ſeparated them by affirmation or negation: but whereſoever we can ſuppoſe ſuch a Creature as *Man* is, endowed with ſuch faculties, and thereby furniſhed with ſuch *ideas* as we have; we muſt conclude, he muſt needs, when he applies his thoughts to the conſideration of his *ideas*, know the truth of certain Propoſitions, that will ariſe from the agreement or diſagreement he will perceive in his own *ideas*. Such Propoſitions being once made about *abſtract ideas*, ſo as to be true, they will, whenever they can be ſuppoſed to be made again, at any time paſt, or to come, by a mind having thoſe *ideas*, always be true. For names being ſuppoſed to ſtand perpetually for the ſame *ideas*; and the ſame *ideas* having immutably the ſame habitudes one to another; Propoſitions concerning any *abſtract ideas* that are once true, muſt needs be *eternal Verities*.

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CHAP. XII.

Of the Improvement of our Knowledge.

IT being the received opinion amongſt men of letters, that *maxims are the foundations of all Knowledge*, and that Sciences are each of them built upon certain *Praecognita*, from whence the Underſtanding was to take its riſe, and by which it was to conduct itſelf in its inquiries in the matters belonging to that *ſcience*, the beaten road of the ſchools has been to lay down in the beginning one or more general Propoſitions, called *Principles*, as foundations whereon to build the Knowledge, that was to be had of that ſubject.

That which gave occaſion to this way of proceeding, was, I ſuppoſe, the good ſucceſs it ſeemed to have in *Mathematicks*, which of all other ſciences, have the greateſt certainty, clearneſs, and evidence, in them. But if we conſider it, we ſhall find that the great *advancement* and certainty of *real Knowledge* men arrived to in theſe *ſciences*, was not owing to the influence of theſe Principles, but to the clear diſtinct and compleat *ideas* their thoughts were employed about; and the relation of *Equality* and *Exceſs*, ſo clear between ſome of them, that they had an *intuitive Knowledge*; and by that a

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way to discover it in others: and this without the help of those *maxims*. For I ask, Is it not possible for a lad to know that his whole body is bigger than his little finger, but by virtue of this Axiom, *the whole is bigger than the part*; nor be assured of it, till he has learned that *maxim?* Let any one consider from what has been elsewhere said, which is known first and clearest by most people, the *particular* instance, or the *general* rule; and which it is that gives life and birth to the other. These *general rules* are but the comparing our more general and *abstract ideas*, which *ideas* are made by the mind, and have names given them, for the easier dispatch in its reasonings: but Knowledge began in the mind, and was founded on *Particulars*, tho' afterwards perhaps no notice be taken thereof: it being natural for the mind, to lay up those general notions, and make the proper use of them, which is to disburthen the memory of the cumbersome load of Particulars.

The way to *improve in Knowledge*, is not to swallow Principles, with an Implicit Faith, and without Examination, which would be apt to mislead men, instead of guiding them into truth; but to get and fix in our minds, *clear* and *complete ideas*, as far as they are to be had, and annex to them *proper* and *constant* names: and thus barely by considering our *ideas*, and comparing them together, observing their agreement or disagreement,

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their habitudes and relations, we ſhall get more true and clear Knowledge by the conduct of this one *Rule*, than by taking up *Principles*, and thereby putting our minds into the diſpoſal of others.

We muſt therefore, if we will proceed as *Reaſon* adviſes, adapt our methods of Inquiry, to the nature of the *ideas* we examine, and the truth we ſearch after. *General* and *certain Truths*, are only founded in the habitudes and relations of *abſtract ideas*. Therefore a ſagacious methodical application of our thoughts for the finding out theſe Relations, is the only way to diſcover all that can with Truth and Certainty be put into general Propoſitions. By what ſteps we are to proceed in theſe, is to be learned in the ſchools of the *Mathematicians*, who from very plain and eaſy beginnings, by gentle degrees, and a continued chain of Reaſonings, proceed to the diſcovery and demonſtration of *Truths*, that appear at firſt ſight beyond humane Capacity. This, I think I may ſay, that if other *ideas*, that are *real* as well as *nominal* Eſſences of their *ſpecies*, were purſued in the way familiar to *Mathematicians*, they would carry our thoughts farther and with greater Evidence and Clearneſs, than poſſibly we are apt to imagine. This gave me the Confidence to advance that Conjecture, which I ſuggeſt, *Chapter* the Third, viz. that *Morality is capable of Demonſtration*, as well as *Mathematicks*: for *moral ideas* being real

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Eſſences, that have a diſcoverable Connexion and Agreement one with another, ſo far as we can find their Habitudes and Relations, ſo far we ſhall be poſſeſſed of *real* and *general Truths*.

In our Knowledge of *Subſtances*, we are to proceed after a quite different method: the bare Contemplation of their *abſtract ideas* (which are but *nominal* Eſſences) will carry us but a very little way, in the ſearch of Truth and Certainty. Here *Experience* muſt teach us what *Reaſon* cannot: and it is by trying alone, that we can certainly know, what other Qualities co-exiſt with thoſe of our *complex idea*; (for inſtance) Whether that *Yellow heavy fuſible* Body, I call *Gold*, be *malleable*, or no; which Experience (however it prove in that particular body we examine) makes us not certain that it is ſo in all, or any other *yellow, heavy, fuſible* Bodies, but that which we have tried; becauſe it is no conſequence one way or the other from our *complex idea:* the neceſſity or inconſiſtence of *Malleability*, hath no viſible Connexion with the combination of that *Colour*, *Weight*, and *Fuſibility* in any Body. What I have here ſaid of the *nominal* Eſſence of *Gold*, ſuppoſed to conſiſt of a Body of ſuch a determinate *Colour*, *Weight*, and *Fuſibility*, will hold true, if other Qualities be added to it. Our Reaſonings from thoſe *ideas*, will carry us but a little way in the certain Diſcovery of the other *Properties*, in thoſe Maſſes of Matter where-

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in all those are to be found. As far as our Experience reaches, we may have certain knowledge, and no farther.

I deny not, but a man accustomed to rational and regular Experiments, shall be able to see farther into the nature of Bodies, and their unknown Properties, than one that is a stranger to them. But this is but *Judgment* and *Opinion*, not *Knowledge* and *Certainty*. This makes me suspect that *Natural Philosophy* is not capable of being made a *science*: from Experiments and historical Observations we may draw Advantages of Ease and Health, and thereby increase our stock of Conveniences for this Life: but beyond this, I fear our *Talents* reach not; nor are our faculties, as I guess, able to advance.

From whence it is obvious to conclude, that since our faculties are not fitted to penetrate the *real Essences* of Bodies, but yet plainly to discover to us the *Being* of a *God*, and the *Knowledge* of our *selves*; enough to give us a clear Discovery of our *Duty*, and great Concernment; it will become us as rational Creatures, to employ our Faculties, about what they are most adapted to, and follow the Direction of Nature, where it seems to point us out the way. For, it is rational to conclude, that our proper Employment lies in those Inquiries, and that sort of Knowledge which is most suited to our natural Capacities, and carries in it

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our greateſt intereſt, that is, *the condition of our eternal State:* and therefore it is, I think, that *morality* is the proper ſcience and buſineſs of *mankind* in general (who are both concerned and fitted to ſearch out their *Summum Bonum*) as ſeveral *Arts* converſant about the ſeveral parts of nature, are the lot and private talent of particular men, for the common uſe of human life, and their own particular Subſiſtence in this World.

The ways to enlarge our Knowledge, as far as we are capable, ſeem to me to be *theſe two:* the *firſt* is to get and ſettle in our minds, as far as we can, clear, diſtinct, and conſtant *ideas* of thoſe things we would conſider and know. For it being evident that our Knowledge cannot exceed our *ideas*; where they are either imperfect, confuſed, or obſcure, we cannot expect to have certain, perfect, or clear Knowledge. The *other* is the art of finding out the intermediate *ideas*, which may ſhew us the Agreement or Repugnancy of other *ideas*, which cannot be immediately compared.

That theſe *two* (and not the relying on *maxims*, and drawing conſequences from ſome general Propoſitions) are the right method of improving our Knowledge, in the *ideas* of other *modes*, beſides thoſe of Quantity, the Conſideration of *mathematical* Knowledge will eaſily inform us. Where *Firſt*, we ſhall find that he that has not clear and perfect *ideas* of thoſe *Angles* or *Figures*, of which he

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desires to know any thing, is utterly thereby incapable of any Knowledge about them. Suppose a man not to have an exact *idea* of a *right Angle*, *Scalenum*, or *Trapezium*, and it is clear, that he will in vain seek any Demonstration about them. And *farther* it is evident, that it was not the influence of *maxims* or *principles*, that has led the masters of this *Science* into those wonderful Discoveries they have made. Let a man of good parts know all the *maxims* of *Mathematicks* never so well, and contemplate their Extent and Consequences as much as he pleases, he will by their assistance, I suppose, scarce ever come to know, that the square of the *Hypotenuse*, *in a right-angled Triangle*, *is equal to the squares of the two other sides*. This, and other *mathematical* Truths have been discovered by the Thoughts, otherwise applied. The mind had other objects, other views before it, far different from those *maxims* which men well enough acquainted with those received *Axioms*, but ignorant of their method, who first made these Demonstrations, can never sufficiently admire.

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CHAP. XIII.

Some further Conſiderations concerning Knowledge.

OUR *Knowledge*, as in other things, ſo in this, has a great Conformity with our *ſight*, that it is neither wholly *neceſſary*, nor wholly *voluntary*. Men that have ſenſes cannot chuſe but receive ſome *ideas* by them; and if they have memory, they cannot but retain ſome of them; and if they have any diſtinguiſhing Faculty, cannot but perceive the Agreement or Diſagreement of ſome of them, one with another. As he that has Eyes, if he will open them by day, cannot but ſee ſome Objects, and perceive a difference in them; yet he may chuſe whether he will turn his Eyes towards an Object; curiouſly ſurvey it, and obſerve accurately all that is viſible in it. But what he does ſee, he cannot ſee otherwiſe than he does: it depends not on his *Will*, to ſee that *Black* which appears *Yellow*. Juſt thus it is with our *Underſtanding*: all that is voluntary in our Knowledge, is the employing or with-holding any of our Faculties from this or that ſort of *Objects*; and a more, or leſs accurate Survey of them: but they being employed, our *Will* hath no power to determine

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the Knowledge of the mind, one way or other. That is done only by the *Objects* themſelves, as far as they are clearly diſcovered.

Thus he that has got the *ideas* of *Numbers*, and hath taken the pains to compare *One*, *Two* and *Three*, to *Six*, cannot chuſe but know that they are equal. He alſo that hath the *idea* of an intelligent, but weak and frail *Being*, made by, and depending on another, who is *Eternal*, *Omnipotent*, perfectly *wiſe* and *good*, will as certainly know, that *man* is to honour, fear, and obey *God*, as that the Sun ſhines when he ſees it. But yet theſe Truths, being never ſo certain, never ſo clear, he may be ignorant of either or both of them, who will not take the pains to employ his Faculties as he ſhould, to inform himſelf about them.

CHAP. XIV.

Of Judgment.

THE *Underſtanding Faculties* being given to man, not barely for Speculation, but alſo for the Conduct of his Life: a man would be at a great loſs if he had nothing to direct him but what has the Certainty of true Knowledge. He that will not *eat* till he has Demonſtration that it will nouriſh him; nor *ſtir*, till he is infallibly aſ-

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ſured of ſucceſs in his buſineſs, will have little elſe to do but *ſit ſtill* and *periſh*.

Therefore as *God* hath ſet ſome things in broad *Day-light*; as he has given us ſome certain Knowledge, tho' limited to a few things, in compariſon, (probably as a taſte of what *intellectual* creatures are capable of, to excite in us a deſire and endeavour after a better State) ſo in the greateſt part of our Concernment, he has afforded us only the *Twilight*, as I may ſo ſay, of *Probability*, ſuitable to that ſtate of *Mediocrity* and *Probationerſhip*, he has been pleaſed to place us in here.

The Faculty which *God* has given *man* to enlighten him, next to certain Knowledge, is *Judgment*, whereby the mind takes its *idea* to agree or diſagree, without perceiving a demonſtrative Evidence in the Proofs. The mind exerciſes this Judgment, ſometimes out of *Neceſſity*, where demonſtrative Proofs, and certain Knowledge are not to be had; and ſometimes out of *Lazineſs*, Unſkilfulneſs, or Haſte, even where they are to be had.

This Faculty of the Mind when it is exerciſed immediately about things, is called *Judgment*; when about truths delivered in words, is moſt commonly called *Aſſent*, or *Diſſent*. Thus the mind has *two Faculties* converſant about Truth and Falſhood: 1*ſt*, *Knowledge*, whereby it certainly perceives, and is undoubtedly ſatisfied of the Agree-

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ment or Disagreement of any *ideas*. 2*dly*, *Judgment*, which is the putting *ideas* together, or separating them from one another in the mind, when their certain Agreement or Disagreement is not *perceived*, but presumed to be so. And if it so unites or separates them, as in reality things are, it is *right Judgment*.

CHAP. XV.

Of Probability.

PROBABILITY is nothing but the appearance of the Agreement or Disagreement of two *ideas*, by the Intervention of Proofs, whose Connexion is not constant, and immutable; or is not perceived to be so; but is, or appears for the most part to be so, and is enough to induce the mind to judge the Proposition to be *true* or *false*, rather than the contrary.

Of *Probability* there are degrees from the neighbourhood of *Certainty* and *Demonstration*, quite down to *Improbability* and *Unlikeliness*, even to the confines of *Impossibility*: and also degrees of *Assent* from certain Knowledge and what is next it, full Assurance and Confidence, quite down to Conjecture, Doubt, Distrust, and Disbelief.

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That Propoſition then is *probable*, for which there are arguments or proofs to make it paſs, or be received for *true*. The Entertainment the mind gives to this ſort of Propoſitions, is called *Belief*, *Aſſent*, or *Opinion*. *Probability* then being to ſupply the defect of our Knowledge, is always converſant about Propoſitions, whereof we have no *Certainty*, but only ſome *Inducements* to receive them for true. The *Grounds* of it are in ſhort *theſe two* following.

Firſt, The *Conformity* of any thing with our own Knowledge, Experience, or Obſervation.

Secondly, The *Teſtimony* of others, vouching their Obſervation and Experience. In the *Teſtimony* of others, is to be conſidered; *1ſt*, The Number; *2dly*, The Integrity; *3dly*, The Skill of the Witneſſes; *4thly*, The Deſign of the Author, if it be a Teſtimony cited out of a Book; *5thly*, The Conſiſtency of the Parts and Circumſtances of the Relation; *6thly*, Contrary Teſtimonies.

The mind before it rationally *aſſents* or *diſſents* to any probable Propoſition, ought to examine all the grounds of *Probability*, and ſee how they make, more or leſs, for or againſt it; and upon a due balancing of the whole, reject or receive it, with a more or leſs firm *Aſſent*, according to the Preponderancy of the greater *Grounds* of *Probability*, on one ſide or the other.

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CHAP. XVI.

Of the Degrees of Aſſent.

THE *Grounds of Probability* laid down in the foregoing *Chapter*, as they are the foundations on which our *Aſſent* is built, ſo are they alſo the meaſure whereby its ſeveral *Degrees* are (or ought) to be regulated. Only we are to take notice, that no grounds of Probability operate any farther on the mind, which ſearches after Truth, and endeavours to judge right, than they appear; at leaſt in the firſt Judgment, or Search that the mind makes. It is indeed in many caſes impoſſible, and in moſt very hard, even for thoſe who have admirable memories, to retain all the Proofs, which upon a due Examination, made them embrace that ſide of the queſtion. It ſuffices that they have once with care and fairneſs, ſifted the matter as far as they could; and having once found on which ſide the *Probability* appeared to them, they lay up the Concluſion in their memories, as a *Truth* they have diſcovered; and for the future remain ſatisfied with the Teſtimony of their memories, that this is the Opinion, that by the Proofs they have once ſeen of it, deſerves ſuch a *Degree* of their *Aſſent* as they afford it.

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It is unavoidable then that the memory be relied on in this case, and that men be perſuaded of ſeveral *Opinions*, whereof the Proofs are not actually in their thoughts, nay, which perhaps they are not able actually to recal: without this the greateſt part of men, muſt be either *Scepticks*, or change every moment, when any one offers them arguments, which for want of memory, they are not preſently able to anſwer.

It muſt be owned that mens ſticking to paſt Judgments, is often the cauſe of great *Obſtinacy* in Error and Miſtake. But the fault is not, that they rely on their memories for what they have before well judged, but becauſe they judged before they had well examined. Who almoſt is there that hath the Leiſure, Patience, and Means to collect together, all the Proofs concerning moſt of the Opinions he has, ſo as ſafely to conclude that he has a clear and full view, and that there is no more to be alledged for his better Information? And yet we are forced to determine our ſelves on one ſide or other: the conduct of our Lives, and the management of our great Concerns, will not bear Delay. For thoſe depend for the moſt part on the determination of our Judgment in points wherein we are not capable of certain Knowledge, and wherein it is neceſſary for us to embrace one ſide or the other.

The Propoſitions we receive upon inducements

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of *Probability*, are of *two sorts: First*, Concerning some particular Existence, or matter of *Fact*, which falling under Observation, is capable of *human Testimony*. *Secondly*, Concerning things, which being beyond the discovery of our *Senses*, are not capable of human Testimony.

Concerning the first of these, *viz. Particular matter of Fact*.

First, Where any particular thing, consonant to the constant Observation of our selves and others in the like case, comes attested with the concurrent Reports of all that mention it, we receive it as easily, and build as firmly upon it, as if it were certain Knowledge. Thus, if all *Englishmen* who have occasion to mention it, should report, that it *froze* in *England* last Winter, or the like, I think a man would as little doubt of it, as that *Seven and Four are Eleven*.

The *First*, and *highest* Degree of *Probability* then is, when the general consent of all men, in all ages, as far as can be known, concurs with a man's own constant Experience in the like cases, to confirm the truth of any particular matter of Fact, attested by fair Witnesses: such are the stated *Constitutions* and *Properties* of Bodies, and the regular Proceedings of *Causes* and *Effects* in the ordinary course of *Nature*; this we call an *Argument* from the nature of things themselves. For what we and others always observe to be after the same

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manner, we conclude with Reaſon, to be the effects of ſteddy and regular *Cauſes*, tho' they come not within the reach of our Knowledge. As that Fire warmed a man, or made *Lead fluid*; that *Iron* ſunk in water, ſwam in quick-ſilver. A relation affirming any ſuch thing to have been, or a prædiction that it will happen again in the ſame manner, is received without doubt or heſitation: and our *Belief* thus grounded, riſes to *Aſſurance*.

Secondly, The next degree of *Probability*, is when by my own Experience, and the agreement of all others that mention it, a *thing* is found to be for the moſt part ſo; and that the particular inſtance of it is atteſted by many and undoubted *witneſſes*. Thus *Hiſtory* giving us ſuch an account of men in all ages, and my own Experience confirming it, that moſt men prefer their own private Advantage, to the Publick. If all Hiſtorians that writ of *Tiberius*, ſay that he did ſo, it is extreamly probable: and in this caſe, our *Aſſent* riſes to a degree which we may call *Confidence*.

Thirdly, In matters happening indifferently, as that a *Bird* ſhould fly this or that way: when any particular matter of Fact comes atteſted by the concurrent Teſtimony of unſuſpected *Witneſſes*, there our *Aſſent* is alſo unavoidable. Thus, that there is in *Italy* ſuch a city as *Rome*; that about One thouſand and ſeven hundred years ago, there lived ſuch a man in it as *Julius Cæſar*, &c.

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A man can as little doubt of this, and the like, as he does of the Being and Actions of his own Acquaintance, whereof he himself is a witneſs.

Probability, on theſe grounds, carries ſo much Evidence with it, that it leaves us as little liberty to believe or disbelieve, as Demonſtration does, whether we will know or be ignorant. But the difficulty is, when Teſtimonies contradict common Experience, and the Reports of Witneſſes claſh with the ordinary courſe of Nature, or with one another. Here diligence, attention, and exactneſs is required to form a *right Judgment*, and to proportion the *Aſſent* to the Evidence and *Probability* of the thing, which riſes and falls, according as the two foundations of Credibility favour, or contradict it. Theſe are liable to ſuch variety of contrary Obſervations, Circumſtances, Reports, Tempers, Deſigns, Overſights, *&c.* of Reporters, that it is impoſſible to reduce to preciſe rules, the various degrees wherein men give their *Aſſent*. This in general may be ſaid, that as the *Proofs* upon due Examination, ſhall to any one appear in a greater, or leſs degree, to preponderate on either ſide, ſo they are fitted to produce in the mind, ſuch different Entertainments, as are called *Belief*, *Conjecture*, *Gueſs*, *Doubt*, *Wavering*, *Diſtruſt*, *Diſbelief*, &c.

It is a *Rule* generally approved, that any Teſtmony, the farther off it is removed from the ori-

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ginal truth, the less force it has: and in *traditional* truths, each remove weakens the force of the *Proof*. There is a *Rule* quite contrary to this, advanced by some men, who look on *Opinions* to gain force by growing *older*. Upon this ground, Propositions evidently false or doubtful in their first beginning, come by an inverted *Rule* of *Probability*, to pass for *authentick* Truths; and those which deserved little Credit from the mouths of their first Relators, are thought to grow *venerable* by Age, and are urged as undeniable.

But certain it is, that no *Probability can rise above its first Original*. What has no other evidence than the single Testimony of *one Witness*, must stand or fall by his *only* Testimony, tho' afterwards cited by Hundreds of others; and is so far from receiving any strength thereby, that it becomes the weaker. Because Passion, Interest, Inadvertency, Mistake of his Meaning, and a thousand odd Reasons, which capricious mens minds are acted by, may make one man quote another's words or meaning wrong. This is certain, that what in one age was affirmed upon slight grounds, can never after come to be more valid in future ages by being often repeated.

The Second sort of Probability, is concerning things not falling under the reach of our senses, and therefore not capable of Testimony: and such are,

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First, The Existence, Nature, and Operations of *finite*, *immaterial* Beings, without us, as *Spirits*, *Angels*, &c. or the Existence of *material* Beings, such as for their smallness or remoteness, our *Senses* cannot take notice of: as whether there be any *Plants*, *Animals*, &c. in the *Planets*, and other mansions of the vast Universe.

Secondly, Concerning the manner of Operation in most parts of the works of *Nature*; wherein, tho' we see the sensible *Effects*, yet their Causes are unknown, and we perceive not the ways, and manner how they are produced. We see *Animals* are generated, nourished, and move; the *Loadstone* draws *Iron*, &c. but the Causes that operate, and the manner they are produced in, we can only guess, and probably conjecture. In these matters *Analogy* is the only help we have; and it is from that alone we draw all our grounds of *Probability*. Thus observing, that the bare rubbing of two Bodies violently upon one another, produces *Heat* and very often *Fire*; we have reason to think that what we call *Heat* and *Fire*, consists, in a certain violent agitation of the imperceptible minute parts of the burning Matter. This sort of *Probability*, which is the best conduct of rational Experiments, and the rise of *Hypotheses*, has also its use and influence. And a wary reasoning from *Analogy* leads us often into the discovery of *Truths*, and useful *Deductions*, which would otherwise lie concealed.

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Tho' the common experience, and the ordinary course of things, have a mighty influence on the minds of men, to make them give or refuse credit, to any thing proposed to their belief; yet there is one case wherein the strangeness of the fact lessens not the *Assent* to a fair Testimony given of it. For where such supernatural *Events* are suitable to ends aimed at by him, who has the power to change the course of Nature; there under such circumstances they may be the fitter to procure belief, by how much the more they are beyond, or contrary to ordinary observation. This is the proper case of *miracles*, which well attested, do not only find credit themselves, but give it also to other *truths*.

There are Propositions that challenge the highest degree of our *Assent* upon bare Testimony, whether the thing proposed agree or disagree with common Experience, and the ordinary course of things or no: the reason whereof is, because the Testimony is of such *an one*, as cannot deceive nor be deceived; and that is *God* himself. This carries with it Certainty beyond Doubt, Evidence beyond Exception. This is called by a peculiar name, *Revelation*, and our *assent* to it, *Faith*; which has as much Certainty in it, as our Knowledge it self; and we may as well doubt of our own *Being*, as we can, whether any *Revelation* from *God* be *true*. So that *Faith* is a settled and sure

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Principle of *Aſſent* and *Aſſurance*, and leaves no Manner of Room for Doubt or Heſitation; only we muſt be ſure, that it be a divine *Revelation*, and that we underſtand it right; elſe we ſhall expoſe our ſelves to all the extravagancy of *Enthuſiaſm*, and all the error of wrong Principles if we have *Faith* and *Aſſurance*, in what is not *divine Revelation*.

CHAP. XVII.

Of Reaſon.

THE word *Reaſon* in *Engliſh*, has different Significations. Sometimes it is taken for *true* and *clear Principles*: ſometimes for *clear* and *fair Deductions* from thoſe Principles: ſometimes for the *Cauſe*, and particularly for the *final Cauſe*; but the Conſideration I ſhall have of it here, is, as it ſtands for a *Faculty*, whereby *Man* is ſuppoſed to be diſtinguiſhed from *Beaſts*; and wherein it is evident, he much ſurpaſſes them.

Reaſon is neceſſary, both for the enlargement of our Knowledge, and regulating our Aſſent: for it hath to do both in Knowledge and Opinion, and is neceſſary and aſſiſting to all our other intellectual Faculties; and indeed, contains *two* of them, *viz. Firſt, Sagacity*, whereby it finds intermediate *ideas*. *Secondly, Illation*, whereby it ſo orders and diſpoſes of them, as to diſcover what connexion there

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is in each link of the Chain, whereby the extreams are held together, and thereby, as it were, to draw into view the Truth ſought for; which is that we call *Illation* or *Inference:* and conſiſts in nothing, but the Perception of the Connection there is between the *ideas*, in each ſtep of the Deduction, whereby the mind comes to ſee, either the certain agreement or diſagreement of any two *ideas*, as in *Demonſtration*, in which it arrives at Knowledge: or their probable Connexion, on which it gives or with-holds its *Aſſent*, as in *Opinion*.

Senſe and *Intuition* reach but a little way: the greateſt part of our Knowledge depends upon Deductions and intermediate *ideas*. In thoſe caſes where we muſt take Propoſitions for true, without being certain of their being ſo, we have need to find out, examine, and compare the grounds of their *Probability:* in both caſes, the faculty which finds out the means, and rightly applies them to diſcover Certainty in the one, and Probability in the other, is that which we call *Reaſon*. So that in Reaſon we may conſider theſe *four* Degrees; 1*ſt*, The diſcovering and finding out of Proofs. 2*dly*, The regular and methodical Diſpoſition of them, and laying them in ſuch order, as their Connexion may be plainly perceived. *Thirdly*, The perceiving their Connexion. 4*thly*, The making a right Concluſion.

There is one thing more which I ſhall deſire to be

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conſidered concerning *Reaſon*, and that is, whether *Syllogiſm*, as is generally thought, be the proper inſtrument of it; and the uſefulleſt way of exerciſing this faculty. The Cauſes I have to doubt of it, are theſe.

Firſt, Becauſe *Syllogiſm* ſerves our *Reaſon* but in one only of the fore-mentioned parts of it, and that is to ſhew the Connexion of the Proofs of any one Inſtance, and no more: but in this it is of no great uſe, ſince the mind can perceive ſuch Connexion, where it really is, as eaſily, nay, perhaps better without it. We may obſerve that there are many men that reaſon exceeding clear and rightly, who know not how to make a *Syllogiſm*: and I believe ſcarce any one makes *Syllogiſms* in reaſoning within himſelf. Indeed, ſometimes they may ſerve to diſcover a fallacy, hid in a *rhetorical* Flouriſh; or by ſtripping an abſurdity of the cover of Wit and good Language, ſhew it in its naked Deformity. But the Weakneſs or Fallacy of ſuch a looſe Diſcourſe it ſhews, by the artificial form it is put into, only to thoſe who have throughly ſtudied *Mode* and *Figure*, and have ſo examined the many ways, that three Propoſitions may be put together, as to know which of them does certainly conclude right, and which not, and upon what grounds it is that they do ſo. But they who have not ſo far look'd into thoſe forms, are not ſure by virtue of *Syllogiſm* that the Concluſion cer-

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tainly follows from the Premiſſes. The mind is not taught to reaſon by theſe *Rules*; it has a native faculty to perceive the Coherence or Incoherence of its *ideas*, and can range them right, without any ſuch perplexing *Repetitions*.

And to ſhew the weakneſs of an argument, there needs no more but to ſtrip it of the ſuperfluous *ideas*, which blended and confounded with thoſe on which the Inference depends, ſeem to ſhew a Connexion where there is none, or at leaſt do hinder the Diſcovery of the want of it; and then to lay the naked *ideas* on which the force of the Argumentation depends in their due order; in which poſition the mind taking a view of them, ſees what Connexion they have, and ſo is able to judge of the Inference without any need of Syllogiſm at all.

Secondly, Becauſe Syllogiſms are not leſs liable to Fallacies than the plainer ways of Argumentation: and for this I appeal to common Obſervation, which has always found theſe artificial methods of Reaſoning more adapted to catch and entangle the mind, than to inſtruct and inform the Underſtanding. And if it be certain that Fallacy can be couch'd in Syllogiſms, as it cannot be denied, it muſt be ſomething elſe, and not Syllogiſm, that muſt diſcover them. But if men ſkill'd in, and us'd to Syllogiſms, find them aſſiſting to their Reaſon in the Diſcovery of Truth, I think they

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ought to make uſe of them. All that I aim at is, that they ſhould not aſcribe more to theſe Forms than belongs to them; and think that men have no uſe, or not ſo full a uſe of their reaſoning faculty without them.

But however it be in Knowledge, I think it is of far leſs, or no uſe at all in *Probabilities:* for the *Aſſent* there being to be determined by the Preponderancy, after a due weighing of all the Proofs on both ſides, nothing is ſo unfit to aſſiſt the mind in that, as *Syllogiſm*; which running away with one aſſumed *Probability*, purſues that till it has led the mind quite out of ſight of the thing under conſideration.

But let it help us (as perhaps may be ſaid) *in convincing men of their errors or miſtakes*; yet ſtill it fails our reaſon in that part, which if not its higheſt perfection, is yet certainly its hardeſt taſk; and that which we moſt need its help in, and that is, *The finding out of Proofs, and making new Diſcoveries.* This way of Reaſoning diſcovers no new Proofs, but is the art of marſhalling and ranging the old ones we have already. A man knows firſt, and then he is able to prove *ſyllogiſtically*; ſo that *Syllogiſm* comes after Knowledge; and then a man has little or no need of it. But it is chiefly by the finding out thoſe *ideas* that ſhew the Connexion of diſtant ones, that our ſtock of Knowledge is encreaſed; and that uſeful arts and ſciences are advanced.

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Reason, tho' of a very large extent, fails us in several Instances: as, 1*st*, Where our *ideas* fail. 2*dly*, It is often at a loss, because of the Obscurity, Confusion, or Imperfection of the *ideas* it is employed about. Thus having no perfect *idea* of the least Extension of *matter*, nor of *Infinity*, we are at a loss about the divisibility of *Matter*. 3*dly*, Our *Reason* is often at a stand, because it perceives not those *ideas* which would serve to shew the certain or probable agreement or disagreement of any two other *ideas*. 4*thly*, Our *Reason* is often engaged in absurdities and difficulties, by proceeding upon false Principles, which being followed, lead men into Contradictions to themselves, and Inconsistency in their own Thoughts. 5*thly*, Dubious words, and uncertain signs often puzzle mens *Reason*, and bring them to a Non-plus.

Tho' the deducing one Proposition from another be a great part of Reason, and that which it is usually employed about: yet the principal act of Ratiocination is the finding the agreement or disagreement of two *ideas* one with another, by the intervention of a third. As a man, by a yard, finds two houses to be of the same length, which could not be brought together to measure their Equality by *juxta-position*. Words have their consequences as the signs of such *ideas*: and things agree, or disagree, as really they are; but we observe it only by our *ideas*.

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In Reaſoning men ordinarily uſe *four* ſorts of *Arguments*.

The *Firſt*, is to alledge the Opinions of men, whoſe parts, learning, eminency, power, or ſome other cauſe, has gained a name, and ſettled their Reputation in the common eſteem with ſome kind of Authority. This may be called *Argumentum ad Verecundiam*.

Secondly, Another way is, to require the Adverſary to admit what they alledge as a Proof, or to aſſign a better. This I call *Argumentum ad Ignorantiam*.

A *Third* way, is to preſs a man with conſequences drawn from his own Principles or Conceſſions. This is already known under the name of *Argumentum ad hominem*.

Fourthly, The uſing of Proofs drawn from any of the foundations of Knowledge or Probability. This I call *Argumentum ad Judicium*. This alone of all the four, brings true Inſtruction with it, and advances us in our way to Knowledge. For *1ſt*, It argues not another man's Opinion to be right, becauſe I, out of reſpect, or any other conſideration but that of Conviction, will not contradict him. *2dly*, It proves not another man to be in the right way, nor that I ought to take the ſame with him, becauſe I know not a better. *3dly*, Nor does it follow, that another man is in the right way, becauſe he has ſhewn me that I am in the wrong.

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This may diſpoſe me perhaps for the Reception of truth, but helps me not to it; that muſt come from *Proofs* and *Arguments*, and Light ariſing from the Nature of Things themſelves; not from my Shame-facedneſs, Ignorance, or Error.

By what has been ſaid of *Reaſon*, we may be able to make ſome gueſs at the diſtinction of things, into thoſe that are according to, above, and contrary to *Reaſon*. *According to Reaſon*, are ſuch Propoſitions, whoſe truth we can diſcover, by examining and tracing thoſe *ideas* we have from *Senſation* and *Reflection*, and by natural deduction find to be true or probable. *Above Reaſon*, are ſuch Propoſitions, whoſe *Truth* or *Probability* we cannot by *Reaſon* derive from thoſe Principles. *Contrary to Reaſon*, are ſuch Propoſitions as are inconſiſtent with, or irreconcileable to, our clear and diſtinct *ideas*. Thus the *Exiſtence of one God*, is according to *Reaſon*: the *Exiſtence of more than one God*, contrary to *Reaſon*; the *Reſurrection of the Body* after death, above *Reaſon*. *Above Reaſon*, may be alſo taken in a double ſenſe, *viz. Above Probability*, or, *above Certainty*. In that large ſenſe alſo, *Contrary to Reaſon*, is, I ſuppoſe, ſometimes taken.

There is another uſe of the word *Reaſon*, wherein it is oppoſed to *Faith*; which, though authorized by common uſe, yet is it in it ſelf a very improper way of ſpeaking: for *Faith* is nothing but

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a firm *Assent* of the mind; which if it be regulated as is our duty, cannot be afforded to any thing but upon good *Reason*, and so cannot be opposite to it. He that believes without having any Reason for Believing, may be in love with his own fancies; but neither seeks *Truth* as he ought, nor pays the Obedience due to his Maker, who would have him use those discerning faculties he has given him, to keep him out of Mistake and Error. But since *Reason* and *Faith* are by some men opposed, we will so consider them in the following *Chapter*.

CHAP. XVIII.

Of Faith and Reason, and their distinct Provinces.

REASON, as contra-distinguished to *Faith*, I take to be the discovery of the *Certainty* or *Probability* of such Propositions or Truths which the mind arrives at by deductions made from such *ideas*, which it has got by the use of its natural faculties, *viz.* by *Sensation* or *Reflection*.

Faith on the other side, is the assent to any proposition, upon the credit of the proposer, as coming immediately from *God*; which we call *Revelation:* concerning which we must observe,

First, That *no man inspired by God, can by any Revelation communicate to others, any new* simple ideas, which they had not before from *Sensation* or

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Reflection: becauſe words, by their immediate operation on us, cannot cauſe other *ideas*, but of their natural ſounds, and as *ſigns* of latent *ideas* they can only recal to our Thoughts thoſe *ideas*, which to us they have been wont to be ſigns of; but cannot introduce any new, and formerly unknown *ſimple ideas*. The ſame holds in all other *ſigns*, which cannot ſignifie to us things, of which we have never before had any *idea* at all. For our *ſimple ideas* we muſt depend wholly on our natural faculties, and can by no means receive them from *traditional Revelation*; I ſay *traditional*, in diſtinction to *original Revelation*. By the *one*, I mean that impreſſion which is made immediately by *God* on the mind of any man, to which we cannot ſet any bounds. And by the *other*, thoſe impreſſions delivered over to others in words, and the ordinary ways of conveying our Conceptions one to another.

Secondly, I ſay, that *the ſame Truths may be diſcovered by Revelation, which are diſcoverable to us by Reaſon*; but in ſuch there is little need or uſe of *Revelation*; *God* having furniſhed us with natural means to arrive at the Knowledge of them: and Truths diſcovered by our natural faculties, are more certain, than when conveyed to us by *traditional Revelation*. For the Knowledge we have, that this *Revelation* came at firſt from *God*, can never be ſo ſure as the Knowledge we have from the

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clear and distinct Perception of the agreement and disagreement of our own *ideas*. This also holds in matters of fact, knowable by our senses: as the *history* of the *Deluge* is conveyed to us by Writings, which had their original from Revelation; and yet no body, I think, will say he has as certain and clear Knowledge of the *Flood*, as *Noah* that saw it, or that he himself would have had, had he then been alive and seen it. For he has no greater Assurance, than that of his *Senses*, that it is writ in the Book, supposed to be writ by *Moses* inspired. But he has not so great an Assurance that *Moses* writ that Book, as if he had seen *Moses* write it; so that the Assurance of its being a *Revelation*, is still less than the Assurance of his *Senses*.

Revelation cannot be admitted against the clear evidence of *Reason*. For since no evidence of our faculties, by which we receive such a *Revelation*, can exceed, if equal, the Certainty of our *intuitive* Knowledge; we can never receive for a Truth any thing that is directly contrary to our clear and distinct Knowledge. Thus the *ideas* of *one body* and *one place* do so clearly agree, that we can never assent to a Proposition that affirms *the same body to be in two distinct places at once*; however, it should pretend to the authority of a *divine Revelation*: since the evidence, *First*, That we deceive not ourselves in ascribing it to *God*: *Secondly*, That we

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underſtand it right, can never be ſo great as the evidence of our own *intuitive* Knowledge, whereby we diſcern it impoſſible for *the ſame body to be in two places at once.*

In Propoſitions therefore, contrary to our diſtinct and clear *ideas*, it will be in vain to urge them as matters of *Faith*. For *Faith* can never convince us of any thing that contradicts our Knowledge. Becauſe, though Faith be founded upon the Teſtimony of *God*, who cannot lie, yet we cannot have an Aſſurance of the Truth of its being a *divine Revelation*, greater than our own Knowledge. For if the mind of man can never have a clearer evidence of any thing to be a *divine Revelation*, than it has of the principles of its own Reaſon; it can never have a ground to quit the clear evidence of its Reaſon, to give place to a Propoſition, whoſe *Revelation* has not a greater evidence than thoſe principles have.

In all things therefore where we have clear evidence from our *ideas*, and the principles of Knowledge above-mentioned, *Reaſon* is the proper Judge; and *Revelation* cannot in ſuch caſes invalidate its decrees; nor can we be obliged, where we have the clear and evident ſentence of Reaſon, to quit it for the contrary Opinion, under a pretence that it is *Matter of Faith*, which can have no authority againſt the plain and clear dictates of *Reaſon*. But,

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Thirdly, There being many things of which we have but imperfect notions, or none at all; and other things, of whose past, present, or future Existence, by the natural use of our faculties, we can have no Knowledge at all: these being beyond the *discovery of our faculties, and above Reason*, when revealed, become the *proper Matter of Faith*. Thus, that part of the angels rebelled against *God*; that the bodies of men shall rise and live again, and the like, are purely Matters of *Faith*, with which *Reason* has directly nothing to do.

First then, Whatever Proposition is revealed, of whose truth our mind, by its natural faculties and notions cannot judge, that is purely *Matter of Faith* and *above Reason*.

Secondly, All Propositions, whereof the mind by its natural faculties, can come to determine and judge from natural acquired *ideas*, are *Matter of Reason*; but with this difference; that in those concerning which it has but an uncertain evidence, and so is perswaded of their Truth only upon probable grounds: in such, I say, an *evident Revelation ought to determine our Assent*, even against *Probability*. Because the mind, not being certain of the Truth of that it does not evidently know, is bound to give up its *Assent* to such a Testimony, which it is satisfied comes from one, who cannot err, and will not deceive. But yet it still belongs to *Reason* to judge of the Truth of its being a *Re-*

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velation, and of the Signification of the Words wherein it is delivered.

Thus far the dominion of *Faith* reaches; and that without any violence to *Reaſon*, which is not injured or diſturbed, but aſſiſted and improved by new diſcoveries of Truth, coming from the *eternal Fountain* of all Knowledge. Whatever *God* hath revealed is certainly true; no doubt can be made of it. This is the proper Object of *Faith*: but whether it be a divine *Revelation* or no, *Reaſon* muſt judge; which can never permit the mind to reject a greater Evidence, to embrace what is leſs evident, nor preſer leſs Certainty to the greater. There can be no Evidence, that any traditional *Revelation* is of divine original, in the words we receive it, and the ſenſe we underſtand it, ſo clear and ſo certain, as that of the Principles of *Reaſon*: and therefore, *Nothing that is contrary to the clear and ſelf-evident dictates of* Reaſon, *has a right to be urged or aſſented to, as a matter of Faith, wherein* Reaſon *has nothing to do.* Whatſoever is divine *Revelation*, ought to over-rule all our Opinions, Prejudices, and Intereſts, and hath a right to be received with a full *Aſſent*. Such a ſubmiſſion as this, of our Reaſon to Faith, takes not away the Land-marks of Knowledge: this ſhakes not the foundations of Reaſon, but leaves us that uſe of our faculties, for which they were given us.

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CHAP. XIX.

Of Enthuſiaſm.

HE that would ſeriouſly ſet upon the ſearch of Truth, ought in the firſt place to prepare his mind with a Love of it. For he that loves it not, will not take much pains to get it, nor be much concern'd when he miſſes it. There is no body who does not profeſs himſelf a lover of truth, and that would not take it amiſs to be thought otherwiſe of. And yet for all this, one may truly ſay, there are very few lovers of truth for Truth's ſake, even amongſt thoſe who perſuade themſelves that they are ſo. How a man may know whether he be ſo in earneſt, is worth Enquiry: and I think there is this one unerring mark of it, *viz.* The not entertaining any Propoſition with greater aſſurance than the proofs it is built upon will warrant. Whoever goes beyond this meaſure of Aſſent, 'tis plain receives not Truth in the Love of it. For the evidence that any Propoſition is true (except ſuch as are ſelf-evident) lying only in the proofs a man has of it, whatever degrees of Aſſent he affords it beyond the degrees of that Evidence, 'tis plain all that ſurpluſage of Aſſurance is owing to ſome other affection, and not to the love of

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Truth. Whatsoever credit we give to any Proposition more than it receives from the principles and proofs it supports it self upon, is owing to our inclinations that way, and is so far a derogation from the Love of Truth as such; which as it can receive no evidence from our Passions or Interests, so it should receive no tincture from them.

The assuming an Authority of dictating to others, and a Forwardness to prescribe to their opinions, is a constant concomitant of this bias and corruption of our Judgments. For how can it be otherwise, but that he should be ready to impose on others Belief, who has already impos'd on his own?

Upon this occasion I shall consider a third ground of Assent, which with some men has the same Authority as either Faith or Reason, I mean *Enthusiasm*; which laying by Reason, would set up Revelation without it. Whereby in effect it takes away both Reason and Revelation, and substitutes in the room of it, the ungrounded fancies of a man's own brain, and assumes them for a foundation both of Opinion and Conduct.

Immediate Revelation being a much easier way for men to establish their Opinions, and regulate their Conduct, than the tedious labour of strict Reasoning, it is no wonder that some have been very apt to pretend to it, especially in such of their Actions and Opinions as they cannot ac-

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count for by the ordinary methods of Knowledge, and principles of Reason. Hence we see that in all ages, men, in whom Melancholy has mixed with Devotion, or whose Conceit of themselves has raised them into an Opinion of a greater familiarity with God than is allowed others, have often flatter'd themselves with a persuasion of an immediate Intercourse with the Deity, and frequent Communications from the divine Spirit. Their minds being thus prepared, whatever groundless Opinion comes to settle itself strongly upon their fancies, is an Illumination from the Spirit of God; and whatsoever odd action they find in themselves a strong Inclination to do, that Impulse is concluded to be a Call or Direction from Heaven, and must be obeyed. This I take to be properly *Enthusiasm*, which tho' rising from the Conceit of a warmed or overweening Brain, works, where it once gets footing, more powerfully on the persuasions and actions of men, than either Reason or Revelation, or both together; men being most forwardly obedient to the Impulses they receive from themselves. Strong Conceit, like a new Principle, carries all easily with it, when got above Common Sense, and freed from all restraint of Reason, and check of Reflection, it is heighten'd into a divine Authority, in concurrence with our own Temper and Inclination.

When men are once got into this way of imme-

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diate Revelation, of Illumination without Search, and of Certainty without Proof, 'tis a hard matter to get them out of it. Reaſon is loſt upon them, they are above it: they ſee the *Light* infus'd into their Underſtandings, and cannot be miſtaken; 'tis clear and viſible there, like the light of bright Sun-ſhine, ſhews it ſelf, and needs no other Proof, but its own Evidence: they *feel* the hand of God moving them within, and the Impulſes of the Spirit, and cannot be miſtaken in what they feel.

This is the way of talking of theſe men: they are ſure becauſe they are ſure: and their perſuaſions are *right*, only becauſe they are *ſtrong* in them. For when what they ſay is ſtrip'd of the metaphor of ſeeing and feeling, this is all it amounts to. Theſe men have, they ſay, clear light, and they ſee; they have an awaken'd ſenſe, and they feel: this cannot, they are ſure, be diſputed them. But here let me ask: this *ſeeing* is it the perception of the Truth of the Propoſition, or of this, that it is a Revelation from God? This *feeling* is it a Perception of an Inclination to do ſomething, or of the Spirit of God moving that Inclination? Theſe are two very different Perceptions, and muſt be carefully diſtinguiſh'd. I may perceive the Truth of a Propoſition, and yet not perceive that it is an immediate Revelation from God. Nay, I may perceive I came not by it in a natural way,

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without perceiving that it is a Revelation from God. Becauſe there be *Spirits*, which without being divinely commiſſion'd, may excite thoſe *ideas* in me, and make their Connexion perceiv'd. So that the Knowledge of any Propoſition coming into my mind I know not how, is not a Perception that it is from God. But however it be call'd Light and Seeing; I ſuppoſe it is at moſt but Belief and Aſſurance. For where a Propoſition is known to be true, Revelation is needleſs. If therefore it be a Propoſition which they are perſuaded, but do not know to be true, it is not ſeeing but believing. What I ſee, I know to be ſo by the Evidence of the thing it ſelf: what I believe, I take to be ſo upon the Teſtimony of another: but this Teſtimony I muſt know to be given, or elſe what ground have I of believing? I muſt ſee that it is God that reveals this to me, or elſe I ſee nothing. If I know not this, how great ſoever my Aſſurance is, it is groundleſs: whatever Light I pretend to, it is but *Enthuſiaſm*.

In all that is of divine Revelation, there is need of no other Proof, but that it is from God: for he can neither deceive nor be deceived. But how ſhall it be known that any Propoſition in our minds is a Truth revealed to us by God? Here it is that *Enthuſiaſm* fails of the Evidence it pretends to. For men thus poſſeſs'd boaſt of a Light, whereby they ſay they are brought into the Knowledge of

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this or that Truth. But if they know it to be a Truth, they must know it to be so, either by its own self-evidence or by the rational Proofs that make it out to be so. If they know it to be a Truth either of these two ways, they in vain suppose it to be a Revelation. For thus all Truths of what kind soever, that men uninspired are enlighten'd with come into their minds. If they say they know it to be true, because it is a Revelation from God, the Reason is good: but then it will be demanded, how they know it to be a Revelation from God. If they say by the Light it brings with it, I beseech them to consider, whether this be any more, than that it is a Revelation because they strongly believe it to be true. For all the Light they speak of, is but a strong persuasion of their own minds that it is a Truth, which is a very unsafe ground to proceed on, either in our tenets or actions.

True Light in the mind is nothing else but the *Evidence* of the Truth of any Proposition: and if it be not self-evident, all the Light it can have is from Clearness of those Proofs upon which it is received. To talk of any other Light in the Understanding, is to put ourselves in the dark, or in the power of the Prince of Darkness. For if strength of persuasion be the Light which must guide us, how shall any one distinguish between the Delusions of *Satan*, and the Inspirations of the *Holy*

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Ghoſt? He therefore that will not give up himſelf to Deluſion and Error, muſt bring this guide of his *Light within* to the trial. God when he makes the Prophet, does not unmake the Man. He leaves his faculties in their natural ſtate, to enable him to judge of his Inſpirations, whether they be of divine Original or no. If he would have us aſſent to the Truth of any Propoſition, he either evidences that Truth by the uſual methods of natural Reaſon, or elſe makes it known to be a Truth which he would have us aſſent to by his Authority; and convinces us that it is from him, by ſome marks, which Reaſon cannot be miſtaken in. Reaſon muſt be our laſt Judge and Guide in every thing. I do not mean that we muſt conſult Reaſon, and examine whether a Propoſition reveal'd from God can be made out by natural Principles, and if it cannot, that then we may reject it: but conſult it we muſt, and by it examine, whether it be a Revelation from God or no: and if Reaſon finds it to be revealed from God, Reaſon then declares for it, as much as for any other Truth, and makes it one of her Dictates. Every conceit that throughly warms our fancies muſt paſs for an Inſpiration, if there be nothing but the ſtrength of our perſuaſions whereby to judge of them: if Reaſon muſt not examine their Truth by ſomething extrinſical to the perſuaſions themſelves, Inſpirations and Deluſions, Truth and

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Falſhood, will have the ſame meaſure, and will not be poſſible to be diſtinguiſhed.

Thus we ſee the holy men of God, who had Revelations from God, had ſomething elſe beſides that internal Light of Aſſurance in their own minds, to teſtifie to them, that it was from God. They had outward ſigns to convince them of the Author of thoſe Revelations. And when they were to convince others, they had a power given them to juſtifie the truth of their Commiſſion from Heaven; and by viſible ſigns to aſſert the divine Authority of the meſſage they were ſent with. *Moſes* ſaw the Buſh burn without being conſumed, and heard a voice out of it. God by another miracle of his rod turn'd into a Serpent, aſſured him likewiſe of a power to teſtifie his miſſion by the ſame Miracle repeated before them, to whom he was ſent. This, and the like Inſtances to be found among the Prophets of old, are enough to ſhew, that they thought not an inward ſeeing or perſuaſion of their own minds a ſufficient Evidence without any other proof, that it was from God, tho' the *Scripture* does not every where mention their demanding or having ſuch proofs.

I do not deny that God can, or doth ſometimes enlighten mens minds in the apprehending of certain Truths, or excite them to good actions by the immediate influence and aſſiſtance of the Holy Spirit, without any extraordinary ſigns accompanying it.

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But in ſuch caſes too we have Reaſon and the Scripture, unerring rules to know whether it be from God or no. Where the Truth embraced is conſonant to the Revelation in the written Word of God; or the Action conformable to the Dictates of Right Reaſon, or Holy Writ, we run no riſque in entertaining it as ſuch; becauſe tho' perhaps it be not an immediate Revelation from God, extraordinarily operating on our minds, yet we are ſure it is warranted by that Revelation which he has given us of Truth. Where Reaſon or Scripture is expreſs for any Opinion or Action, we may receive it as of divine Authority: but 'tis not the ſtrength of our own perſuaſions which can by itſelf give it that ſtamp. The bent of our own minds may favour it as much as we pleaſe; that may ſhew it to be a fondling of our own, but will by no means prove it to be an *Offſpring* of Heaven, and of divine Original.

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CHAP. XX.

Of wrong Assent or Error.

ERROR is a Mistake of our Judgment, giving *Assent* to that which is not true. The Reasons whereof may be reduced to these *four*: First, *Want of Proofs*. Secondly, *Want of Ability to use them*. Thirdly, *Want of Will to use them*. Fourthly, *Wrong Measures of Probability*.

First, Want of Proofs; by which I do not mean only the want of those Proofs which are not to be had, but also of those Proofs which are in being, or might be procured. The greatest part of mankind want the conveniencies and opportunities of making Experiments and Observations themselves, or of collecting the Testimonies of others, being enslaved to the necessity of their mean Condition, whose lives are worn out only in the Provisions for living. These men are by the Constitution of human Affairs, unavoidably given over to invincible Ignorance of those Proofs, on which others build, and which are necessary to establish those Opinions. For having much to do to get the means of living, they are not in a Condition

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to look after those of learned and laborious Enquiries.

It is true, that *God* has furnished men with faculties sufficient to direct them in the way they should take, if they will but seriously employ them that way, when their ordinary vocations allow them leisure. No man is so wholly taken up with the attendance on the means of living, as to have no spare time at all to think on his *Soul*, and inform himself in matters of Religion, were men as intent on this, as they are on things of lower concernment. There are none so enslaved to the necessity of life, who might not find many vacancies, that might be husbanded to this advantage of their Knowledge.

Secondly, Want of *Ability* to use them. There be many who cannot carry a Train of Consequences in their heads, nor weigh exactly the preponderancy of contrary Proofs and Testimonies. These cannot discern that side on which the strongest Proofs lie; nor follow that which in it self is the most probable Opinion. It is certain, that there is a wide difference in mens Understandings, Apprehensions and Reasonings, to a very great Latitude, so that one may, without doing Injury to mankind, affirm, that there is a greater distance between some *men* and *others* in this respect, than between some *men* and some *beasts*: but how this comes about is a Speculation, though of

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great Conſequence, yet not neceſſary to our preſent Purpoſe.

Thirdly, For want of *Will* to uſe them. Some, tho' they have opportunities and leiſure enough, and want neither parts nor learning, nor other helps, are yet never the better for them, and never come to the Knowledge of ſeveral Truths that lie within their reach; either upon the account of their hot purſuit of Pleaſure, conſtant drudgery in Buſineſs, Lazineſs and Oſcitancy in general, or a particular averſion for Books and Study: and ſome out of fear that an impartial Inquiry would not favour thoſe Opinions, which beſt ſuit their Prejudices, Lives, Deſigns, Intereſts, *&c.* as many men forbear to caſt up their Accounts, who have reaſon to fear that their Affairs are in no very good Poſture.

How men, whoſe plentiful fortunes allow them leiſure to improve their Underſtandings, can ſatisfie themſelves with a lazy Ignorance, I cannot tell: but methinks they have a low Opinion of their *Souls*, who lay out all their Incomes in Proviſions for the Body, and employ none of it to procure the Means and Helps of Knowledge. I will not here mention how unreaſonable this is for men that ever think of a future State, and their Concernment in it, which no rational man can avoid to do ſometimes: nor ſhall I take notice what a ſhame it is to the greateſt Contemners of Know-

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ledge, to be found ignorant in things they are concerned to know. But this, at leaſt, is worth the Conſideration of thoſe who call themſelves *Gentlemen*; that however they may think Credit, Reſpect, and Authority, the concomitants of their Birth and Fortune; yet they will find all theſe ſtill carried away from them by men of lower Condition, who ſurpaſs them in Knowledge. They who are blind, will always be led by thoſe that ſee, or elſe fall into the Ditch: and he is certainly the moſt ſubjected, the moſt enſlaved, who is ſo in his Underſtanding.

Fourthly, Wrong meaſures of *Probability*; which are,

Firſt, *Propoſitions that are not in themſelves certain and evident, but doubtful and falſe, taken for Principles.* Propoſitions looked on as Principles, have ſo great an Influence upon our Opinions, that is uſually by them we judge of Truth, and what is inconſiſtent with them, is ſo far from paſſing for *probable* with us, that it will not be allowed *poſſible*. The Reverence born to theſe Principles is ſo great, that the Teſtimony, not only of other men, but the Evidence of our own Senſes are often rejected, when they offer to vouch any thing contrary to theſe eſtabliſhed Rules. The great Obſtinacy that is to be found in men, firmly believing quite contrary Opinions, though many times equally abſurd, in the various Religions of man-

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kind, are as evident a proof, as they are an unavoidable consequence of this way of Reasoning from received traditional principles: so that men will disbelieve their own eyes, renounce the Evidence of their Senses, and give their own Experience the Lye, rather than admit of any thing disagreeing with these sacred Tenets.

Secondly, *Received Hypotheses.* The difference between these and the former, is, that those who proceed by these, will admit of matter of fact, and agree with Dissenters in that; but differ in assigning of Reasons, and explaining the manner of Operation. These are not at that open defiance with their *Senses* as the former: they can endure to hearken to their Information a little more patiently; but will by no means admit of their Reports in the Explanation of things; nor be prevailed on by *Probabilities* which would convince them, that things are not brought about just after the same manner that they have decreed within themselves that they are.

Thirdly, *Predominant Passions or Inclinations:* let never so much *Probability* hang on one side of a *covetous* man's Reasoning, and *money* on the other, it is easie to foresee which will prevail. Tho' men cannot always openly gain-say, or resist the force of manifest *Probabilities*, that make against them, yet yield they not to the Argument. Not

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but that it is the Nature of the Understanding, constantly to close with the more probable side: but yet a man hath power to suspend and restrain its Enquiries, and not permit a full and satisfactory Examination. Until that be done, there will be always these *two ways* left of evading the most apparent *Probabilities*.

First, That the Arguments being brought in *Words*, there may be *Fallacy* latent in them; and the consequences being perhaps many in train, may be some of them incoherent. There are few discourses so short and clear, to which men may not, with satisfaction enough to themselves raise this doubt, and from whose Conviction they may not without reproach of Disingenuity or Unreasonableness set themselves free.

Secondly, Manifest *Probabilities* may be evaded upon this Suggestion, that *I know not yet all that may be said on the contrary side:* and therefore, tho' a man be beaten, it is not necessary he should yield, not knowing what Forces there are in reserve behind.

Fourthly, *Authority*, or the *giving up our Assent to the common receiv'd Opinions*, either of our Friends or Party, Neighbourhood or Country. How many men have no other ground for their Tenets, than the supposed Honesty or Learning, or Number of those of the same Profession? as if

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honeſt or bookiſh men could not err; or Truth were to be eſtabliſhed by the Vote of the Multitude. Yet this with moſt men ſerves the Turn. All men are liable to Error, and moſt men are in many points by *Paſſion* or *Intereſt* under temptation to it. This is certain, that there is not an Opinion ſo abſurd, which a man may not receive upon this Ground. There is no Error to be named, which has not had its Profeſſors. And a man ſhall never want crooked Paths to walk in, if he thinks that he is in the right Way, where-ever he has the Footſteps of others to follow. But, notwithſtanding the great Noiſe is made in the World about Errors and Opinions, I muſt do Mankind that Right as to ſay, there are not *ſo many men in Errors and wrong Opinions as is commonly ſuppoſed*: not that I think they embrace the Truth, but indeed, becauſe, concerning thoſe Doctrines they keep ſuch a Stir about, they have *no Thought, no Opinion at all*. For if any one ſhould a little catechiſe the greateſt part of the *Partiſans* of moſt of the Sects in the World, he would not find concerning thoſe Matters, they are ſo zealous for, that they have any Opinions of their own: much leſs would he have Reaſon to think, that they took them upon the Examination of Arguments, and Appearance of Probability. They are reſolved to ſtick to a Party, that Education or Intereſt

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has engaged them in; and there, like the common Soldiers of an Army, ſhew their Courage and Warmth, as their Leaders direct, without ever examining, or ſo much as knowing the Cauſe they contend for.

CHAP. XXI.

Of the Diviſion of the Sciences.

ALL that can fall within the compaſs of Human Underſtanding, being either, 1*ſt*, The Nature of Things, their Relations, and their Manner of Operation: Or, 2*dly*, That which *Man* himſelf ought to do as a rational and voluntary Agent, for the attainment of any End, eſpecially *Happineſs*: Or, 3*dly*, The Ways and Means whereby the Knowledge of both of theſe are attained and communicated. I think *Science* may be properly divided into theſe *three Sorts*.

Firſt, The Knowledge of Things, their Conſtitutions, Properties, and Operations, whether material or immaterial; this, in a little more enlarged ſenſe of the Word, I call Φυσικὴ, or *Natural Philoſophy*. The End of this is bare *ſpeculative Truth*, and whatſoever can afford the mind of man any ſuch, falls under this Branch: whether it be God

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himself. *Angels*, *Spirits*, *Bodies*, or any of their Affections, as *Number*, *Figure*, &c.

Secondly, Πραϰτιϰὴ, the Skill of right-applying our own Powers and Actions for the attainment of things good and useful. The most considerable under this head, is *Ethicks*, which is the seeking out those Rules and Measures of humane Actions, which lead to *Happiness*, and the Means to practise them. The End of this is not bare *Speculation*; but *Right*, and a Conduct suitable thereto.

Thirdly, Σημειωτιϰὴ, or the *Doctrine of Signs*: the most usual being *Words*, it is aptly enough term'd *Logick*: the business whereof is to consider the Nature of *Signs*, which the mind makes use of for the understanding of things, or conveying its Knowledge to others. Things are represented to the mind by *ideas*: and mens *ideas* are communicated to one another, by *articulate Sounds*, or *Words*. The Consideration then of *ideas* and words, as the great Instruments of Knowledge, makes no despicable part of their Contemplation, who would take a view of human Knowledge in the whole Extent of it.

This seems to me the *first and most general, as well as natural Division* of the Objects of our Understanding. For a man can employ his thoughts about nothing, but either the Contemplation of *Things* themselves for the Discovery of Truth,

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or about the *Things* in his own power, which are his *Actions*, for the attainment of his own Ends; or the *Signs* the mind makes use of, both in the one and the other, and the right ordering of them, for its clearer Information. All which *Three, viz. Things*, as they are in themselves Knowable: *Actions*, as they depend on us in order to Happiness, and the right use of *Signs*, in order to Knowledge, being *Toto Coelo* different, they seemed to me to be the three great Provinces of the *intellectual* World wholly separate, and distinct one from another.

THE END.

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
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